GEOGRAPHIES OF BELONGING

The Transnational and Local Involvement of Economically Successful Migrants

Marianne van Bochove

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Economically Successful Migrants

Meervoudig thuis

De transnationale en lokale betrokkenheid van
economisch succesvolle migranten

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When I started my study in Sociology at the Erasmus University Rotterdam ten years ago, I never thought I would become a PhD student one day. Investigating minority and migration issues fascinated me, but I did not think it was possible to do that for a living. When I was offered the opportunity to write this dissertation, some people told me it would be better to discover the 'real' world instead of staying safely within the university walls. I proved myself and others wrong. It is possible to make a profession of one's personal interests, and although in the past year I have indeed mainly been surrounded by the walls of my office, throughout the project, I have learned much about important things happening outside.

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Contents

List of Figures and Tables

1. Transnational Involvement and the Super-Diverse City

If scholars of migration had to pick one word to describe the nature of contemporary migration flows and immigrant populations, many of them would probably choose terms like "diversified," "differentiated," or "fragmented" (e.g. Alba and Nee 2003: 213; Castles and Miller 2003: 8; Engbersen et al. 2007: 399). It is often said that diversity itself is diversifying, creating a situation of "super-diversity" (Vertovec 2007) in most countries of immigration and particularly in their urban areas (cf. Amin 2008: 6). Migrants do not only differ with regard to their ethnic background or country of origin, but also in terms of their labor market position, legal status, immigrant generation, religion, age, and spatial distribution. An important variable that adds to this super-diversity, and in which I am particularly interested in this study, is migrants' transnational involvement, defined as the total of individuals' transnational activities and identifications (cf. Snel et al. 2006: 288). In the rapidly expanding field of transnational migration studies, it has been demonstrated that much variety exists in the nature of the transnational ties of different migrant groups, depending on individual factors as well as characteristics of the sending and receiving countries (cf. Morawska 2009: 175). The cross-border practices of, say, highly skilled second-generation Chinese in the US differ from those of retired Turkish former guest workers in the Netherlands.

Despite the variety of meanings of 'transnationalism' for different migrant groups and in different contexts, so far, scholars of transnational migration seem to agree that the concept helps us understand migrants' simultaneous incorporation into their host and home societies. However, because it is used indiscriminately for a wide range of border-crossing ties, transnationalism has become a vague concept (cf. Vertovec 2001: 576). As the political scientist Sartori (1970: 1035) argues, although we ultimately need universally applicable concepts, we should bear in mind that we can cover more only by saying less. There will always be a tension between range of explanation and accuracy of description, but, Sartori argues, by developing conceptual tools on a medium level of abstraction, and by moving upwards and downwards along the "ladder of abstraction," macro-theory and empirical testing can be brought together (1970: 1053).

Following this line of reasoning, in this study I will argue that in a situation of super-diversity, the all-encompassing concept of transnationalism needs specifica-

tion. Without abandoning the term altogether, I will suggest that in order to understand the cross-border activities and identifications of different migrant groups, concepts with a lower abstraction level are needed. This research studies two socioeconomically successful migrant groups in the city of Rotterdam, the Netherlands. The first group consists of immigrants who have settled in the Netherlands a long time ago or who belong to the second generation and have attained middle-class status; the second group is formed by highly skilled migrants or knowledge workers who came to the Netherlands more recently to work there on a temporary basis. In general terms, I investigate the ways in which these migrants combine their incorporation into the city and country of residence with different kinds of transnational ties. Although this research thus obviously builds on previous studies on the relationship between 'assimilation' or 'integration' and transnationalism (cf. Snel et al. 2006; Marger 2006; Waldinger 2008; Morawska 2009), it goes beyond them in various ways.

In the next section, I discuss how migrants' transnational ties are usually studied and explain my alternative approach. There, I will also clarify what makes the two investigated groups of migrants interesting cases for an in-depth understanding of transnational involvement. Next, I explain why cities can be seen as strategic sites for studying migrants' transnational activities and identifications. At the end of this chapter, I will formulate the research questions which structure the empirical part of this book.

Transnational involvement: addressing the questions what, who, and where

It is "an overworked term and its ubiquity inevitably leads to confusion," Linda Bosniak (2006: 1) states in her book *The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership*. Although referring to the concept of citizenship, her words could have just as easily been about the term transnationalism. Just like citizenship, or transnationalism's big brother globalization, transnationalism is on its way to becoming "an overripe buzz word that has lost its analytical potency" (Carling 2007: 13). However, rather than completely renouncing such "catch-all" terms (cf. Dicken 2007: 7), it can be fruitful to disentangle them, as Bosniak did in the case of citizenship. Following Bauböck's (2010: 310) recommendation, I will not attempt to "purge

the literature on transnationalism of its core concept," but aim to further contextualize and specify it.

I already roughly defined *transnational involvement* as the total of individuals' transnational activities and identifications (cf. Snel et al. 2006: 288). I prefer the term transnational involvement to transnationalism, because 'involvement' presumes activity, whereas the suffix 'ism' is often associated with a doctrine or ideology (cf. Bauböck 2010: 309; Lubinda 2010: 121; Freeden 1998: 751). However, since transnationalism is more commonly employed, in discussing the literature I will use the terms interchangeably. The concept 'identification' is generally preferred to 'identity' to stress the fact that it concerns a process rather than a static entity (cf. Nederveen Pieterse 2007: 32; WRR 2007: 33). Following Bosniak's approach, in this section I further specify the concept of transnational involvement by addressing three questions regarding its *substance* (what is it?), its *subjects* (who performs it?), and its domains or *spheres* (where does it take place?).[1]

In discussing the substance of transnational involvement, I pay special attention to the different meanings the prefix 'trans' is given in existing studies. In answering the question who performs transnational activities and identifications, I discuss factors which are known to influence individuals' degree of transnational involvement. In doing so, I focus particularly on characteristics relevant for the middle-class immigrants and knowledge workers studied in this research. The subsection on where transnational involvement takes place does not so much concern the geographical location of activities and identifications, but rather the social spheres in which they take place, such as the political or economic sphere. Although in answering these three questions many important aspects of transnational migration studies will be discussed, this section is not meant as an attempt to give a comprehensive overview of the research field.[2] Instead, I focus on issues which are central to my own study of transnational involvement. In each of the three subsections, I will outline my approach to the questions *what*, *who*, and *where*.

[1] See Portes et al. (1999) for a similar approach.

[2] See for such an overview, for instance, Levitt and Jaworsky (2007).

The substance of transnationalism

Ever since the term transnationalism made its first appearance in migration studies in the early 1990s (cf. Kivisto 2001: 551), there has been debate about what it means when we say that people are part of 'transnational communities', undertake 'transnational practices', or lead 'transnational lives'. Whereas in economics the term transnational has a clear-cut definition which is shared by economists around the world,[3] in sociology throughout the years many – sometimes complementary, other times competing – definitions have been developed (cf. Vertovec 1999; Carling 2007). What studies on migrant transnationalism have in common is that they generally refer to people as being transnationally active not when they are active in countries other than their home country – which is central to the economic definition – but exactly when their activities are linked to the country from which they originate. This has to do with the fact that in transnational migration studies, the focus is not primarily on cross-border activities of the 'parent enterprise' (people in the home country), but on the homeland ties of the 'foreign affiliates' (emigrants). Less agreement, however, exists on what intensity or frequency homeland ties should have before they can be called transnational (cf. Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Portes et al. 1999; Itzigsohn et al. 1999). According to Fox (2005: 172), since no clear definition exists, transnationalism is often used as a "you know it when you see it" term. Related to such definitional issues, the field of transnational migration studies has drawn much criticism. Here, I will focus on two critiques which are important for the approach I develop in this study: (1) We do not need the term transnationalism for understanding migrants' homeland links, since the existing terminology is sufficient; (2) The term transnationalism is incorrect, since it is used for links that could be better described as 'international', 'bi-national', or 'bi-local'.

First, the introduction of the term transnationalism suggests that existing theoretical notions are no longer adequate for understanding migrants' position in their country of settlement (Kivisto 2001: 552). The term, according to Basch et al. (1994), denotes that migrants' lives increasingly have become unbound: although living in one country, migrants maintain several links with another. However, several schol-

[3] In economics, a corporation is referred to as transnational when it "controls assets of other entities in economies other than its home economy, usually by owning […] an equity capital stake of 10% or more of the ordinary shares or voting power"(http://www.grips.ac.jp/csids/perspectives/perspective03.pdf, see also Cherunilam 2007: 380).

ars have argued that the cross-border activities and identifications which are now referred to as transnational are nothing new (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007: 133). Kivisto (2001: 554), for instance, finds the examples Basch et al. give to underline the importance of a transnational perspective not very convincing. According to him, the authors show a lack of historical consciousness when suggesting that cross-border activities or feelings of belonging such as sending remittances and a desire to return to the homeland are new phenomena. Such cross-border ties already existed among migrants centuries ago and therefore form no sufficient ground for a new terminology (cf. Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004: 1187; Vertovec 2001: 576). Kivisto (2001: 572) claims that, from a historical perspective, transnationalism is basically a stage in the process of assimilation; just like participation in local ethnic communities, participation in transnational communities often facilitates migrants' acculturation in the host society.

However, various scholars argue that even if transnationalism is not a new phenomenon as such, there is no doubt that in recent years it has become much more important (cf. Tarrow 2005: 49; Nederveen Pieterse 2007: 185; Skrbis 2008: 232). Developments in transportation and communication technologies have made it easier for migrants to keep in "regular and sustained" contact with their country of origin (Portes et al. 1999: 219, cf. Morawska 2009: 12). More concretely, relatively affordable airline tickets have made frequent back-and-forth traveling available to more migrants, and internet services such as Skype have made it possible to keep face-to-face contact with relatives and friends abroad without requiring physical movement. In stressing this aspect of what can be called "time-space compression" (Harvey 1989) or "time-space distanciation" (Giddens 1994), the concept of transnationalism is similar to – or, in the words of Kivisto (2001: 566), appears a virtual synonym of – globalization. So, again, the question arises whether we need the term transnationalism to understand what is happening. For some, an answer to this question is that, although the terms are indeed closely related, compared to globalization theory, the transnational perspective pays more attention to the role of the nation-state. According to authors such as Faist (2000: 210) and M.P. Smith (2001: 3), globalization implies the deterritorialization or denationalization of economic, political, and cultural affairs, whereas transnational studies investigate how cross-border activities are anchored in one or more nation-states. However, beside the fact that many students of globalization do recognize the importance of territory and national borders (cf. Held

2004; Dicken 2007), one can wonder why transnational migration studies do not show more interest in migrants' activities and identifications which are really *trans*-national, in the sense that they transcend the borders of the sending and receiving nation-state.

This brings me to the second point of criticism that transnational migration studies have met with, concerning the usage of the prefix 'trans'. Morawska (2009: 152-3) distinguishes between two different interpretations of this prefix. On the one hand, there is a "vertical" interpretation, which focuses on links *beyond* the national level, and on the other hand, there is a "horizontal" interpretation, which refers to ties *across* two nation-states. The vertical interpretation is dominant in political science literature, for instance in studies on transnational environmental or human rights movements (e.g. Khagram et al. 2002; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005), and can also be found in studies on the "pan-ethnic" and "pan-religious" identifications of specific diasporic groups, such as Gypsies and Jews (cf. Lucassen 2006: 19). In migration studies in general, however, scholars usually adopt the horizontal interpretation of transnationalism. Following Basch et al.'s (1994: 6) classic definition, they study migrants' "social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement." Levitt and Jaworsky (2007: 131) more recently argued that the term should include "not just the home and the host countries," but also "other sites around the world." Although some scholars have adopted such a broader view (e.g. Levitt 2003; Bowen 2004; Colic-Peisker 2006; Mancheva 2008), the majority of studies on migrants' transnational practices and identifications still conceptualize transnationalism in terms of the maintenance of ties with two countries.

Morawska gives the impression that to her both interpretations of transnationalism are equally valid. Still, in her research on the transnational involvement of various migrant groups in the US, without further explanation, she only takes into account migrants' horizontal ties. Various migration scholars have criticized this prevailing horizontal approach. Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004: 1181), for instance, claim that relations concerning two states should be referred to as international, rather than transnational. Building on this notion, Lucassen (2006: 20) argues that most studies in the field of transnational migration focus on ties that are actually "bi-local" or "bi-national." Bi-local ties exist between specific places in the sending and receiving countries, such as migrants' relations with their relatives 'back home'. Studies that analyze migrant organizations and state institutions are mainly con-

cerned with bi-national ties. These ties are more political in nature and concern national issues, for example in the case of refugees who fight the political regime in their country of origin. Lucassen (2006: 32) holds that whereas bi-local and bi-national ties are quite common among first-generation migrants, the history of Western Europe "does not offer many examples" of the vertical, border-transcending type of transnationalism. So far, however, not much empirical research has been done on the importance of transnational involvement beyond the national level.

In this research, I will empirically investigate which *spatial scales* (or geographical levels; I will use these terms interchangeably) are important in the lives of the two migrant groups studied.[4] Like most scholars of transnational migration, I take a rather general concept – transnational involvement – as a starting point. Similar to what Blumer (1954: 7) calls a "sensitizing concept," I use this term for giving "a general sense of reference and guidance." Whereas many scholars in this field end with the same definition that they started with, in this research I further specify the term. I look at activities and identifications both 'horizontally across' and 'vertically beyond' the national level and explore the relevance of these ties for different migrant groups and in different contexts. Thus, I not only include migrants' ties with their relatives in the country of origin or their homeland political ties, but also their border-transcending ties, for instance based on pan-ethnic, pan-religious, or global humanitarian identifications.

Although the question of whether present-day transnational ties are qualitatively or quantitatively different from those of migrants in other periods of time is not central to my argument,[5] I do intervene in the discussion about how transnationalism relates to the more classic terminology of migrant integration or assimilation (cf. Kivisto 2001: 572). Instead of looking only at the migrants' border-crossing and border-transcending ties, I examine in what ways they combine these with their incorporation into the country – and, in particular, the city – of settlement.

[4] Both the terms 'spatial' and 'geographical' are commonly used in literature on cross-border activities. Savage et al. (2005: 207) talk of "spatial extension," Dicken et al. (2001: 90) use "geographical scale," while Pries (2005: 174) refers to "geographic reach."

[5] See for such a historical perspective, for instance, Foner (2000: 169-87).

The subjects of transnationalism

Migrants are generally seen as the subjects of transnationalism *par excellence*, since they have left their home country to settle somewhere else and thus can be expected to have certain cross-border ties. Although 'non-migrants' – members of the native Dutch middle class, to be more precise – are included for comparison, this research also particularly focuses on migrants. I have already explained that in this research, I compare two groups of migrants in the city of Rotterdam. The group which I call *middle-class migrants* consists of first-, 1.5-, and second-generation upwardly mobile migrants from 'classic' immigrant groups in the Netherlands (i.e., Surinamese, Turks and Moroccans)[6]; the group of *knowledge workers* is composed of highly skilled temporary migrants from various Western and non-Western countries (e.g., the US, the UK, India, and China). The first group of migrants are part of what are sometimes called "classic" or "old" patterns of settlement migration, while the second group of migrants typify "new," more "unpredictable," migration patterns (cf. Engbersen et al. 2010: 117; Favell 2008: xii). The composition of the two studied groups of migrants is explained in more detail in the next chapter (see for an overview of the characteristics of the respondent groups Table 2.6, pp. 58-59). Here, I will discuss what makes this "convergent" comparison – that is, a comparison between different groups in one locality (cf. Green 1997) – different from already existing ones and strategic for the further specification and contextualization of the concept of transnationalism.

First of all, most of the comparative studies in the field of transnational migration are concerned with comparing various ethnic groups, rather than different types of migrants. In the American literature, for instance, Dominican and Salvadoran immigrants are often compared with each other, or with Colombians or Haitians (e.g. Guarnizo et al. 2003; Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2002). European studies often focus on Turks (e.g. Faist 1999; Erhkamp 2005), sometimes in comparison with other groups, such as Kurds (e.g. Østergaard-Nielsen 2003) or Moroccans and Surinamese (e.g. Van Bochove et al. 2010a). Since knowledge workers are generally not considered to be 'immigrants' or to have an 'ethnic background', they are excluded from such comparisons (cf. Lucassen and Lucassen 2011: 40). It is remarkable that comparisons between different ethnic groups are assumed to be self-evidently valu-

[6] 1.5 generation migrants are those who were born abroad and arrived in the Netherlands before the age of 12 and grew up there (cf. Kasinitz et al. 2008: 2).

able, whereas comparisons between different types of migrants are highly exceptional.[7] Sometimes, distinctions are drawn between the transnational ties of immigrants and expatriates. For instance, knowledge workers are said to differ from 'ordinary' migrants, in that they have a more cosmopolitan outlook and participate in global networks, rather than leading bi-national lives (cf. Hannerz 1990: 243). In other words, horizontal transnationalism is seen as the most important form of transnational involvement among 'classic' migrants, while vertical transnationalism is deemed typical for highly skilled temporary migrants. However, such statements are more often based on assumptions than empirical evidence, and thus require further investigation.

The two groups of migrants do not just provide interesting cases because the *nature* of their transnational involvement is assumed to differ. Based on the results of empirical studies, differences can also be expected in the *extent* to which these migrants are involved in transnational activities or have transnational identifications. Early research on migrant transnationalism consisted mainly of anthropological case studies focusing on individuals or organizations known to be active across borders (Carling 2007: 17; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007: 131). Later on, several scholars criticized these studies for sampling on the dependent variable and, consequently, exaggerating the importance of transnational practices; the impression was given that every migrant is a "transmigrant" (cf. Kivisto 2001: 556; Guarnizo et al. 2003: 1213). More recently, quantitative studies in particular have shown that various factors influence the degree of individual migrants' transnational involvement. Three factors which are relevant for the two studied migrant groups will be further explained below: (1) the number of years migrants have spent in the country of settlement, (2) their socio-economic position, and (3) their citizenship status.

The most discussed background characteristic influencing migrants' transnational involvement is probably the number of years spent in the country of settlement compared to the stay in the country of origin, or, similarly, the migrants' age at the time of arrival. This debate is often phrased in the question, "How exclusive is transnationalism to the first generation of migrants?" (Vertovec 2001: 577). This question is closely related to the discussion about whether transnationalism can be seen as a form of, or a stage in, the process of assimilation, which is dealt with in the

[7] Morawska (2009) does include different types of migrants, but mainly describes them separately. My approach is most similar to Colic-Peisker's (2006), who compares the "ethnic" and "cosmopolitan" transnational practices of different types of Croatian immigrants.

section on the substance of transnationalism. Scholars seem to agree on the fact that "second generation's transnational connections are significantly less intense, more limited in scope, and more situational" than those of first-generation migrants (Morawska 2009: 195). Compared to their parents, second-generation migrants are generally considered more adapted to the country of settlement and less connected with the country of origin (cf. Alba and Nee 2003: 151; Lucassen 2006: 21). However, several objections have been made to the statement that transnational involvement is mainly found among the first generation. Morawska (2009: 197), for instance, refers to the existence of "oppositional transnationalism." According to her, especially for socioeconomically successful second-generation migrants who are confronted with prejudice, homeland identification serves as an escape, or as a means of preserving self-esteem (cf. Itzigsohn 2000: 1147; Guarnizo et al. 2003: 1239). Moreover, whereas bi-local and bi-national ties are generally more common among first- than second-generation migrants, this does not imply that the subsequent generations have no transnational ties altogether. The scarce data available on this topic suggest that border-transcending attachments – such as pan-ethnic identifications – are especially found among the second and third generation. For instance, whereas many first-generation Mexicans in the US strongly identify with their country of origin, their American-born children often see themselves more as 'Hispanic' (cf. Morawska 2009: 192).

Another factor that is said to influence migrants' transnational involvement is their socioeconomic position. The predictive role of indicators such as education and employment is ambiguous, however, as Guarnizo et al. (2003: 1216) point out. According to assimilation theory, migrants with a higher education level more easily integrate into the host society than lower educated migrants, and therefore are less inclined to maintain homeland ties. Empirical studies, then again, either show there are no significant differences between higher and lower educated migrants with regard to their degree of transnational involvement (cf. Snel et al. 2006: 304), or find a positive relationship between education level and transnational activity (cf. Guarnizo et al. 2003: 1234). The latter result is often explained by the fact that undertaking transnational activities requires a certain level of financial and social capital, which higher educated migrants have more at their disposal (cf. Foner 2000: 179; Itzigsohn and Giorguli Saucedo 2002: 782; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007: 133). Regarding professional economic activities, Snel et al. (2006: 295), for instance, found that highly edu-

cated migrants with well-paid jobs are more involved in homeland business activities than migrants with a lower socioeconomic status. However, no such difference was found regarding their contacts with relatives in the country of origin. This suggests that the relationship between socioeconomic position and transnational involvement at least partly depends on the domain or sphere one is looking at, a topic that will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

Various scholars have pointed to a third factor influencing the extent to which migrants are transnationally active, namely their citizenship status. Just as in the case of generation and socioeconomic status, different ideas exist about the exact role of this factor. Based on their research on the political claims of immigrants in various European countries, Koopmans et al. (2005) conclude that in countries where immigrants have a weak legal status, such as Switzerland, homeland political claims are most prevalent (Koopmans et al. 2005: 127-8). In countries as the Netherlands, France, and the UK, where established migrant groups have a relatively strong position, political claims are mainly directed to the country of settlement. Koopmans et al. (2005: 143) explain these findings by pointing to the inclusive policies of the latter countries, which facilitate migrants' political and cultural integration. Guarnizo et al. (2003: 1229), however, argue that a secure status in the country of settlement not only promotes integration, but can also facilitate certain homeland practices, since a host country passport enables migrants to travel back and forth without restrictions. Waldinger (2008) contradicts the views of Koopmans et al. and Guarnizo et al., by arguing that for both migrants with a secure and an insecure legal status in the country of settlement it is increasingly difficult to maintain homeland relations, because of the barriers that are created by receiving countries. According to Waldinger (2008: 25), countries of settlement "engage in a twofold capture, taking hold of the loyalties of those settled immigrants who enjoy secure legal status, while placing unauthorized immigrants, afraid of the risks of another illegal border crossing, in a sort of territorial confinement." Since these diverse conclusions are based on specific cases, both with regard to the settlement countries (most scholars, such as Guarnizo et al. and Waldinger, focus on the US) and the type of migrants they concern (authorized and unauthorized 'classic' immigrant groups), it is difficult to make general statements about the importance of citizenship status. However, there is agreement that the political opportunity structure in the country of settlement to a large extent de-

termines whether or not migrants are politically active across borders (cf. Martiniello 2006: 104).

In this research, I examine the differences and similarities between the transnational involvement of middle-class migrants and knowledge workers. In doing so, I pay attention to the nature of their transnational activities and identifications, as well as to the relative importance of such ties in their lives. Although comparisons are often made between 'classic' migrants from different ethnic backgrounds, in this research, I do not primarily focus on differences between, for instance, Moroccan and Turkish middle-class migrants. When such differences appear to play an important role, I will, of course, address them. The same is true for differences among first-, 1.5-, and second-generation middle-class migrants and differences relating to gender or life-cycle stage. My main objective, however, is to learn more about the differences and similarities between so-called 'classic' and 'new' migrants. In this sense, my focus is more on spatial mobility than on immigration. As Koslowski (2006: 276) argues, "Given that contemporary migration often begins as tourism, study or temporary work abroad *international mobility* is a more all-inclusive category for understanding the dynamics of international migration" (original emphasis).

Regarding the *nature* of their ties, I investigate whether the dominant images of middle-class immigrants as 'bi-nationals' and knowledge workers as 'cosmopolitans' are accurate. Variables such as socioeconomic position, migrant generation, and citizenship status are often said to be important predictors of the *extent* to which individual migrants are transnationally active. However, as I have shown above, studies on such factors have yielded ambiguous results. The migrants in this research all have a middle-class status or higher and can be said to have sufficient financial capital to be involved in transnational practices. Based on their relatively high education level, at the same time it can be expected that these migrants easily integrate into the receiving society and are more oriented toward their country of residence than toward their homeland.

The two migrant groups differ according to their length of stay. The knowledge workers only moved to the Netherlands recently, while the middle-class migrants have already spent an important part of their lives there. Because of this, the middle-class immigrants can be expected to be less active on a transnational level than the knowledge workers. However, oppositional transnationalism, as described

by Morawska (2009: 197), and transnational involvement beyond the homeland – such as pan-religious identifications – might be important among these 'classic' immigrants. Another difference between the two types of migrants is their citizenship status. A majority of Surinamese, Turkish, and Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands have Dutch citizenship (cf. Dagevos 2008: 11), whereas most knowledge workers, who come to the Netherlands to work for a few years, do not have a Dutch passport. I will investigate in what ways these differences influence the degree to which the two groups of migrants maintain local, national, and transnational ties.

Although the unit of analysis in this study is the individual migrant (cf. Portes et al. 1999: 220), this is not to say that other units are left out of consideration (cf. Kivisto 2001: 561). It is empirically investigated what networks or organizations migrants are part of and what role these play in their activities and identifications.

The spheres of transnationalism

Although general statements about the (lack of) importance of transnationalism are regularly made (cf. Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004; Lucassen 2006; Fechter 2007), the variety of results of the many case studies on migrants' homeland ties shows that such statements in fact are not very informative. In the previous section, I have already argued that various personal characteristics influence the extent to which migrants are transnationally active. In this section, I will add to this that the importance of transnationalism – in both its vertical and horizontal senses – depends on what aspects of people's lives are taken into consideration. Various scholars have argued that a distinction should be made between economic, political, and (socio-)cultural transnationalism (e.g. Portes et al. 1999; Vertovec 2001; Snel et al. 2006; Morawska 2009), sometimes complemented by civil-societal (Itzigsohn et al. 1999) and religious (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007) transnationalism. Although it is often said that these social domains, fields or – the term that I will use – *spheres* differ from one another with regard to their "spatial extension and scope" (Savage et al. 2005: 207), so far not many studies have systematically investigated what exactly are these differences. Before explaining my own approach, I will first briefly discuss what is known about the importance of transnationalism in the three most commonly distinguished spheres, i.e., (1) the economic, (2) the political, and (3) the socio-cultural.

Migrants' economic transnational ties are often roughly divided into two categories: "professional" or "public" economic activities such as business-related investments and trips, and "personal" or "private" transactions such as sending money or goods to relatives abroad (cf. Snel et al. 2006: 291; Boccagni 2010: 201).[8] Whereas professional economic activities are especially linked to ethnic entrepreneurs (cf. Rusinovic 2006), personal activities such as remittance sending are generally regarded as more widespread. The importance of remittances is reflected in World Bank figures: in 2008, officially recorded remittance flows amounted to 444 billion US dollars worldwide, of which 338 billion were sent to developing countries (Ratha et al. 2009). The true size of these flows is even much higher, since many transactions are made through informal channels. In addition to studies on migrants' cross-border economic activities, research has been done that focuses on how migrants' lives are shaped by processes of economic transnationalization. In the words of Guarnizo and Smith (1998: 3), these studies concentrate on transnationalism "from above" instead of "from below." Expatriates, sent to work abroad by the company they work for, can be seen as part of such institutionalized economic transnationalism (cf. Fechter 2007: 19; Beaverstock 2005: 250). These migrants are characterized by their geographical mobility and their supposedly fluid lifestyles (cf. Ong 1999; Bauman 1998; Hannerz 1990). However, even though their market position can in some sense be deemed unbound, this is not to say that they lead completely "mobile lives" (cf. Elliott and Urry 2010). Although empirical research on this topic is still scarce, available studies suggest that the social lives of expatriates are "marked by boundaries" (Fechter 2007: 165) and "restricted to particular territories" (Ley 2004: 157).

Although cross-border political practices originally did not receive the same amount of attention as activities in the economic and socio-cultural spheres, according to Smith and Bakker (2008: 14), in recent years "political transnationalism has emerged as a growing dimension of transnational studies." A majority of studies on migrants' transnational political participation focus on what Guarnizo et al. (2003: 1223) call "electoral" activities, such as participation in homeland elections and in-

[8] Snel et al. (2006) describe this distinction as the difference between "professional" and "everyday" economic activities. However, these terms are not mutually exclusive, since professional activities can be undertaken also on an everyday basis and personal activities such as remittance sending are not undertaken frequently per se. Boccagni (2010) makes a distinction between "public" and "private" transnational activities. Calling business transactions 'public', however, is debatable.

volvement in homeland political parties. Compared to economic activities such as remittance sending, homeland activities in the political sphere are generally considered to be less common. Differences may exist between and within migrant groups, and some activities are more common than others, but by and large the conclusion is that only a relatively small percentage of migrants are politically active on a transnational level (cf. Itzigsohn 2000; Waldinger 2008). However, so far, not much is known about the importance of migrants' political activities beyond the national level, for instance addressing human rights issues. Moreover, relatively little attention has been paid to "non-electoral" political practices, such as participating in a demonstration (cf. Guarnizo et al. 2003; Snel et al. 2006).

Of the three often distinguished spheres, the socio-cultural is probably the least well-defined. In many classifications, this sphere serves as a kind of residual category, containing activities varying from contacting relatives in the country of origin to attending concerts of homeland artists. What studies on socio-cultural transnationalism usually have in common is a focus on processes of identification; a theme that generally does not receive much attention in studies on economic or political transnationalism. According to Itzigsohn et al. (1999: 332), studies on cultural transnationalism investigate "a diverse number of practices and institutions that take part in the formation of meanings, identities and values." More specifically, many of such studies are concerned with how migrants shape their national and ethnic identities in the new context of the country of settlement (cf. Fechter 2007: 105; Raj 2003: 6; Groenewold 2008: 109). Various studies have shown that even if they barely participate in homeland-directed activities, many migrants still feel that they belong to their country of origin (cf. Ip and Hsu 2006: 286; Waldinger 2008: 21). However, this is not to say that migrants do not identify themselves with the host country as well. Although in countries throughout Europe political movements have been on the rise which proclaim the need for rediscovering 'our' national identity and ask migrants to make a definitive choice between 'here' and 'there', social scientists agree that people actually have multiple identities which in many cases are smoothly combined (cf. A.D. Smith 1991: 175-6; Van Gunsteren 1998: 15; Sen 2006: 24). The real question, therefore, is not *if* migrants feel connected to more than one place or group of people, but rather *when*, *where*, and *why* these different identifications come to the fore and *what* relationships exist between them (cf. Castells 2003: 6-7).

In this research, the distinctions among the economic, political, and socio-cultural spheres play an important role.[9] I will investigate in what ways economic transnationalism 'from above' shapes the middle-class migrants' and knowledge workers' lives: do their jobs largely determine their geographical movements? I will also examine their political involvement, focusing on different dimensions of citizenship, including both 'electoral' and 'non-electoral' (or 'conventional' and 'unconventional') practices regarding different spatial levels. Finally, I look at the geographical scale of the migrants' socio-cultural involvement, including their contacts with relatives and friends and their participation in civil society. Although several studies on migrants' transnational involvement have made similar distinctions between different domains of life, my approach contributes to the existing literature in at least two important respects.

First, so far, not much is known about the relationships among the economic, political, and socio-cultural spheres. Itzigsohn et al. (1999: 324) remark that the classification of activities is sometimes arbitrary. They, for instance, pose the question of whether fundraising for a political party is an economic or a political practice. Similarly, the question could be asked whether sending money to relatives abroad is an economic or a socio-cultural activity. I would argue that, since economic means are used to achieve something else (e.g., political influence or family well-being), in both cases, the second options should be chosen. However, in addition to explanations of how certain practices or identifications should be classified, it would be interesting to learn more about the interactions among them. In this research, I will pay special attention to these relations, for instance by focusing on the consequences of knowledge workers' economic transnational involvement for their family life and the interaction between middle-class immigrants' political and socio-cultural identifications.

In doing so, Rainer Bauböck's (1996) triangle of state, market, and family (see Figure 1.1) is a source of inspiration. According to Bauböck (1996: 76), a precarious balance exists among these three "institutional ensembles." Bauböck's model adds to this that in each social institution – which he defines as a set of rules and norms that structure social interaction (1996: 77) – individuals play a different role. In the market sphere, they can be employees, entrepreneurs, or consumers. In the sphere of the

[9] This distinction is an analytical one. Similar to what Bradley (1996: 19) wrote about inequality based on class, gender, ethnicity, and age, the economic, political, and socio-cultural spheres "cannot be separated in their effects within concrete social relationships."

state, they are primarily citizens who have certain rights and obligations. The domain of the family or community (what I call the socio-cultural sphere) is characterized by "expectations of solidarity and generalized reciprocity among members" (Bauböck 1996: 78). [10] The role of individuals in this last sphere is characterized by less anonymity and more intimacy. For instance, relationships between family members or friends can be expected to be closer than those between colleagues or fellow citizens. Although individuals are confronted with contradictory roles, they will attempt to establish coherence between them, in other words, to combine them "into a consistent biographical framework" (cf. Berger and Luckmann 1971: 81). In this study, I will investigate how different types of migrants combine their roles as economic agents, citizens, and private persons on different spatial levels.



Figure 1.1: Triangle of state, market, and family, and the role individuals play in these spheres, based on Bauböck (1996: 80)

[10] See also Bell (1978: xvi-xvii), who argues that the economic, political, and cultural "realm" are based on "antagonistic principles": the economic realm is based on specialization and hierarchy, the political realm on equality, and the cultural realm (understood as efforts in, among other things, painting, poetry, and fiction) on self-expression.

In addition to the fact that studies on migrants' transnational involvement usually do not address the relationships among the political, economic, and socio-cultural spheres, a second shortcoming can be detected. Although transnational migration scholars generally acknowledge that feelings of belonging are relational,[11] they often do not pay attention to the different settings where the formation of identities takes place. As I mentioned earlier, only the socio-cultural sphere is explicitly linked to processes of identification; studies focusing on the economic or political sphere are mainly concerned with migrants' activities. However, just as activities can be related to the socio-cultural sphere, identities can be formed at the workplace or in reaction to political issues (cf. Bradley 1996: 23). I will therefore pay attention to both activities and identifications in each sphere. In the empirical chapters, I will explain the exact conceptualization and operationalization of the migrants' involvement.

The super-diverse city as a strategic research site

Similar to migration issues in general (cf. Castles 2000: 129), migrants' simultaneous involvement in different countries is usually analyzed on a national level (e.g. Guarnizo et al. 2003; Snel et al. 2006; Waldinger 2008). However, several scholars have criticized this "methodological nationalism" (cf. Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), suggesting that instead of the nation-state, the city is "the place where the business of modern society gets done, including that of transnationalization" (Holston and Appadurai 1999: 3), and that cities form "key sites of the transnational ties that increasingly connect people, places, and projects across the globe" (Smith and Eade 2008: 3). Statements like these sound plausible, but they do not make clear what qualities exactly make cities such interesting locations for studying transnational involvement. Others have been more explicit about this. Sassen (1999: 189), for instance, argues that cities are a "strategic site not only for global capital but also for the transnationalization of labor and the formation of transnational identities," because they are "the terrain where people from many different countries are most likely to meet and a multiplicity of cultures come together." As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the diversity in many of today's cities is said to have reached the stage of super-diversity (cf. Vertovec 2007; Amin 2008). According to

[11] That is to say, "appropriated by the individual through a process of interaction with others" (Berger and Berger 1972: 62).

Stevenson (2003: 159), this diversity contributes to the fact that, in contrast to the "surveillance and order of small communities," cities "provide spaces for citizens to experiment with their identities and participate in a more disorderly existence."

The importance of characteristics such as density, diversity, and anonymity was already central to classic urban sociological studies (e.g. Wirth 1938; Gans 1962; Fischer 1975, 1976). The insights of these studies are still relevant for studying cities today. Particularly Fischer's subcultural theory provides a convincing explanation for the assumed importance of cities in processes of transnationalization. Fischer (1975: 1325) claims that places with a high population concentration – in his words, places with a high degree of "urbanism" – have more intense subcommunities or subcultures than less densely populated areas. This intensification of subcultures is promoted by two mutually reinforcing processes: "critical mass" and "intergroup relations." With the notion of critical mass, Fischer points to the fact that the larger a subculture's population – be it students, criminals, artists, or immigrants – the more developed its institutions. These institutions, such as dress styles or associations, encourage their members to stay involved in their group and thus further strengthen the subculture (Fischer 1975: 1326). The second reason why subcultures are more intense in urban areas is that the presence of many different subcultures stimulates competition and conflict between members of different groups. Fischer (1975: 1326) argues that the contact with "strange others will lead, at least initially, to stronger affirmation of own-group standards."

Based on these theoretical notions, it can be argued that subcommunities of transnationally active migrants are particularly found in cities. Cities host large and diverse migrant populations, varying from undocumented migrants who hope to find a job in the informal sector and expatriates who work for transnational corporations to established immigrant groups, including second-generation migrants who were born and raised in the city. The presence of a substantial number of migrants from all kinds of backgrounds creates a basis – in Fischer's terminology, critical mass – for a variety of immigrant organizations, interest groups, and religious and cultural facilities. Involvement in such institutions can further promote migrants' ethnic and homeland ties. Moreover, interaction with distinct ethnic groups can reinforce group boundaries. For instance, contacts between Turkish and Moroccan immigrants can intensify the feeling of being a 'Turk' or a 'Moroccan', which in turn might stimulate their homeland attachment. Similarly, encounters between migrants and non-

migrants can strengthen the feeling of belonging somewhere else. The existence of large, super-diverse populations, together with the institutionalization of differences and frequent encounters between members of different 'communities' can be said to make cities interesting places for studying transnational involvement (cf. Kennedy 2004: 174). In this research, I will not be able to test whether Fischer's assumptions are correct or not, since I do not make a comparison between migrants who live in urban and rural areas. However, I will try to find out in what ways migrants' transnational ties are stimulated – or perhaps obstructed – by characteristics of their living environment.

Of course, the city is not the only place where subcultures are formed and encounters between different groups occur. Amin and Thrift (2002: 1) argue, for instance, that due to the existence of city commuters, tourists, teleworking, and the new media, the "footprints of the city" are everywhere (cf. Berger et al. 1973: 67; Burgers 2002). The internet has made it possible for people with similar interests to come together without physical propinquity being required. On social networking sites and online forums, processes of in- and exclusion take place, leading to the affirmation of in-group values (cf. De Koster and Houtman 2008: 1168). Although it can thus be argued that the city has lost its monopoly (if it ever had one) on the formation of interest groups and on facilitating encounters between them, this is not to say that online contacts have replaced offline ones. For some subcultural groups, in particular for those which have a lifestyle that is not accepted by society at large, the internet certainly can be a place of refuge. In many other cases, however, online and offline contacts are complementary (cf. De Koster 2010). In this study, I consider the city to be an important place for the two groups of migrants' daily activities and the construction of their identities, while at the same time acknowledging the importance of their – online and offline – ties outside the city.

In the light of Fischer's notions of critical mass and intergroup relations, Rotterdam, the city where I conducted this research, is a highly interesting case. Rotterdam is the second largest city in the Netherlands and one of its most diverse. Almost fifty percent of its population are first- and second-generation immigrants (COS 2011), and the city hosts around 170 different nationalities (cf. Chief Marketing Office Rotterdam 2007). Rotterdam is known for its port, the largest in Europe and the third in the world, and promotes itself with slogans such as 'World Port World City' and 'Manhattan on the river Maas', referring to its impressive skyline. This cosmo-

politan outlook is not adopted by everyone, however. In the past decade, perceived differences between 'autochtones' and 'allochtones' – or, perhaps even more important, 'non-Muslims' and 'Muslims' – have dominated local politics. I will discuss the demographic, economic, and political conditions of Rotterdam in more detail in Chapter 2.

Aim, research questions, and outline of this book

In this chapter, I have argued that transnationalism is too vague a term to provide a good understanding of the border-crossing and border-transcending ties migrants maintain. Although the concept can be useful as a general starting point, it needs further specification. By using more precise concepts, or, in Sartori's terminology, by moving downwards along the ladder of abstraction, the range of explanation will inevitably decline (cf. Sartori 1970: 1053). To put it simply, the term 'transnational ties' is more inclusive than, for instance, the more specific term 'bi-national political activities'. However, somewhat more accuracy will not harm the field of transnational migration, as it will bring more balance between the ideals of factual precision and theoretical scope (cf. Goudsblom 1977: 19). In this research, I will empirically investigate the spatial scope of the economic, political, and socio-cultural activities and identifications of middle-class migrants and knowledge workers in the city of Rotterdam. In doing so, this book adds to existing studies on transnationalism in at least four respects, which I will briefly recapitulate.

I disentangle transnational involvement, first, by investigating what kind of borders the migrants' activities and identifications cross or transcend. Instead of only looking at the homeland ties migrants maintain ('horizontal' transnational ties), I also pay attention to ties beyond national borders ('vertical' transnational ties), for instance based on a shared religion or a cosmopolitan outlook. This approach contributes to a better understanding of the different appearances of transnational involvement and their relative importance.

Second, instead of primarily focusing on different ethnic groups, in this research, I make a comparison between two different types of migrants. Based on existing studies, it can be expected that differences exist between the transnational ties that 'classic' and 'new' immigrant groups maintain. Whereas other studies mainly assume such differences, I will systematically compare representatives of both

groups. The 'classic' group consists of (descendents of) former guest workers and postcolonial immigrants who have attained middle-class status. The 'new' group consists of highly skilled temporary migrants from around the world. These groups are interesting cases. They both can be expected to have sufficient financial means to undertake transnational activities, but, because of their different migration background and citizenship status, the nature and extent of their transnational involvement are likely to differ. By comparing middle-class immigrants' activities and identifications with those of knowledge workers, a better understanding of both groups' specifics is achieved, while at the same time general similarities can be recognized. Moreover, when it seems relevant, I will also compare the two groups of migrants with an additional group of native Dutch middle-class respondents.

Based on Bauböck's (1996) model of the market, the state, and the family, I make distinctions among the migrants' economic, political, and socio-cultural activities and identifications. Obviously, the distinction between these social spheres is an analytical one. In reality, people's position in the one sphere influences their position in the other. Although in each of the empirical chapters, I primarily focus on one particular sphere, I, therefore, also pay attention to the interactions among them. This is the third way in which this study contributes to the existing literature. Although various scholars of transnational migration have made a distinction between different spheres or domains, so far, their interrelatedness has not been thoroughly investigated.

Fourth and finally, although border-crossing and border-transcending ties are central to this study, I do not isolate them from the migrants' attachments to their country and city of settlement. Whereas many scholars study migrants' multiple attachments from a national perspective, this research pays special attention to their incorporation at the local level. Because of their super-diverse population, their critical mass, and their many encounters between different ethnic groups, cities can be seen as strategic places for studying migrants' activities and identifications. In this study I investigate what role the city plays in the lives of middle-class migrants and knowledge workers in Rotterdam and what relationships exist between their local and transnational ties.

This study addresses the following research questions:

> 1. What is the spatial scale of the middle-class migrants' and knowledge workers' activities and identifications in the economic, political, and social-cultural spheres?
>
> 2. What differences and similarities exist between the activities and identifications of the two groups of migrants, and how can they be explained?
>
> 3. What is the relationship between the two groups of migrants' activities and identifications in the economic, political, and socio-cultural spheres?

These questions are answered based on a mixed methods study, that is to say, a study in which qualitative and quantitative methods are combined. One of the advantages of such an approach is that it provides a first insight into the general patterns of the migrants' activities and identifications, while at the same giving more in-depth understanding of their motivations and experiences. In Chapter 2, I will further explain the methods used, as well as some important characteristics of the city of Rotterdam.

Chapter 3, which deals with the migrants' position in the economic sphere, has a dual objective. First of all, in this chapter, I discuss the migrants' labor market position. The migrants were selected based on their socioeconomic success, which is expected to provide them the necessary economic and cultural capital to be active in different types of transnational activities. Here, I will explain what this success means in terms of the sectors in which they work, the types of jobs they perform, and their salaries. I will look at the migrants' economic position from the perspective of transnationalism from 'above' and 'below'. For instance, were the knowledge workers forced to move abroad by the transnational firms they work for, or did they decide to go to Rotterdam themselves? The second objective is to give a general insight into the spatial mobility of the two groups of migrants, which is important for understanding their activities and identifications in each of the three spheres. I will focus on their past movements and future migration plans, comparing the importance of economic considerations to other (for instance, family-related) motives. It is often assumed that expatriates are inherently different from 'classic' migrants, in

that they do not permanently settle somewhere, but are always on the move, either because they enjoy traveling or their employer tells them to. Here, I will examine whether knowledge workers are indeed 'cosmopolitans', who always look for new experiences, or 'organization men', whose lives are completely dominated by their jobs, or if they are actually quite similar to the middle-class migrants.

I conclude each empirical chapter with an intermezzo regarding one or both of the migrant groups. In these intermezzos, I turn to a specific issue (Intermezzo I and II) or a concrete case (Intermezzo III) that deserves more attention. The intermezzos are related to issues that were raised in the chapters that preceded them, but can be read as short independent stories. The first intermezzo further investigates the economic success of fifteen female middle-class migrants and deals with the question of whether they consider themselves to be positive examples, or 'role models', for other women. In this intermezzo, the context dependency of processes of identification becomes apparent. Although these middle-class migrants are proud of their 'roots', they make clear that in the economic sphere, they want to be judged only on their achievements.

Chapter 4 concerns the political sphere. Here, I question another dominant view in the academic literature and public debate, namely that 'classic' migrants have a bi-national political outlook, expressed in dual nationality, homeland political activities, and dual loyalty. I compare the two groups of migrants with regard to the spatial scale of different dimensions of their citizenship (that is, their formal status, 'conventional' and 'unconventional' political practices, and feelings of national belonging), and investigate to what extent political bi-nationalism is actually characteristic of 'classic' migrants. In the second intermezzo, I further investigate the finding that many of the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers participate in consumer boycott actions concerning border-transcending political issues, such as the war in Iraq and global environmental problems.

In Chapter 5, I discuss the socio-cultural sphere. It is often said that people's social networks are increasingly globalized. Knowledge workers are believed to keep in contact with others around the world, whereas 'classic' migrants are assumed to have close contacts with relatives in their home country. On the other hand, both groups of migrants are said to be locked up in local 'bubbles' or 'enclaves'. In this chapter, I will focus on the spatial scope of the migrants' socio-cultural ties, including their relationships with family and friends, their activities in

civil society, and the spending of their leisure time. Moreover, I pay special attention to the role of cultural proximity in their emotional attachment to different places. The third intermezzo further investigates the issue of socio-cultural incorporation. An American woman, who came to Rotterdam because of her husband's job, tells her story about bringing up her children in a geographically distant and culturally different country.

In the final chapter, I return to the questions of what transnational involvement is, who performs it, and where it takes place. Based on the analysis of their activities and identifications in the three distinguished spheres, I draw conclusions about the spatial scales of the lives of the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers. To what extent can they be regarded as local, (bi-)national or 'truly' transnational workers, citizens, and community members? And how do the migrants combine these different roles? I also draw conclusions about the differences and similarities between the two groups of migrants. Is the distinction between 'classic' and 'new' migrants a useful one? Then, I will address the more abstract issue of the substance of transnationalism and its importance compared with local or national incorporation. I conclude with some implications of my findings for current academic and public debates and future research.

2. Location, Methods, and Fieldwork

This book is largely based on data collected for the *Transnationalism and Urban Citizenship* project, of which my dissertation project is a part.[12] In different stages between April 2007 and October 2009, a survey was conducted among 400 socioeconomically successful respondents in the city of Rotterdam. The project combined attention to all kinds of transnational practices and processes of identification with a strong focus on local incorporation. Compared to studies investigating the relationship between national integration and transnational involvement – which *de facto* often comes down to a bi-national approach – this project was more sensitive to spatial levels below and above the nation-state. Whereas the *Transnationalism and Urban Citizenship* project was particularly interested in migrants' political involvement (cf. Van Bochove et al. 2010a), my dissertation also pays attention to the spatial scale of their ties in the economic and the socio-cultural spheres. In this chapter, I elucidate the methodological approach and how the fieldwork was conducted. Furthermore, at the end of this chapter I will discuss some of the respondents' key characteristics. First, however, I will give a description of the research location: the city of Rotterdam.

Rotterdam: demographic, economic, and political conditions

In the previous chapter, I explained why cities can be seen as strategic research sites for studying transnational involvement. Because of its super-diverse population and its heated debates on immigrant integration, Rotterdam provides a particularly interesting case for studying migrants' feelings of belonging to various groups and places. In the terminology of Seawright and Gerring (2008: 297), who write about purposive case selection, Rotterdam might be more an example of an "extreme" case, than a "typical" one. However, although the findings of this research cannot be transferred one on one to other Dutch cities, Rotterdam in many ways plays a pioneering role in the Netherlands, especially when it comes to dealing with migration

[12] This project was financed by Nicis Institute and the Municipality of Rotterdam. Prof. dr. Godfried Engbersen supervised the project; Dr. Katja Rusinovic and I were responsible for conducting and coordinating the fieldwork. Based on the results of this project, Nicis Institute has published two reports, the first about the migrant middle class (Van Bochove et al. 2009) and the second about knowledge workers (Van Bochove et al. 2010b).

and integration issues. Not only did the popularity of late politician Pim Fortuyn and the rise of a far-right, 'anti-immigrant' party start in Rotterdam, also various national policy measures were developed and first implemented there. It could thus be argued that, because of similar developments in other cities, the Rotterdam case has become less extreme. In this section, I will further discuss important characteristics of Rotterdam, and, where this is relevant, of the Dutch context in general.[13] In doing so, I pay special attention to the position of the migrant groups studied in this research: Surinamese, Turkish, and Moroccan middle-class immigrants and knowledge workers from various Western and non-Western countries. I will start with an overview of important developments in Rotterdam's population composition. After that, I discuss the city's economic and political state of affairs.

The demographic context

Rotterdam's image of being a working man's and immigrant city has a long history (Van de Laar 2007: 115, cf. Van de Laar et al. 1998; Burgers 2001). As a result of the agricultural crisis at the end of the nineteenth century, Rotterdam experienced a great inflow of migrants from several rural areas in the Netherlands who hoped to find a job in the port and to build a new life in the city (Bruggeman and Van de Laar 1998: 147). Van de Laar (2007: 115) draws a parallel between this period of internal migration and the arrival of migrants from abroad in the decades after the Second World War. Similar to the 1880s, in the 1960s and 1970s mostly low-skilled workers from rural areas came to Rotterdam to work in the port and in related industries such as shipbuilding and metal fabrication. In the early 1960s, these so-called guest workers mainly came from Italy and Spain. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Yugoslavia, Morocco, and especially Turkey became important sending countries (cf. Krijnen 1998; Tinnemans 1994). The Dutch government made official recruitment agreements with these countries. Next to officially recruited workers, however, many migrants came on their own initiative (cf. Tinnemans 1994: 68). The number of guest workers in Rotterdam increased quickly. In 1961, Rotterdam hosted only

[13] The characteristics I discuss here are comparable to the different types of context Smith and Bakker (2008: 4-5) describe in their study on political transnationalism in Mexico and the US. Next to what they call the political-economic context, the socio-cultural context, and the institutional context, they identify a fourth context: the historical. However, this fourth type can be – and in this chapter is – integrated with the other three.

somewhat more than a thousand guest workers; in 1966 their number had already increased to more than ten thousand, and another five years later there were almost twenty thousand (Municipal Archive of Rotterdam 2010).

In 1974, after the first oil crisis and in line with most other North-European countries, the Dutch government announced a recruitment stop (Krijnen 1998: 242). This, however, did not mean the end of immigration from the Mediterranean. Whereas a majority of the Spanish and Italian guest workers returned home in the 1970s, many Turkish and Moroccan workers postponed their return (cf. Nicolaas and Sprangers 2001: 26). Since migrant workers had obtained certain social rights in the Netherlands, staying longer seemed to many a better option than returning to the home country (Cottaar and Bouras 2009: 244-5). In the 1970s and early 1980s, many Turks and Moroccans arranged for their wives and children to come to the Netherlands (Engbersen et al. 2007: 392). In the late 1980s, family formation became an important motivation for migration; many children who had themselves come to the Netherlands because of family reunification now looked for a partner in the country of origin (Krijnen 1998: 242).[14]

In the early 1970s, when unemployment rates started rising, the Netherlands experienced another migration flow: the arrival of migrants from the Dutch colony of Surinam, a small country in northern South America. Compared to the labor migration from Mediterranean countries, the migration from Surinam was more politically motivated (cf. Tinnemans 1994: 133). Two developments led to a big increase of the number of Surinamese migrants. The first was the fact the Dutch government began to talk about restricting immigration from the colonies. Many Surinamese thought 'better safe than sorry' and came to the Netherlands before certain barriers might be erected. The Surinamese elections in 1973 formed a second important push-factor. The Creoles had won the elections and stated they would negotiate with the Netherlands about achieving independence. Especially Surinamese of Hindustani and Javanese origin feared that under Creole domination, life in an independent Surinam would become precarious (Tinnemans 1994: 133). After Surinam's independence in 1975, there remained a free circulation of people between Surinam and the Netherlands until 1980 (Obdeijn and Schrover 2008: 251). In this period, about one-third of the Surinamese population chose Dutch citizenship and came to the Nether-

[14] Irregular migration from Turkey and Morocco to the Netherlands also took place, and is still continuing today (cf. Leerkes et al. 2007).

lands (Dutch National Archives 2002; Nell 2007: 233). In comparison with migration from Surinam in the 1950s and 1960s – when many Surinamese came to the Netherlands to study – these new migrants were generally less well-educated (Tinnemans 1994: 134). A majority of them settled in the Dutch 'Randstad' (i.e., Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht, and surrounding areas) (Municipal Archive of Rotterdam 2010).

The Dutch government considered the stay of guest workers from Turkey and Morocco and postcolonial migrants from Surinam as a temporary one. The guest workers were expected to return to their homeland to invest the money they made, and the Surinamese migrants were thought to go back to Surinam as soon as the political situation there had stabilized (cf. Tinnemans 1994: 134). In reality, only a relatively small percentage of these migrants returned, whereas the arrival of newcomers continued. Due to stricter conditions, since the 1990s family reunification and formation have declined (cf. Krijnen 1998: 243; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009). Nowadays, a substantial part of the Surinamese, Turks, and Moroccans in the Netherlands belong to the second generation. Similar to the offspring of the internal migrants who came to Rotterdam at the end of the nineteenth century, many of these second-generation migrants have acquired a higher socioeconomic status than their parents (cf. Burgers 2001: 25). It can be expected, and recent empirical research confirms this (cf. Uyterlinde et al. 2007), that these socioeconomically mobile migrants will increasingly leave the city and settle in one of its suburbs. Next to the 'white flight', which started in the 1970s and still continues today, in recent years a 'black flight' is starting to be visible (cf. Burgers and Van der Lugt 2006). An important incentive for these outflows of middle-class residents is the fact that one-family dwellings are relatively scarce in the city.

Rotterdam's present population composition clearly bears the marks of the above-described migration flows into and out of the city. Table 2.1 shows Rotterdam's population in 2009, compared with national figures.

Table 2.1: The composition of the population in Rotterdam and the Netherlands in 2009, absolute numbers and percentages

	Rotterdam	**The Netherlands**
Total population	587,161 (100%)	16,485,787 (100%)
• Native Dutch	311,778 (53.1%)	13,198,081 (80.1%)
• Immigrants	275,383 (46.9%)	3,287,706 (19.9%)
○ Surinamese	52,206 (8.9%)	338,678 (2.1%)
○ Turks	46,203 (7.9%)	378,330 (2.3%)
○ Moroccans	38,158 (6.5%)	341,528 (2.1%)
○ Other non-Western immigrants	77,479 (13.2%)	750,774 (4.6%)
○ EU immigrants	33,909 (5.8%)	877,552 (5.3%)
○ Other Western immigrants	27,428 (4.7%)	600,844 (3.6%)

Source: Based on figures of O+S (www.os.amsterdam.nl); COS (www.cos.rotterdam.nl), and CBS Statline (statline.cbs.nl).

The first thing that stands out from Table 2.1 is the high percentage of immigrants or 'allochtones' in Rotterdam. The category of immigrants includes second-generation immigrants, which *Statistics Netherlands* (CBS) defines as people who are born in the Netherlands, but have at least one foreign-born parent. As I mentioned earlier, Rotterdam has one of the highest percentages of immigrants of any city in the Netherlands. The percentage of immigrants from non-Western countries is the highest in the country (cf. O+S 2011). The relative share of the native Dutch population has declined steadily over the past decades. In 1993, 67 percent of the Rotterdam population was still native Dutch; in 2000 this figure had dropped to 60, and, as the table shows, it further declined to 53 percent in 2009. The native Dutch population is the only population group mentioned in the table that has decreased in absolute numbers in the past decade. In 2009, there were about 40,000 fewer native Dutch inhabitants in Rotterdam than in 2000. According to a recent population forecast, in 2015, a majority of the Rotterdam population will be 'allochtonous' (COS 2009: 33).

Table 2.1 shows that the share of non-Western migrants in Rotterdam is notably larger than the share of non-Western migrants on the national level. The percentage of the Rotterdam population that belongs to one of the three largest immigrant groups (i.e., Surinamese, Turks, and Moroccans) increased by 3 percent between

2000 and 2009.[15] The relative and absolute increase of these migrant groups is for a large part attributable to a further growth of the second generation. In 2009, 51.1 percent of the Moroccans in Rotterdam were second-generation immigrants, compared with 42.1 percent in 2000. The second generation formed 49.3 percent of the Turkish population in 2009 (44 percent in 2000), and 42.1 percent of the Surinamese population (36.7 percent in 2000).[16] The category 'Other non-Western immigrants' in Table 2.1 consists in large part of first- and second-generation Antilleans, Cape Verdeans, and Chinese.[17]

Based on Table 2.1, only limited statements can be made about the presence of knowledge workers in Rotterdam. Highly skilled temporary migrants who come to Rotterdam to work are particularly represented in the categories 'EU immigrants', 'Other Western immigrants', and 'Other non-Western immigrants'. The number of non-Western knowledge workers in the Netherlands has increased rapidly in past years and is expected to grow further (cf. IND 2009: 16; COS 2009: 34). However, because of the great heterogeneity within the category of 'Other non-Western immigrants' regarding such variables as education and job level, Table 2.1 does not give an indication of their presence in Rotterdam. The number of Western migrants (consisting of the categories 'EU immigrants' and 'Other Western immigrants') is a more commonly used – but still very crude – indicator for the presence of highly skilled migrants. Table 2.1 shows that the share of such migrants in Rotterdam (10.4 percent) does not differ much from the national average. Compared to Amsterdam (14.8 percent) and The Hague (14.1 percent), however, the percentage of this population category in Rotterdam is considerably lower. Classical expatriate groups in the

[15] The presented numbers and percentages regarding developments of the Rotterdam population between 1993 and 2009 are based on data from www.rotterdam.buurtmonitor.nl.

[16] These percentages are based on *RotterdamDATA*, available at www.cos.rotterdam.nl. According to *Statistics Netherlands* (CBS), the number of non-Western immigrants who belong to the third generation is also increasing considerably. The third generation consists of individuals who have at least one grandparent born in a 'non-Western' country. In demographic statistics, third-generation immigrants are usually not counted as a separate group, but as 'autochtones', in other words, as native Dutch (cf. http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/bevolking/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2003/2003-1289-wm.htm).

[17] Just like the Surinamese, Turks, and Moroccans, these groups have a long history in Rotterdam and the Netherlands. See about Cape Verdean migrants, for instance, Van de Laar (2007), and about Chinese migrants, Meeuwse (2010).

Netherlands, such as Americans, Germans, and British, are less represented in Rotterdam than in Amsterdam and The Hague.[18]

Official figures on the number of knowledge workers in Rotterdam are largely absent. The *Municipal Personal Record Database* (Dutch acronym: GBA), which contains personal data of residents in the Netherlands, does not include information about whether or not someone is an expatriate or knowledge worker. Although companies do register the number of knowledge workers they employ, these figures are not collected on a municipal level. Moreover, knowledge workers who work in Rotterdam might live elsewhere. Consequently, the number of knowledge workers remains an educated guess. According to the Municipality of Rotterdam, between 25,000 and 30,000 expatriates live in Rotterdam and its suburbs (Van der Steen and Heijstek 2010). This rough estimate is based on the total number of Western migrants, minus groups who presumably came to the Netherlands for political reasons (such as former Yugoslavs), and migrant groups in which the second generation is larger than the first (such as Germans and Indonesians).[19] Furthermore, non-Western migrants from certain probable expat-sending countries (such as China, South Korea, and Taiwan) are included. Since this definition also includes many second-generation migrants and lower skilled labor migrants, it is likely to overestimate the presence of knowledge workers in Rotterdam.[20]

Due to the lack of official data, definite statements about the nationalities of knowledge workers in Rotterdam cannot be made. From national figures, it is known that among the knowledge workers who came to the Netherlands under the 'Knowledge migrant procedure' (in Dutch: 'Kennismigrantenregeling') in 2007, the most common nationalities were Indian, American, Chinese, and Japanese (IND 2009: 16). The number of knowledge workers from India and China especially has shown a remarkable increase over the past years. General data on migrants' coun-

[18] According to the research institute of the Municipality of Amsterdam, O+S, in 2009, 0.38 percent of the Rotterdam population consisted of people with German nationality. In The Hague this was 0.62 percent, and in Amsterdam, 0.73 percent. The presence of British nationals was as follows: 0.26 percent in Rotterdam, 0.79 percent in The Hague, and 0.96 percent in Amsterdam. See the website of S+O, www.os.amsterdam.nl, for comparisons between the population compositions of the four major cities in the Netherlands.

[19] Statistics Netherlands classifies Indonesia as a Western country.

[20] The report in which this estimate was first published, *Rotterdam, thuishaven voor expats? Een verkenning naar de Rotterdamse expat*, written in 2007 by Tanja Groenendijk, is not publicly available. Parts of it were provided on request by the Rotterdam Expat Desk.

tries of birth provided by the *Rotterdam Center of Research and Statistics* (COS) show that in Rotterdam the number of Indian and Chinese migrants is also increasing. Table 2.2 gives an overview of the number of first-generation migrants 25 years of age and older from various countries in 2002 and 2007.[21] Although these figures concern all migrants and not only knowledge workers, they indicate that on the local level, Indian migrants are also exceeding American ones.

Table 2.2: First-generation migrants 25 years of age and older in Rotterdam, by country of birth, 2002 and 2007, absolute numbers

	2002	**2007**
Old EU member states		
Germany	3,704	3,264
United Kingdom	1,744	1,427
Belgium	1,220	1,119
France	726	728
New EU member states		
Poland	690	1,300
Romania	235	290
Other Western countries		
United States	645	606
Japan	390	376
Non-Western countries		
China	1,776	2,433
India	527	627

Source: GBA 2002 and 2007, edited by COS.

[21] These countries were selected based on frequency. 'Classical' immigrant groups such as Surinamese, Turks, Moroccans, Antilleans, Cape Verdeans, and Indonesians were excluded. Although certainly a number of first-generation migrants from these countries can be counted as knowledge workers, the majority cannot. Only migrants 25 years of age and older are displayed, in order to exclude children and, as far as possible, students.

Additional calculations by COS show that migrants from India, China, and the US relatively often leave Rotterdam within a period of five years.[22] This is an indication that many of these migrants did indeed come to Rotterdam to work there for a few years. Of the groups displayed in Table 2.2, the group of Polish migrants is the fastest growing one; between 2002 and 2007 their number almost doubled. This reflects a national trend. In 2009, immigrants from new EU member countries – those that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 – accounted for almost one quarter of the total inflow of foreign nationals into the Netherlands (24,200 of the total of about 100,000) (OECD 2011: 304). Although Polish migrants in the Netherlands are generally associated with low-skilled temporary work, in past years highly skilled migration from Poland – and to a lesser extent Romania and Bulgaria – has increased as well (cf. Weltevrede et al. 2009: 75).

The figures presented in this section show that Rotterdam can rightfully be called a super-diverse city (cf. Vertovec 2007). Not only does the city host many different ethnic groups, much variety also exists regarding migration motives and migrant generation. The respondent groups in this research reflect this diversity. The group of Surinamese, Turkish, and Moroccan middle-class respondents consists of first-, 1.5-, and second-generation migrants. Within the group of knowledge workers, many different nationalities are represented. At the end of this chapter, I will discuss the respondents' characteristics in more detail.

The economic context

Rotterdam can be characterized as "a rich city with poor people" (Schrijnen 2004: 166). Whereas in the past, a flourishing port implied high employment rates, from the 1970s onwards this connection loosened (cf. Burgers 2001: 14). In the 1950s and 1960s, the expanding port generated a high labor demand, which could not be met by the local workforce. Guest workers from the Mediterranean were recruited in this period of economic prosperity. However, as a result of processes of automation, combined with the two oil crises in the 1970s, many jobs disappeared, and unemployment rates rose. Although the total number of containers processed increased

[22] In 2007, 80 percent of the first-generation Indian migrants who moved from Rotterdam had lived there less than five years. Among the first-generation Chinese and American migrants, this was more than 70 percent. These figures are based on the GBA and analyzed by Paul de Graaf of COS.

more than tenfold between 1969 and 1987, the number of dock laborers decreased by 80 percent in that same period (cf. Burgers 2001: 16). Low-skilled migrant workers were especially affected by the deindustrialization; many of them lost their jobs and were not qualified for new jobs in the postindustrial service economy.

Today, Rotterdam still has a relatively high unemployment rate. In 2008, 6.6 percent of the labor force in Rotterdam was unemployed. In the other large cities this was between 4.1 and 4.7 percent, while the national average was 3.9 percent.[23] The high unemployment rate in Rotterdam can be partly explained by the fact that Rotterdam's labor force is relatively less educated. In 2005, half of the labor force in Amsterdam was counted as highly educated, whereas in Rotterdam this was only about a third. And whereas in Amsterdam, only 16 percent of the labor force was considered less educated, in Rotterdam this was 28 percent (OBR 2006: 47). Not surprisingly, the average income in Rotterdam is lower than in the other large cities and than the national average. Table 2.3 displays the average net spendable income of the native Dutch and immigrant population of the three largest cities and the Netherlands as a whole.

Table 2.3: The average net spendable income of people who have income 52 weeks per year (x 1,000 Euro), 2006

	Rotterdam	**Amsterdam**	**The Hague**	**The Netherlands**
Total population	17,7	19,4	19,2	18,6
• Native Dutch	18,8	20,7	20,1	18,9
• Immigrants	15,9	17,5	17,8	17,2
○ Western immigrants	18,7	21,4	22,8	19,1
○ Non-Western immgrants	15,0	15,6	15,4	15,1

Source: CBS/RIO 2006, www.os.amsterdam.nl.

The table shows that the average income of almost all population groups is lowest in Rotterdam. In all cities, non-Western immigrants have the lowest income. Compared

[23] See www.os.amsterdam.nl.

to the other cities, the average income of the native Dutch population in Rotterdam is also relatively low. Amsterdam and The Hague – cities that have a reputation for hosting many expats – have a relatively affluent population of Western immigrants. In Rotterdam, the Western immigrants' average income is lower than that of the native Dutch population.

Although non-Western immigrants on average have the lowest net spendable income, it should be emphasized once again that the internal diversity within this category is very high. As I mentioned earlier, a growing proportion of Surinamese, Turkish, and Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands can be counted as middle class (cf. Dagevos et al. 2006). However, just as it is almost impossible to find reliable data on the presence of knowledge workers in Rotterdam, not much is known about the size of the immigrant middle class on the local level. On request, COS has analyzed data on the income of households in Rotterdam, classified by ethnicity and migrant generation.[24] According to the calculations of COS, approximately half of the native Dutch households in Rotterdam belong to the 'low income' group.[25] Among the three migrant groups, six out of ten households have a low income. Whereas 15 percent of the native Dutch households can be counted as 'high income' households, among the Surinamese and Turkish households this percentage is around 8, and of the Moroccan households less than 7 percent have a 'high income'. Second-generation migrant households in all three migrant groups, on average, have a lower income than households of first-generation migrants. This counterintuitive finding can be explained by the fact that many second-generation migrants are still in the early stages of their careers (Dagevos et al. 2006: 142). Since second-generation Surinamese, Turks, and Moroccans generally have a higher education level than their parents, it can be expected that the average income of second-generation households will increase in the near future.

Detailed information about the economic sectors in which different population groups in Rotterdam are active is not publicly available. Therefore, I will conclude with some general remarks on the city's current employment by sector. De-

[24] COS based these calculations on the RIO-dataset of CBS.

[25] According to COS, a 'low income' is an income with which a household belongs to the lowest 40 percent of the national distribution of incomes. An 'intermediate income' is an income with which a household belongs to the middle 40 percent of the national distribution. Finally, a 'high income' is an income with which a household belongs to the highest 20 percent of this national distribution.

spite processes of deindustrialization, today, still a relatively large part of the employed labor force in Rotterdam works in industry and construction. In 2007, this was almost 11 percent in Rotterdam, compared to around 6 percent in Amsterdam and The Hague.[26] In Amsterdam, almost two-thirds of the jobs are in the commercial service sector, especially in finance and producer services. The Hague also has a characteristic profile, with almost half of its jobs being in the non-commercial service sector, notably public administration. Compared to these cities, Rotterdam's economy has a less pronounced profile. A majority of its jobs (54 percent) are in commercial services, particularly in producer services, trade, and transport. In the non-commercial service sector (35 percent of the jobs), especially health service, public administration, and education provide much of the employment.

The political context

The political developments in Rotterdam over the past decade are in various respects trend-setting for the Netherlands. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, Rotterdam was the city where the Dutch shift to the right first took place. For a long time, the Labor Party (PvdA) was the natural home for the working-class population in Rotterdam. Between the 1960s and the 1990s, the PvdA was the largest party in the City Council and with varying coalition partners responsible for the local policy. In the past decade much has changed. Although in the 1990s the Labor Party had already lost part of its loyal rank and file, losing its supposedly indisputable position as the city's largest party in the 2002 local elections was a painful experience for the party leaders. The populist right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn and his newly-founded party Livable Rotterdam stunned the established parties by gaining 17 of the 45 seats in the City Council. Forming a coalition was a difficult task for Livable Rotterdam, since many parties were reluctant to work with the flamboyant Fortuyn and his largely inexperienced partisans. Fortuyn's strong statements on the 'failing integration of immigrants' and the need for an 'immigration stop' formed other obstacles for many parties. Statements like these – which provided an important basis for his popularity among a large part of the Rotterdam electorate – gave him and his party the image of being 'anti-immigrant'. Despite these barriers, a coalition was finally formed with the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Liberals (VVD).

[26] See www.os.amsterdam.nl.

The 2002 local elections, held in March, were perceived as an important indicator for the Dutch national elections of May that same year. A national turn to the right was expected, since the popular Fortuyn also joined these elections, with his party List Pim Fortuyn (LPF). A clear turn to the right indeed occurred, but nobody could have predicted the circumstances in which this happened. A few weeks before the elections, Fortuyn left the building where he had given a radio interview and was shot dead by an animal rights activist. Fortuyn's death caused much grief and anger among the Dutch public.[27] Many people became even more determined to support Fortuyn's party, paying a last tribute to the murdered politician. The LPF achieved a historic triumph in Dutch parliament (from 0 to 26 seats) and took part in a government with the same coalition partners as Livable Rotterdam. The presence of the so-called 'Fortuynists' caused friction within the Dutch government. After being installed in July 2002, the Cabinet resigned in October 2002. LPF's electorate gradually declined, leading to the party's abolishment in 2008. This does not mean, however, that the support for a harsher immigration and integration policy has decreased. A large part of the former LPF electorate are nowadays followers of another far-right party: Geert Wilders's Party for Freedom (PVV).

Although in Rotterdam, the coalition of Livable Rotterdam, CDA, and VVD also experienced internal problems, the 2002-2006 administration is by many seen as relatively successful (cf. Van Ostaaijen 2010). In contrast to the national party LPF, Livable Rotterdam maintained the support of a large part of its electorate in the following elections. However, in 2006, the Labor Party recaptured its position as the largest party in Rotterdam. In particular the high turn-out rate among immigrant voters is seen as an important explanation for the Labor Party's recovery (cf. Tillie 2006). In the most recent local elections, in 2010, the Labor Party received only about 700 more votes than Livable Rotterdam. The Labor Party formed a coalition with the Liberals, the Democrats (D66), and the Christian Democrats.

Although the rise of Livable Rotterdam is remarkable, in Rotterdam, far-right parties were successful before. As Table 2.4 shows, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Centre Party and the Centre Democrats were seated in the Rotterdam City Council. More than is the case with present-day far-right parties such as Livable Rotterdam and, on the national level, Geert Wilders's PVV, these earlier parties were la-

[27] See for a short overview of the events around the 2002 elections in the Netherlands, *Dutch prepare for shift to the Right*, on http://news.scotsman.com/world/Dutch-prepare-for-shift-to.2326946.jp.

beled 'radical right'. In the 1994 local elections, Rotterdam had the highest percentage of Centre Democrats voters of any large city in the Netherlands (Hippe et al. 1995). The CD represented the sentiments of a substantial part of the native Dutch population in Rotterdam. Many people – then and now – have the feeling that due to continuing processes of immigration, the city is not 'theirs' anymore. In particular the changing composition of their neighborhoods makes them feel strangers in their own city (cf. De Gruijter et al. 2010). Since the rise of Pim Fortuyn, it has become more accepted to express such feelings of dissatisfaction publicly.

Table 2.4: Distribution of seats in the Rotterdam City Council, 1978-2010

	1978	**1982**	**1986**	**1990**	**1994**	**1998**	**2002**	**2006**	**2010**
Labor Party (PvdA)	25	21	24	18	12	15	11	18	14
Livable Rotterdam (LR)	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	14	14
Christian Democrats (CDA)	10	8	8	9	6	6	5	3	3
Liberal Party (VVD)	6	9	7	6	6	9	4	3	4
Green Party (GL)	1	4	2	2	3	4	3	2	3
Democrats (D66)	2	2	2	7	7	3	2	1	4
Centre Party/Centre Democrats (CP86/CD)	-	-	1	2	6	-	-	-	-
Other parties	1	1	1	1	5	7	3	4	3
Total	**45**	**45**	**45**	**45**	**45**	**45**	**45**	**45**	**45**

Source: Burger et al. (2010: 12).

Livable Rotterdam put the themes 'safety' and 'integration' on top of the local political agenda. The party advocates a 'zero tolerance' attitude toward mugging, burglary and drug-related nuisance, combined with a strong focus on the socio-cultural adaptation of immigrants. Livable Rotterdam's 2002-2006 administration aimed at making the city attractive again for middle-class families. According to the party, an important cause of the high crime rates and failing immigrant integration in Rotterdam is the city's unbalanced population composition. The concentration of lower-class immigrant households in certain neighborhoods is believed to create 'unlivable' situations. In 2006, Rotterdam was the first Dutch city to experiment with the banning of low-income households from certain districts to prevent further concen-

trations of underprivileged groups (cf. Bol and De Langen 2006). Although after 2006, Livable Rotterdam was not in power anymore, several of its measures were adopted not only by the following local administrations, but also by the national government. The law that was developed against "ghetto formation," publicly known as the 'Rotterdam Act', was later on also approved by the Dutch Lower House, which made it possible for other cities to implement the act as well.[28] More in general, the 'Rotterdam Approach', which is described as a strategy of dealing with problems by "daring and doing," is a phenomenon that is influential beyond the city itself.[29]

Although the policy strategies of Livable Rotterdam and the Labor Party in past years have proved to be quite similar, this does not mean that the two parties have buried the hatchet. In January 2009, Ahmed Aboutaleb, a Labor Party politician of Moroccan origin, was installed as the mayor of Rotterdam (cf. Burke 2009). He became the first mayor in the Netherlands with dual Dutch-Moroccan nationality and the first Muslim mayor of a large West European city. When Aboutaleb was appointed, the leader of Livable Rotterdam said this was unacceptable to his party. Aboutaleb's two passports were seen as a sign of dual loyalty. After Aboutaleb's installation, Livable Rotterdam gave the new mayor a stamped envelope addressed to the king of Morocco, so he could send his Moroccan passport back to where it belonged (cf. Van Bochove et al. 2010a). This would not be the last time Livable Rotterdam would question Aboutaleb's loyalty. The party and many of its followers fear that, whenever he gets the opportunity, Aboutaleb will favor his 'own people' (i.e., other Moroccans, Muslims, or immigrants in general). However, many others see Aboutaleb as the perfect mediator between the city's native Dutch and immigrant population.[30] Although Livable Rotterdam portrays Aboutaleb as a representative of the immigrant population, he is also known for his firm statements toward the 'Muslim community'. In 2004, after film maker Theo van Gogh was stabbed to death by an extremist Muslim of Moroccan descent, Aboutaleb – at that time alderman in Amsterdam – gave a speech in a local mosque, saying that whoever does not sub-

[28] See 'Lower House approves 'Rotterdam Act'', www.nisnews.nl/public/090905_1.htm.

[29] See on 'De Rotterdamse aanpak', for instance, www.rotterdam.nl/cultuurgemeenterotterdam.

[30] The daily paper *Trouw* (17 October 2008), for instance, wrote that Aboutaleb's appointment was "good for Rotterdam and for the country." In *De Volkskrant* (18 October 2008), Aboutaleb was described as "a role model for newcomers in the Netherlands." The phenomenon of immigrant role models forms the topic of the first intermezzo, at the end of Chapter 3.

scribe to the core values in the Netherlands can pack his bags and leave: "Nobody will stop you. *Adieu*, planes are flying every day." Because of statements like this, it is sometimes said that Aboutaleb's political style resembles that of certain right-wing populists.[31]

It can be concluded that the integration of immigrants in Rotterdam is a hot issue. Although the city has a long history of incorporating newcomers, in the past decade the presence of a large 'allochtonous' population has been increasingly deemed problematic. Despite the fact that a growing part of the first- and second-generation immigrant population in Rotterdam has achieved middle-class status, when politicians talk about preserving and attracting middle-class families, they are often implicitly referring to native Dutch households who are about to move to a suburb or already have done so (cf. Reijndorp and Van der Zwaard 2004: 86). Immigrant middle-class families do not get much attention; according to Reijndorp and Van der Zwaard (2004: 83) they form a largely ignored population category. Knowledge workers are an exception, however. In recent years, the Municipality of Rotterdam has developed a specific policy to attract these highly skilled migrants. Unlike most other categories of migrants (cf. Lucassen and Lucassen 2011: 18), knowledge workers are said to deserve a "red carpet welcome" (cf. Municipality of Rotterdam 2009: 17). In 2008, a special Expat Desk opened its doors. At this desk, expatriates can receive practical information about, for instance, obtaining a residence permit, opening a bank account, or finding a house. However, compared to cities as Amsterdam and The Hague, which have a long tradition of providing specific expat services, in Rotterdam, this red carpet policy is still in its early stages (cf. Van Bochove et al. 2010b).

Research design

With its diverse population, its image of being a rich city with poor people, and its heated political debates on immigration and integration, Rotterdam is a highly interesting setting for studying the local and transnational activities and identifications of socioeconomically successful migrant groups. In doing so, this research adopts a mixed methods approach, denoting a combination of quantitative and qualitative

[31] On the website www.maroc.nl/forums, Aboutaleb's statements were discussed by Dutch youngsters of Moroccan descent under the header of *Ahmed Aboutaleb: de witte Marokkaan* ["the white Moroccan"].

measures. The number of mixed methods studies is increasing rapidly in recent years (cf. Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2009: 266). However, although some scholars of transnational involvement also adopt a mixed methods approach (e.g. Bailey et al. 2002; Savage et al. 2005; Carling 2007), most literature in this field is still based on either in-depth case studies focusing on the nature of migrants' homeland ties (e.g. Nell 2007; Smith and Bakker 2008; Thompson 2009) or on large data sets that provide information on the quantitative importance of transnationalism (e.g. Snel et al. 2006; Waldinger 2008; Clark 2009). Both quantitative and qualitative studies have led to important – although sometimes contradictory – conclusions about the necessity of a transnational perspective. In their overview of two decades of transnational migration studies, Levitt and Jaworsky (2007: 142), however, rightly argue that the time has come to "move beyond thick description, single case studies, and quantification, to address a set of more-focused themes and questions." This research makes an attempt to do so, by treating qualitative and quantitative measures as complements rather than substitutes. After having further explained this approach, I will elucidate the selection and recruitment of respondents and the conduct of the fieldwork. I conclude this section with discussing the study's reliability and validity.

A mixed methods approach

Given that I am interested in both the extent to which the respondents participate in various activities and develop various identities and their motives for these practices and identifications, I adopt a mixed methods approach (cf. Borkan 2004: 4). Mixed methods research can be understood as "research that involves collecting, analyzing, and interpreting quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or in a series of studies that investigate the same underlying phenomenon" (Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2009: 267). In this research, I have chosen a mixed method procedure that is concurrent rather than sequential. Both forms of data were collected at the same time and analyzed side by side (cf. Creswell 2009: 14).

In total, 400 respondents were interviewed about their activities and identifications relating different spatial scales and social spheres. The interviews took place on a face-to-face basis, using a survey consisting of open- and closed-ended ques-

tions.[32] The *Transnationalism and Urban Citizenship* survey (further referred to as the TUC survey) that was used is partly based on a survey that was developed for a previous research project on transnational involvement (cf. Engbersen et al. 2003; Snel et al. 2006). However, the survey used in this research supplements the previous one in various ways. Whereas the older survey consisted almost entirely of closed-ended questions, the TUC survey also includes many open-ended questions. The closed-ended questions provide information about the respondents' general characteristics, such as their job level, migration history, nationality, and family situation. Furthermore, quantitative instruments were used to gain first insight into the respondents' economic, political, and socio-cultural activities and feelings of belonging. In the open-ended questions respondents were asked to give reasons for their answers (such as, "Why did you adopt Dutch nationality?") or to give additional information (for instance, "What are your activities as a volunteer?"). In the empirical chapters of this book, I will refer to the exact questions that were asked. The quantitative data were coded and analyzed in SPSS. The qualitative data analysis program ATLAS.ti was used for analyzing the answers to the open questions.[33]

A second important difference between the TUC survey and the previous one is that the TUC survey not only focuses on bi-national ties, but also includes questions regarding various spatial scales. Special attention was paid to the respondents' urban practices and identifications. For instance, respondents were asked how long they have lived in Rotterdam, why they chose to live there, and to what extent they feel an emotional bond with the city. In other cases, the spatial levels of the respondents' activities and identifications were not already determined in the questions or answer categories. For example, the respondents were asked if they ever participated in various kinds of political practices. When their answer was affirmative, they were asked when and where the activity took place, and what the aim was. Particu-

[32] The questionnaire used among the middle-class respondents can be found at: http://www.eur.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/fsw/Sociologie/burgerschap/Vragenlijst_Transnationalisme_en_Stedelijk_Burgerschap.pdf. The knowledge worker survey can be found at: http://www.eur.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/fsw/Sociologie/expats/Erasmus_Questionnaire_on_Transnationalism_and_Citizenship.pdf.

[33] In analyzing the qualitative material, more than 400 different codes were developed in ATLAS.ti. For instance, the answers to the question in what other countries the respondents have lived and for what reasons (see Chapter 3) were coded as 'USA', 'Western-Europe', Southern-Europe, 'Asia', etc., and as 'work-related', 'for studies', 'because of return migration', 'together with parents', etc. Parts of the qualitative data were transferred into SPSS.

larly questions like these made it possible to find out the importance of transnational ties beyond national borders.

Although the TUC survey was used among all three respondent groups, it was adapted to specific characteristics of the different groups. The immigrant and native Dutch middle-class respondents were interviewed on the basis of a Dutch questionnaire (in this book, I translated their statements into English), whereas the survey used for interviewing the knowledge worker respondents was in English. Next to questions on the Netherlands and Rotterdam, in the surveys used among the middle-class immigrants and the knowledge workers many questions concerned their (parents') country of origin. Since for the native Dutch respondents the (parents') country of origin was the Netherlands, the survey used for this respondent group was shorter. Compared with the survey used among the middle-class immigrants and the native Dutch, the knowledge worker version consisted of more open-ended questions. Because of the fact that not much is known yet about the daily lives of knowledge workers in the Netherlands, it was decided to interview these migrants even more in-depth than the other respondent groups.

Selecting and recruiting respondents

The 400 respondents interviewed in this research consist of 225 middle-class migrants of Surinamese, Turkish, and Moroccan origin, 75 knowledge workers from various Western and non-Western countries, and 100 native Dutch middle-class respondents. Surinamese, Turkish, and Moroccan migrants were selected because they represent the three largest migrant groups in Rotterdam. In selecting knowledge workers, at first, the aim was to select respondents only from among the three largest national groups. However, since official figures on the countries of origin of knowledge workers in Rotterdam are absent, this self-imposed restriction was lifted. Moreover, although we (meaning the TUC research team) could have chosen to base our selection on national data – and thus select only Indian, American, Japanese, and Chinese knowledge workers (cf. IND 2009: 16) – this restriction would have made it unnecessarily difficult to recruit a substantial number of respondents. Since this study is primarily interested in comparing two types of migrants, it was more important that the respondents met the criteria for being a 'knowledge worker' or a 'middle-class immigrant', than that they had a certain ethnic or national background.

Although this research first and foremost focuses on the two groups of migrants, native Dutch respondents are included to enable a comparison between the experiences of migrants (including the second generation) and non-migrants (cf. Martiniello 2006: 105). Below, I will explain based on what criteria the respondents were selected, and how they were recruited.

The respondents all have in common that they live in the Rotterdam area. A large majority of them live in the municipality of Rotterdam itself; the others live in one of its suburbs, such as Capelle aan den IJssel, Barendrecht, and Lansingerland. In determining the respondents' countries of origin, the definition of *Statistics Netherlands* (CBS) is followed. In this research, I classify a respondent as 'native Dutch' if both this respondent's parents were born in the Netherlands, regardless of the individual's own country of birth. If one or both parents were born in another country, the respondent is classified as 'non-native Dutch', further specified into different countries of origin and different immigrant generations (cf. CBS 2010).

Regarding other selection criteria, a distinction can be made between the migrant and native Dutch middle class on the one hand and the knowledge workers on the other hand. In selecting Surinamese, Turkish, Moroccan, and native Dutch middle-class respondents, the definition of middle class was derived from *The Netherlands Institute for Social Research* (SCP). According to SCP, immigrants can be counted as middle class if they meet one or more of the following criteria: (a) they have a job that requires at least intermediate vocational education; (b) they work as independent entrepreneurs for at least a year, and (c) they have a gross income per year above the national median income (Dagevos et al. 2006: 120).[34] In addition to SCP's definition, in this research only respondents who work at least 20 hours per week were included. Moreover, instead of classifying every entrepreneur as middle class, only entrepreneurs in producer services were selected. Based on previous research, it is known that migrants who work in this sector have a higher education level than, for instance, those who own a grocery store or hair salon (cf. Rusinovic 2006).

According to the 'Knowledge migrant procedure' of the Dutch *Immigration and Naturalisation Service* (IND), a knowledge worker is a migrant from outside the European Union, coming to the Netherlands to work as an employee and receiving a gross annual income above a certain minimum level. These amounts are indexed annually for inflation. In 2008, the minimum was about € 48,000 for knowledge

[34] In 2004, the Dutch national median income was € 22,921.

workers 30 years of age or older and about € 35,000 for those younger than 30 (IND 2009: 11). Furthermore, migrants who come to the Netherlands to work as a PhD student or as another type of scientific researcher are included in IND's definition, regardless of their income. Although many of the highly skilled temporary migrants in this research meet these official criteria, in selecting respondents, an extended version of this definition was used. In this research, the term 'knowledge worker' also includes migrants from EU member states. These 'free movers' are an interesting category to include, because they form an important part of the highly skilled labor migration to large European cities (cf. Favell 2008). Furthermore, people coming to the Netherlands because of their partner's work were included. Following Colic-Peisker (2010: 471), I call these accompanying partners "trailing spouses." In addition to the fact that these spouses usually have more time to participate in a survey (cf. Fechter 2007: 9), they are believed to play an important role in the local incorporation and future plans of the expatriate family, which makes it interesting to include their experiences.[35] Because of expected similarities in migration history, family situation, and activities and opinions, principally, no couples were included. Only in one case, both the expatriate husband and his spouse were interviewed (separately), because of their remarkable life stories. These respondents meet the following conditions: (a) they (or their partner) came to the Netherlands to perform a job that requires at least higher vocational education; (b) they reside in the Netherlands longer than six months and less than seven years. A minimum period of residence was required since migrants who had just arrived would not be able to answer certain questions. A maximum was included because of this research's focus on highly skilled migrants who came to the Netherlands on a temporary basis.

As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, reliable data on the presence of middle-class immigrants and knowledge workers in Rotterdam are scarce. Randomly selecting respondents who meet the above-described criteria would be almost impossible. Therefore, various strategies were used to recruit respondents. Since the migrant groups studied in this research form only a small part of the total immigrant population in Rotterdam, snowball sampling and chain referral sampling are useful sam-

[35] In 2002, the Dutch newspaper *NRC Handelsblad*, for instance, published an article entitled 'Als de vrouw maar gelukkig is' ['As long as the wife is happy'], about the investments multinationals make for their employees' spouses, to prevent "the failure of an expat assignment due to unhappy partners."

pling methods (cf. Penrod et al. 2003). Both methods are based on the principle that initial respondents are asked if they know any other persons who meet the selection criteria. Chain referral sampling differs from snowball sampling in that "multiple networks are strategically accessed to expand the scope of investigation beyond one social network" (Penrod et al. 2003: 102). In accordance with this method, in this research multiple 'snowballs' were developed from various starting points. The interviewers recruited initial respondents through their own social networks and various businesses, organizations, and meetings. An online tracking system was created, so the interviewers could see which persons and institutions were already contacted. Interviewers were allowed to interview only people they did not know in person. The respondents recruited through interviewers' 'own' social network in practice are thus persons they know only indirectly, such as 'a colleague of my brother's' or 'my aunt's neighbor'. These initial respondents were then asked if they knew any other potential respondents, preferably outside their own direct circle of family, friends, and colleagues. A maximum of three referrals per respondent were allowed. Table 2.5 gives an overview of the number of respondents recruited through different sources. The consequences of these strategies for the generalizability of this research's results are discussed in the section on internal and external validity.

Table 2.5: Strategies for recruiting respondents, absolute numbers and percentages

	Middle-class migrants	**Middle-class native Dutch**	**Knowledge workers**
Network respondents	121 (53.8%)	32 (32.0%)	31 (41.3%)
Network interviewers	72 (32.0%)	60 (60.0%)	23 (30.7%)
Contacting organizations	15 (6.7%)	-	16 (21.3%)
Attending meetings	6 (2.7%)	5 (5.0%)	5 (6.7%)
Previous research	11 (4.9%)	-	-
Other	-	3 (3.0%)	-
N	**225**	**100**	**75**

Note: 'Previous research' includes respondents who also participated in Katja Rusinovic's (2006) research on first- and second-generation immigrant entrepreneurs. 'Other' includes respondents who were approached on the street or in a shop.

Conducting the fieldwork

In total, the *Transnationalism and Urban Citizenship* project counted 28 interviewers, mainly students in sociology. The fieldwork was conducted in three stages, each stage being directed to a different group of respondents and carried out by a different interview team. Although all three stages involved native Dutch interviewers (such as me), during the middle-class migrant fieldwork, also interviewers with a migrant background were employed. These interviewers of Surinamese, Turkish, and Moroccan origin often had easy access to potential respondents. The interviews with knowledge workers were also partly conducted by migrant interviewers. For this part of the fieldwork, fluency in English was required.

Because the survey interviews consisted of a combination of multiple choice and open-ended questions, interviewers needed the capacity to read questions and answer categories as neutrally as possible and to react to respondents' answers with further questions. To promote the quality of the fieldwork, collective interview training sessions were held. Moreover, one of the two research coordinators joined the interviewers during their first interview, to give them some more tips and tricks afterwards. I joined 21 of such interviews. After each interview, the interviewers imported the quantitative questions in SPSS and transcribed the qualitative questions in Word format documents. Contrary to the interviews with knowledge workers – which had more open-ended questions – the interviews with middle-class respondents were not recorded. Despite the fact that interviewers were asked to write down the respondents' answers as literally as possible, we inevitably lost some information because of this.

The interviews with migrant middle-class respondents generally took about 1 to 1.5 hours. Because the native Dutch respondent survey was somewhat shorter, these interviews generally took up to an hour. The knowledge worker survey took longest: generally about 1.5 to 2 hours. The interviews I conducted myself – 58 in total, more or less equally divided among the three groups – in many cases took some additional time, because I wanted to further discuss some specific topics, such as feelings of belonging.

A total of 9 interviews with knowledge workers were excluded from the sample because the respondents did not meet the selection criteria, for instance because they migrated to the Netherlands a long time ago or came for family reasons.

Some of these interviews were conducted in the orientation phase of the fieldwork, in order to test the survey and receive input to sharpen the questions.[36] Although these respondents are not included in the quantitative analysis, occasionally I will refer to their answers on the open-ended questions.

In addition to the 400 survey interviews, 15 'purely' qualitative interviews were conducted with successful immigrant women. Of these women, 8 also participated in the larger research project. The other 7 were women of Surinamese, Turkish, and Cape Verdean origin, of which some were publicly known for their successful career in business or politics. I did 7 of these interviews myself; the other 8 were conducted by a research assistant. In the interviews, the women talked about their road to economic success and the barriers they had to overcome. These interviews will be central to the intermezzo about the economic sphere at the end of Chapter 3. In the orientation phase of the fieldwork among the knowledge workers, several in-depth interviews were conducted with representatives of organizations that deal with these migrants, such as the Expat Desk, a relocation agency, two international schools, and an expat association. The interview I had with the coordinator of an expat association forms the basis of the intermezzo at the end of Chapter 5, which deals with the socio-cultural sphere.

Internal and external validity

Regarding this research's validity, I will address two relevant questions: (1) to what extent do the results of this research reflect what the respondents *really* do, think, and feel?, and (2) to what extent do the results of this research reflect what the *total population* of middle-class migrants, knowledge workers, and native Dutch in Rotterdam do, think, and feel? The first question concerns the research's internal validity, the second its generalizability or external validity.

Socially desirable answers are a threat to a research's internal validity. The tendency of respondents to give answers they think the interviewer wants to hear is known to be influenced by interviewers' background characteristics, such as gender and ethnicity. For instance, in studies about gender roles, male respondents are more likely to say that women have too much influence in society when they face a male

[36] This was also done at the start of the fieldwork among the middle-class migrants. In this case, all initial interviews could be included in the sample, since the respondents met the selection criteria and the questionnaire was not changed drastically.

interviewer, whereas they are more likely to say that women have too little influence when the interviewer is female (cf. Bernard 2000: 213). The fact that in this research female and male interviewers both interviewed female and male respondents probably has not affected the results much, since no specific gender-related questions were asked. Possible effects of the interviewers' ethnic background deserve more attention, since such ethnicity-of-interviewer effects are known to be probable in the case of questions related to ethnic or racial issues. Research among Mexican-Americans, for instance, showed that respondents reported having more Mexican-American friends to a Mexican-American than to an Anglo-American interviewer (cf. Reese et al. 1986: 568).

Of the 225 middle-class migrants interviewed for this research, 92 were interviewed by someone who had the same ethnic background. In 66 cases, the interviewer was native Dutch, and in 67 cases, the respondent and the interviewer were both migrants, but had different ethnic backgrounds. The knowledge workers were mainly interviewed by native Dutch. Analysis of the interviews with middle-class migrants shows that regarding certain questions, interviewer effects occurred (Van Bochove et al., forthcoming). Respondents who were interviewed by a native Dutch person, for instance, express stronger identification with Dutch people than respondents interviewed by another migrant. Respondents who were interviewed by someone who had the same ethnic background as they have report stronger identification with the home country than those interviewed by an outsider (either a native Dutch person or someone with another non-Dutch background).[37] However, although the ethnic background of the interviewer has some influence on the respondents' answers to questions on identification, this effect should not be exaggerated. For instance, even though identification with native Dutch people proves to be

[37] Such interviewer effects are often explained by the fact that respondents try to avoid offending the interviewer (Reese et al. 1986: 563). A Turkish respondent who has no warm feelings for 'the Dutch' might feel more confident to tell this to another immigrant than to a native Dutch person. Another Turkish respondent, who does not feel close to Turkey, might feel more at ease talking to a non-Turkish interviewer. Consequently, ethnic matching does not necessarily provide more 'genuine' answers than a mixed situation (cf. Rhodes 1994: 552). Moreover, it should be remarked that strategic answering is not the only explanation possible for interviewer effects. In the case of questions concerning identification, respondents might unconsciously feel more 'Turkish' when they talk to a Turkish person and more 'Dutch' when the interviewer is native Dutch. Since identifications are always constructed in interaction with others, one cannot simply argue that identifications expressed to a Dutch interviewer are less (or more) 'real' than those expressed to a fellow Turk.

stronger among respondents who were interviewed by a native Dutch interviewer, still, similar to those who were interviewed by a fellow immigrant, these respondents first and foremost identify with co-ethnics in the Netherlands.

In my own interviews with middle-class migrants, I experienced that the respondents were not hesitant to say critical things about Dutch society. Although this could be understood as a sign that they saw me – being a native Dutch person – as partly responsible for certain societal problems (cf. Barreto et al. 2003: 308), I interpreted it primarily as an indication that they felt they could talk freely and were not wondering whether or not I would be offended. In the interviews with knowledge workers, this was sometimes different. The following quotation illustrates the caution among some of the respondents.

> I'm not negative about this country at all, please don't take it this way, but…

A memo of an American interviewer even more explicitly shows the hesitance of some knowledge workers. I had joined this interviewer during her first interview. In the transcription of the interview, she noted:

> The respondent expressed to me after the interview that she was worried about making negative comments about the Netherlands and Dutch culture, as she did not want to offend Marianne in any way, especially because she thought she was a very nice and friendly person.

Such remarks suggest that some knowledge workers consider themselves to be 'guests' in the Netherlands. A good guest naturally does not offend his or her hostess. The middle-class migrants, on the other hand, seemed to feel they had the right to be critical, because the Netherlands is 'their' country as well as 'mine'. Fortunately, although sometimes hesitant at the start, in the course of the interview, the knowledge workers also appeared to be comfortable enough to talk openly about their experiences in Dutch society.

Next to issues concerning the research's internal validity, some remarks should be made about its external validity. As I explained earlier, this research is based on a non-random sample, which means that some members of the population were less likely to be included than others. Because chain referral sampling – based on accessing multiple networks – was an important strategy for recruiting respon-

dents, persons who fell outside such networks were less likely to be reached. For instance, a Surinamese man who lives in a 'white' neighborhood, who works in an 'all-Dutch' office, and who does not associate much with other people with a migrant background is less likely to be referred to by other migrant respondents than a Surinamese man who lives in a mixed neighborhood, who has colleagues of different ethnic backgrounds, and who spends much of his leisure time volunteering for a migrant organization. In other words, although the selection of respondents was formally based on criteria such as job level, socially active respondents who have friends and colleagues who are migrants as well are probably overrepresented. Similar to other research (cf. Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008: 167), Moroccan respondents generally proved more difficult to reach than respondents of other ethnic groups. To recruit Moroccan respondents, several civil society organizations were contacted, with the result that, again, 'active' migrants were interviewed.

For reasons of comparability, the tables in the empirical chapters generally present percentages. Because of the non-random nature of the sample, these percentages need to come with a "health warning" (cf. Savage et al. 2005: 16). Based on the results it is not possible to make definite statements about the total population of middle-class migrants, native Dutch, and knowledge workers in Rotterdam. My aim is a different one than statistically testing various hypotheses. Rather, in Layder's (1998: 38) words, I attempt to bring various methods and theories into dialogue with each other, which means that "the theory both adapts to, or is shaped by, incoming evidence at the same time as the data themselves are filtered through (and adapted to) the extant theoretical materials that are relevant and at hand." Different from a grounded theory approach, the objective of this so-called adaptive theory approach is not generating a new theory from scratch, but building on existing theories. In this research, I follow this approach, by intervening in current debates on the two groups of migrants' transnational and local involvement. I thus systematically compare my own empirical findings with dominant assumptions in the literature. As Layder (1998: 51) puts it, this is analyzing data with theory in mind.

Introducing the respondents

Before turning to the empirical chapters, I will provide a first glance at the diversity of the respondent groups. Below, I will briefly introduce the respondents, by dis-

cussing some of their general characteristics, such as sex, age, country of origin, and education level. An overview of these characteristics per respondent group can be found in Table 2.6, on pages 58-59. In addition, the tables in the Appendix give an overview of some general characteristics of each of the 400 respondents.

Male-female and knowledge worker-spouse ratio

In selecting the migrant and native Dutch middle-class respondents, we aimed at achieving a more or less equal share of male and female respondents. As Table 2.6 shows, this has succeeded. Also within the groups of Surinamese, Turkish, and Moroccan middle-class immigrants, the number of men and women is nearly equal. In the group of knowledge workers, however, more women than men were interviewed. This was mainly caused by the fact that trailing spouses are included as well, of whom most are female. While only about a quarter of the knowledge workers in the Netherlands who received a residence permit in 2008 were female (IND 2009: 17), the share of male and female knowledge workers in this research is more evenly divided. Of the 29 male respondents, 28 came to Rotterdam as a knowledge worker and one as a trailing spouse. Of the 46 female respondents, 24 are knowledge workers themselves and 22 are trailing spouses. In this research, I will refer to both types of respondents as knowledge workers. I will only distinguish between those who came because of their own job and trailing spouses when important differences exist.

Age distribution

In all three respondent groups, about one-third of the respondents are between 25 and 30 years old. Another third are between 30 and 40. Although the respondents were not selected based on their age, the age distribution in the group of middle-class migrants and the group of knowledge workers is rather similar. The average age among the native Dutch respondents is somewhat lower. Among the middle-class respondents, no important differences exist between the ages of male and female respondents. In the group of knowledge workers, the female respondents – particularly those who came to the Netherlands because of their own job – are generally younger than the male respondents.

Length of stay and generation

Whereas the respondent groups are quite similar regarding their gender and age, they completely differ with regard to their length of stay in the Netherlands. Except for one respondent who was born in Zambia and lived there for three years, all native Dutch middle-class respondents were born in the Netherlands. Of the middle-class migrants, about one-third were born in the Netherlands. All the others have lived there for at least ten years; most of them migrated more than twenty years ago. One of the knowledge workers was born in the Netherlands. He left the country more than twenty years ago and now temporarily lives there again because of his job. About half of the knowledge workers came to the Netherlands between one and three years ago.

The group of middle-class migrants consists of three different immigrant generations. Respondents that came to the Netherlands when they were twelve years or older are classified as first generation. Middle-class migrants who were born in Surinam, Turkey, or Morocco, but who came to the Netherlands before the age of twelve, can be called the 1.5 generation (cf. Kasinitz et al. 2008: 2). The second generation consists of migrants who were born in the Netherlands. Although the middle-class migrants were not selected based on their immigrant generation, the respondents are almost equally divided among the three generations.

The parents' country of birth

As I explained earlier, in determining the respondents' ethnic background, I follow the definition of *Statistics Netherlands* (CBS). Respondents are classified as native Dutch when both of their parents were born in the Netherlands. The parents of the middle-class migrants were almost all born in Surinam, Turkey, or Morocco. In the case of ten respondents, the parents were born in two different countries. Most of them have one Surinamese and one native Dutch parent. The most common countries of birth among the knowledge workers' parents are the US, the UK, Japan, Germany, Portugal, India, Poland, China, and South Africa. Next to these countries, there are respondents whose parents were born in Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Pakistan, Romania, Spain, and Taiwan. Some respondents' parents were born in two different countries, such as Po-

land/Romania, Italy/Peru, Taiwan/the Netherlands, France/US, and Tunisia/Italy. In by far the most cases, the knowledge workers were born in the same country as at least one of their parents.

Although knowledge workers of both Western and non-Western origin are interviewed, the majority have a Western background. Non-Western knowledge workers proved to be more difficult to find than Western ones. Indian knowledge workers, who form a steadily growing group, are especially underrepresented in this research.

When I cite the respondents, in addition to their sex and age, I will also refer to their parents' country of birth. Often, but certainly not always, this country corresponds with the respondents' nationality. In Chapter 4, I will further discuss this issue.[38]

Religion

A majority of the middle-class migrants call themselves Muslims. Of the 75 Moroccan middle-class migrants, 73 are Muslims. Of the 75 Turkish middle-class migrants, 64 are Muslims. Most of the other migrants from these groups do not have a religion. Within the group of Surinamese middle-class migrants, more variety exists. Most of the Creole-Surinamese are Christians (34, to be exact), one is a Muslim, and some others do not have a religion. Most of the Hindustani-Surinamese are Hindus (16 of them), three are Muslims, one is a Christian, and another one is not religious. Most other Surinamese respondents (for instance those who have a Javanese or mixed background) are Christians. In total, less than one in ten middle-class migrants state that they do not have a religion.

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[38] Of course, the categories 'Surinamese', 'Turkish', and 'Moroccan' (as well as the other ethnic backgrounds represented in this research) are internally diverse. The Surinamese respondents were asked whether they count themselves as 'Creoles', 'Hindustani', 'Javanese', or another group; within the Turkish respondent group, several respondents classify themselves as 'Kurds' or 'Alevis'; among the Moroccan respondents, the most important distinction is between 'Berber' and 'Arabic' Moroccans. In this research, however, the only distinction I sometimes make is between Creole-Surinamese and Hindustani-Surinamese. Although there certainly is a difference between 'ethnic' and 'national' background (e.g., all Creoles are Surinamese, but not all Surinamese are Creoles), I do not always make a strict distinction between them. For instance, in discussing marriages between Surinamese migrants in Chapter 5, I use the common term 'co-ethnic marriage', instead of 'co-national marriage'.

Among the knowledge workers, the percentage of atheists is somewhat higher: about one in five respondents. Almost one in three knowledge workers is Christian. Four knowledge workers, of which three have an Indian background, are Hindus. One Albanian and one Turkish knowledge worker are Muslims. Four Japanese knowledge workers are Buddhists. More than half of the native Dutch respondents are not religious, while most of the others are Christians. Three native Dutch respondents are Muslims.

Although I do not go into detail about the respondents' religious practices, I do discuss religion as a ground for political solidarity (Intermezzo II) and place attachment (Chapter 5).

Job type and education level

Most of the middle-class respondents are employees, while others work as entrepreneurs, and again others combine both. Among the knowledge workers, only employees were interviewed. Most of the trailing spouses do not have a paid job. A large majority of the knowledge workers have a university degree. Among the middle-class native Dutch, almost half do, and among the middle-class migrants, one-fifth. In the next chapter, I will further discuss the respondents' economic characteristics, including their job levels, salaries, and the sectors in which they work.

Table 2.6: Characteristics of the three respondent groups, percentages

	Middle-class migrants	Knowledge workers	Middle-class native Dutch
Gender			
Male	52.0	38.7	51.0
Female	48.0	61.3	49.0
Type of respondent			
Knowledge worker	NA	69.3	NA
Trailing spouse	NA	30.7	NA
Age			
20-24	7.6	4.0	10.0
25-29	29.3	30.7	36.0
30-34	17.8	18.7	18.0
35-39	16.4	17.3	10.0
40-44	11.1	16.0	7.0
45-49	8.4	8.0	6.0
50-54	5.3	4.0	9.0
55 and over	4.0	1.3	4.0
Length of stay			
NA (Born in NL)	36.9	1.3	99.0
Less than a year	-	9.3	-
Between 1-2 years	-	48.0	-
Between 2-3 years	-	13.3	-
Between 3-4 years	-	8.0	-
Between 4-5 years	-	12.0	-
Between 5-6 years	-	4.0	-
Between 6-7 years	-	5.3	-
Between 10-20 years	13.3	-	-
Between 20-30 years	21.3	-	1.0
Between 30-40 years	26.2	-	-
More than 40 years	2.2	-	-
Generation			
First	32.9	100	NA
1.5	30.2	-	NA
Second	36.9	-	NA

Note. In the case of 'Length of stay', the knowledge worker that was born in the Netherlands is also counted in the category of 'Between 2 and 3 years'.

	Middle-class migrants	Knowledge workers	Middle-class native Dutch
Parents' country of birth			
The Netherlands	-	1.3	100
Surinam	30.2	-	-
Turkey	32.9	2.7	-
Morocco	32.4	-	-
US	-	13.3	-
UK	-	10.7	-
Japan	-	6.7	-
Germany	-	5.3	-
Portugal	-	5.3	-
India	-	5.3	-
Poland	-	5.3	-
China	-	4.0	-
South Africa	-	4.0	-
Other country	-	21.3	-
Two different countries	4.4	14.7	-
Religion			
Islam	63.1	2.7	3.0
Christianity	19.1	64.0	39.0
Hinduism	7.1	5.3	-
Buddhism	-	5.3	1.0
Other	1.8	1.3	3.0
None	8.9	21.3	54.0
Job type			
Employee	80.9	78.7	87.0
Entrepreneur	11.1	-	10.0
Both	8.0	-	3.0
No paid job	-	21.3	-
Education level			
Intermediate vocational	15.1	4.0	11.0
Higher vocational	52.9	9.3	35.0
University	21.3	81.3	44.0
Other	10.7	5.3	10.0
N	**225**	**75**	**100**

3. Staying for Stability or Moving for More

The nature of knowledge workers' movement and settlement is generally considered to be "clearly very different to the standard migration/immigration story" (Favell 2008: 100). In contrast with 'classic' migrants, who migrate because of "harsh economic or political pressures" and who depend closely on family or ethnic ties, expatriates' spatial mobility is mostly based on "free choice" and they are less "encapsulated" within communities based on "primordial" bonds (Kennedy 2004: 161-2). Based on such differences, rather than immigrants, knowledge workers are usually portrayed as either "cosmopolitans" or "organization men." Knowledge workers are seen as cosmopolitans, because they are "comfortable in many places and able to understand and bridge the differences among them" (Kanter 1995: 22-3), they "move because they find the world within their (global) reach irresistibly *attractive*" (Bauman 1998: 92, original emphasis), and for them, "openness to new experiences is a vacation" (Hannerz 1990: 243). However, Hannerz argues that contemporary expatriates are more likely to be organization men, whose lives are extremely dominated by their work and who are part of "occupational cultures" rather than cosmopolitan ones, and tied to "transnational job markets" (Hannerz 1990: 243, cf. Burgers and Touburg, forthcoming).

Differences between 'classic' migrants and expatriates usually are assumed rather than investigated (cf. Lucassen and Lucassen 2005: 2; Lucassen and Lucassen 2011: 40). Systematic comparisons are important, however, not only because they help to understand in what ways exactly knowledge workers differ from other types of migrants, but also because they make it easier to resist the temptation to see everything knowledge workers do or say as most extraordinary. In this chapter, I compare the knowledge workers and middle-class migrants with regard to their economic position. My aim is, first, to give insight into the characteristics of both types of migrants' employment and, second, to learn more about how their jobs shape their spatial mobility. In doing so, I focus on "transnationalism from above," pushed by transnational corporations, as well as on the decisions taken "from below" by the migrants themselves (cf. Guarnizo and Smith 1998: 3). Although the emphasis in this chapter is on the economic sphere, socio-cultural considerations prove to play an important role in both groups of migrants' past movements and future migration plans and therefore will receive considerable attention as well.

I start this chapter with discussing the migrants' jobs, paying attention to the sectors in which they are employed, the geographical scope of the companies they work for, their job levels, and salaries. Next, I focus on their migration history, looking at the number of times they have stayed abroad, their previous destinations, and their (parents') reasons for coming to the Netherlands. Then, I will examine whether the migrants plan to stay in the Netherlands or want to move to another country, and what role economic and other considerations play in this decision. Finally, based on these findings, I will draw conclusions about the question of whether knowledge workers can be regarded as cosmopolitans, who move out of curiosity, or as organization men, who move because their employer wants them to, and to what degree this makes them different from, or similar to, the middle-class migrants.

Employment characteristics

In this section, I describe the knowledge workers' and middle-class migrants' current employment situations. At the end of Chapter 2, I have briefly introduced the respondents' education level and discussed whether they are employees or entrepreneurs. Here, I will start with a discussion of the economic sectors in which the two groups of migrants work, with a particular focus on the spatial reach of these sectors: do they operate on a local, national, or transnational level? I will also look at the composition of the migrants' colleagues: are they migrants as well, and, if so, do they have the same ethnic or national background as the respondents? Moreover, I will compare both groups' job levels and salaries. In accordance with their image as cosmopolitans or transnational organization men, knowledge workers who travel around the world because of their jobs are often regarded as an elite (cf. Castells 2000: 447; Beaverstock 2002). I will discuss whether the knowledge workers studied here are part of what Elliott and Urry (2010: 68) call the "mega wealth" of a new global "super-elite."

Economic sectors

The respondents were selected based on the fact that they live in the city of Rotterdam or one of its suburbs. Looking at their employment, it proves that a majority of them also work in the city. Of the 59 knowledge workers who have a paid job, 35

work in Rotterdam (almost 60 percent). Among the middle-class migrants who work as employees, 151 out of 200 work in Rotterdam (about 75 percent). The middle-class migrants who are entrepreneurs almost all own a business in Rotterdam. Most of the other knowledge workers and middle-class migrants work in smaller cities in the Rotterdam area (such as Spijkenisse, Vlaardingen, Dordrecht, and Delft). Some respondents have a job in another large city, such as The Hague or Amsterdam.

Table 3.1: Knowledge workers by sector, percentages

	Knowledge workers
Industry	18.7
University or other research institute	18.7
Architecture	10.7
IT	9.3
Transportation and logistics	8.0
FIRE	5.3
Government	5.3
Education	2.7
No paid job	21.3
N	**75**

Table 3.1 shows the sectors in which the knowledge workers in this research are employed, in order of frequency. About one-fifth of the respondents are employed by large industrial companies, most of them operating in the oil and gas industry, the food and consumer products industry (particularly Unilever, which has its headquarters in Rotterdam), and the automobile industry. Another fifth – including three trailing spouses – work for a university (in most cases the Erasmus University Rotterdam and the Delft University of Technology), or for a commercial research institute. Knowledge workers employed in IT, a sector which accounts for an important part of the highly skilled migration to the Netherlands (cf. IND 2009: 19; Burgers and Touburg, forthcoming), are also represented. The respondents in this sector – including one trailing spouse – particularly work for companies engaged in software development. Some of the knowledge workers are employed in the so-called FIRE sec-

tor – finance, insurance, and real estate – which, like IT, is often associated with the presence of professionals from abroad (e.g. Beaverstock 2002, 2005). These respondents, for instance, work at a bank or an asset management firm. In contrast with Amsterdam, however, Rotterdam is not a prominent player in the financial field (cf. Van der Waal and Burgers 2009: 2719).

A sector in which Rotterdam does stand out is architecture. The award-winning Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas founded his Office for Metropolitan Architecture (OMA) there in 1975, which was a decisive factor in the city's development as a cluster of innovative architectural firms (cf. Kloosterman and Stegmeijer 2005). Eight of the knowledge workers in this research work for such a firm. The respondents working in the transportation and logistics sector reflect another important aspect of Rotterdam: its port. The port of Rotterdam is the largest in Europe and the world's third largest after Shanghai and Singapore. The respondents work for corporations such as Maersk and Hoyer Global Transport, for which the Rotterdam area is a strategic location. Finally, some respondents – including one trailing spouse – work for a governmental institution, either on the European level (such as the European Commission) or related to their home country (such as the US army). In addition to the spouses who work at a university or research institute, in the IT sector, or for a government institution, two trailing spouses work at an international secondary school. A majority of the interviewed spouses, however, do not have a paid job.

According to Iredale (2001: 13), knowledge workers are typically employed in internationally oriented sectors which are "highly fluid in terms of skill requirements," which experience "little impact of particular cultural contexts," and in which human capital is acquired through "on-the-job experience." Although it is an empirical question as to what extent the jobs that the knowledge workers perform meet all these characteristics, the sectors in which they work indeed have in common that they are to a large extent directed at the global market. The respondents that work in the industrial sector, IT, transportation and logistics, and FIRE are mostly employed at export-oriented transnational corporations (TNCs). The architectural firms for which some of the respondents work are not just directed at the Netherlands either; these firms are involved in projects around the world (cf. Kennedy 2004: 159). One respondent, for instance, is currently developing a theater complex in Taiwan. The respondents who work at a university are mainly involved in disciplines such as urban planning, architecture, and logistics. Although – just as in the case of the archi-

tects – the Rotterdam area is of particular interest to them, the output of their work is in many cases not specifically directed at Rotterdam or the Netherlands.

Although part of the middle-class migrants work in the same sectors as the majority of the knowledge workers, Table 3.2 shows that among these respondents, other sectors are of particular importance. Compared with the export-oriented sectors in which many knowledge workers are employed, the sectors which are most common among the middle-class migrants are much more directed at the local population itself. In this respect, the middle-class migrants and native Dutch are roughly similar.

Table 3.2: Middle-class migrants and native Dutch by sector, percentages

	Middle-class migrants	**Middle-class native Dutch**
Social work	16.4	10.0
Government	15.1	18.0
Education	14.2	10.0
Justice and police	10.7	3.0
FIRE	9.8	9.0
Health care	9.3	15.0
Media and art	5.3	12.0
Recruitment and job placement	4.9	4.0
Industry	3.6	7.0
IT	3.6	4.0
Hospitality and catering	3.1	5.0
Transportation and logistics	1.8	1.0
Architecture	1.3	-
University or other research institute	0.9	2.0
N	**225**	**100**

Note. When respondents have more than one job – for instance, those who work both as an employee and an entrepreneur – Table 3.2 displays the job on which they spend most of their time.

About one-sixth of the middle-class migrants are employed in social work. This category not only includes respondents who work in social, community, or youth work, but also those who are employed by, or are the owners of, organizations that offer advice on societal issues, in many cases related to intercultural matters. Another sixth of the respondents work in education, which includes employment in primary and secondary schools, intermediate and higher vocational education (in Dutch: MBO and HBO), and adult education. Some of these respondents serve specific segments of the super-diverse urban population. They, for instance, work at an Islamic school or at an institute that offers Dutch lessons for immigrants. Respondents who have a job in the justice and police sector, for instance, work in the police force, for institutions concerned with criminal rehabilitation, or at a law firm. Most of the respondents who work in health care work in a hospital; some others work in a nursing home or for a home care organization. In this sector, too, some respondents are active in an "ethnic" or "niche" market (cf. Rusinovic 2006: 65), that is to say, their services are particularly directed at ethnic or religious minorities. For example, some work for a home care organization that provides care to elderly Muslims.[39]

Although the sectors discussed above also include (semi-)governmental organizations, government is classified as a separate sector. Most of the respondents working in this sector have a job at the local government, for instance in the janitorial department, public transport, or social services. Some others work for the national government in The Hague, such as for the Ministry of Housing, Social Planning and the Environment,[40] or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similar to social work and education, the government sector includes about one-sixth of the respondents. The remainder of the sectors in which the middle-class respondents are employed mainly involve commercial organizations. In addition to respondents working as an employee at a bank or accounting firm, relatively many entrepreneurs can be found in

[39] Rusinovic (2006: 65) defines an "ethnic market" as a market in which ethnic products or services – for instance, certain homeland products – are directed at a clientele that has the same ethnic background as the entrepreneur. In a "niche market," the supplier and its customers also share the same ethnic background, but in this case non-ethnic products – such as legal advice or insurance – are provided. The examples of home care and education for Muslims are somewhat in between both categories, since the product is not particularly ethnic, but does take into account specific cultural or religious traditions.

[40] This ministry no longer exists. In the current government, its tasks are divided between the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations.

the FIRE sector, for instance in accountancy or real estate. The recruitment and job placement sector also includes a number of entrepreneurs; one respondent, for example, runs a job vacancy website for 'young ethnic professionals'. Finally, some respondents work in the media and art and the hospitality and catering sectors. The former includes respondents who work for a newspaper, a museum, or a dance academy; the latter mainly concerns respondents who have a managerial position in a restaurant.

It can be concluded that, although cities like to present themselves as 'world cities' or 'global cities' – I mentioned earlier that Rotterdam is promoted as 'World Port World City' – a large part of their employment is, in fact, not global at all. As Persky and Wiewel (1994: 131) put it: "The great majority of workers in large cities are not making international business deals; they are doing something else. And for the most part that something else is very much locally oriented." Later in this chapter, I will discuss the consequences of the middle-class migrants' local and the knowledge workers' transnational orientation for their future migration plans.

Business contacts, job levels, and salaries

Although the middle-class migrants often work in different sectors than the knowledge workers, both groups have in common that a majority of their colleagues are generally native Dutch. This is the case for about 60 percent of both migrant groups. Three-quarters of the middle-class migrants have at least one co-ethnic colleague. This is also true for about half of the knowledge workers who have a paid job. Three knowledge workers say that a majority of their colleagues have the same national background as themselves (for instance, a Japanese respondent who works for Toshiba). Among the middle-class migrants, 11 respondents who work in an 'ethnic' or 'niche' market mainly have colleagues – or, in the case of respondents who have a one-man business, customers and clients – who are co-ethnics. About two-thirds of the middle-class migrants only speak Dutch at work; the others combine Dutch with the language of the country of origin, or, in exceptional cases, with English. Although almost all knowledge workers say that they can speak Dutch at least a little, only five knowledge workers speak some Dutch at work. In most cases, they only speak English, which, for many, is not their first language. Others speak

English as well as their native language. This is particularly common among knowledge workers with an Asian (e.g., Japanese, Chinese, or Korean) background.

Important differences exist with regard to the respondents' job levels. Almost all of the knowledge workers who came to the Netherlands because of their own job have a profession that requires a university degree (48 out of 52 respondents). Four of the seven trailing spouses who have a paid job work on an academic level as well. Among the 200 middle-class migrants who work as an employee, 29 (about 15 percent) have a job that requires a university degree. More than half of the middle-class migrants have a job that requires higher vocational education (128 respondents); the other 43 respondents mainly work on an intermediate vocational level.[41] In terms of Esping-Andersen's (1993) classification of occupations, the knowledge workers mainly have jobs on top of the "fordist" and "post-industrial" hierarchies. Many of them have a managerial position (such as product manager, brand manager, or tax manager) or fall into the category of professionals and scientists (for instance, architect, consultant, assistant professor, or PhD student). According to Esping-Andersen (1993: 24), these occupations have a high degree of authority and responsibility, and require a high level of human capital. Other occupations are one step lower in Esping-Andersen's rank. Some knowledge workers, for instance, are financial analysts or tax advisers, which are classified as 'administrative workers' (cf. Steijn et al. 2000: 83). Among the middle-class migrants, some respondents are managers, business owners, professionals or scientists. Most of these respondents, however, have administrative functions (such as department secretary) or are 'semi-professionals' (for example, teacher, social worker, or nurse). Some of the respondents who have a job that requires intermediate vocational education – which was one of this research's minimum requirements for being considered as middle class (cf. Dagevos et al. 2006: 120) – can be classified as 'skilled manual production workers' (such as electrician) or 'skilled service workers' (such as policeman).

The differences in job levels between the knowledge workers and the middle-class migrants are only partially reflected in their wages. Table 3.3 gives an overview of the net monthly income of the two migrant groups. The native Dutch are again added for comparison. In the case of the knowledge workers, the categories 'No income' and 'Less than 1,000' consist entirely of trailing spouses. Some of the

[41] Three respondents who work as an employee say their job does not so much require a certain education level, but rather specific work experience.

middle-class migrants who have a part-time job also earn less than 1,000 Euros per month. Various scholars – and interviewed expatriates themselves (cf. Fechter 2007: 164) – have questioned the view that knowledge workers form a 'global elite'. Considering the wages of many of the knowledge workers in this research, it might indeed be better to talk about a transnational 'middle class' (cf. Weiss 2006; Favell 2008: 51). In particular the PhD students and some of the architects who are still trainees have a lower income than would be expected from a highly privileged group. Their net monthly income in most cases is between 1,500 and 2,000 Euros, which is also the most frequently reported category among the middle-class migrants and native Dutch. The knowledge workers in this category, for the most part women, are relatively young (in their mid-twenties), and thus still in the early stages of their careers.[42]

Table 3.3: The respondents' net monthly income in Euros, percentages

	Middle-class migrants	**Knowledge workers**	**Middle-class native Dutch**
No income	-	21.3	-
Less than 1,000	5.8	6.7	-
1,000 – 1,500	11.1	2.7	15.0
1,500 – 2,000	40.4	20.0	43.0
2,000 – 2,500	20.9	13.3	19.0
2,500 – 3,000	9.8	9.3	8.0
3,000 – 4,000	4.4	8.0	9.0
4,000 – 6,000	3.6	9.3	5.0
6,000 – 10,000	0.9	4.0	-
More than 10,000	0.9	1.3	-
No answer	2.2	4.0	1.0
N	**225**	**75**	**100**

[42] According to Fechter (2007: 41), the number of female expats is rising, particularly those who are single, have no children, and are between the age of 25 and 35.

Most of the knowledge workers who are employed in the industrial sector earn considerably more: between 3,000 and 6,000 Euros per month. These respondents are generally male and slightly older (in their early or mid-thirties). About 17 percent of the respondents have an income that falls in this range, among the middle-class native Dutch, 14 percent, and among the middle-class migrants, only 8 percent. Incomes above 6,000 Euros are exceptional among the migrant groups and absent among the native Dutch respondents. Two middle-class migrants and one knowledge worker say that they have a net income per month of more than 10,000 Euros. These are a Moroccan female who owns a recruitment company, a Turkish male who is the owner of a law firm, and an American knowledge worker who has an executive function at Unilever. It can be concluded that, regarding their job levels, the knowledge workers are almost all on top of the hierarchy. Similar to the other respondent groups, however, their incomes are rather diverse.

Roads to Rotterdam

Expatriates' image of being cosmopolitans is largely based on the assumption that they have temporarily lived in several countries (cf. Hannerz 1990: 240-1). Different from 'classic' migrant groups, knowledge workers are supposed to be experienced travelers, who find living in various parts of the world incredibly interesting (Bauman 1998: 92).[43] In this section, I will discuss whether the knowledge workers in this research are really such globetrotters, and if they, in this respect, differ from the middle-class migrants. I will first look at the two groups of migrants' stays abroad, paying attention to both frequency and destination. Then, I explore the reasons why they came to the Netherlands instead of another country. Whose decision was this, and what (economic or other) considerations were decisive?

[43] Various scholars, including Hannerz himself, however, argue that although traveling a lot and having a cosmopolitan outlook are related, they are not exactly the same. Hannerz (1990: 241) writes that many people who travel are looking for a "home plus" experience, that is to say, they want to have the same comfort as they have at home, but then with more sunshine, exotic animals, and so on. Similarly, Kanter (1995: 23) states that "some widely travelled people remain hopelessly parochial."

Numbers and destinations of stays abroad

The idea that a 'real' knowledge worker is someone who has had more than one migration experience comes to the fore in Colic-Peisker's (2010) research among highly skilled migrants in Australia. She defines "transnational knowledge workers" (TKWs) as people who have lived and worked in at least three different countries, their home country included. Although it is quite interesting to learn more about such a mobile subset, in this research, knowledge workers' previous migration experiences are regarded as an empirical question rather than a condition for being considered a knowledge worker.

Table 3.4 shows the number of times the knowledge workers have been outside their country of origin for a period of six months or longer before they came to the Netherlands. Since I am interested here in their migration background in general, not only work-related stays are included. It is striking that for about one-third of the respondents, their stay in the Netherlands is their first experience abroad. Although it could be expected that particularly the youngest category of knowledge workers – those in their twenties – are represented among these novices, this is actually not the case; the share is similar in all age categories. Of the 26 respondents who have one previous migration experience, 14 went abroad for their studies; most others went because of their (partner's) job. About half of the knowledge workers thus have never worked abroad before and would not be counted as a "TKW" according to Colic-Peisker's definition.

Table 3.4: Number of times the knowledge workers have lived abroad before for six months or longer, percentages

	Knowledge workers
Never	32.0
Once	34.7
2-3 times	21.3
4-5 times	9.3
More than 5 times	2.7
N	**75**

The knowledge workers who have two or more previous migration experiences also went mainly because of education and work. Some have lived in one or more foreign countries as a child; their parents were expatriates as well. The respondents who have lived abroad before four times or more come closest to the image of the highly skilled "globetrotter" (cf. Mahroum 2000). One respondent, for instance, has lived in eight different countries in the past twenty years. However, such cases are quite exceptional. In Beaverstock's (2005: 252) terminology, the "international spatial career paths" of most of the knowledge workers prove to be modest.

Although the knowledge workers are less footloose than could be expected, they are still more geographically mobile than the middle-class migrants. These respondents were asked if they – after their arrival in the Netherlands, or in the case that they were born in the Netherlands, ever – have lived abroad for six months or longer. Table 3.5 shows that this is the case for about a quarter of the respondents, who, in this regard, look a lot like the native Dutch respondents.[44]

Table 3.5: Number of times the middle-class migrants (since their arrival in the Netherlands) and native Dutch have lived abroad for six months or longer, percentages

	Middle-class migrants	**Middle-class native Dutch**
Never	77.8	77.0
Once	16.4	15.0
2-3 times	5.8	8.0
N	**225**	**100**

The two migrant groups also differ with regard to their destinations. Two-thirds of the middle-class respondents who have temporarily lived outside the Netherlands have stayed in their (parents') country of origin. Whereas the knowledge workers primarily moved because of their studies or jobs, the main reason for the middle-class migrants was the fact that their parents wished to return 'home'. In many cases, this return migration took place in the 1980s and 1990s, when the respondents in

[44] Of the first generation middle-class migrants, eight have lived in a country other than their country of origin before they came to the Netherlands. Most of these respondents stayed abroad with their parents, for instance, in Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Curacao, Greece, France, or Belgium.

question were still children. Surinamese, Turkish, and Moroccan respondents tell comparable stories. Their parents – in practice often their fathers – had decided to return permanently to the country of origin. However, in the words of some respondents, the life in their home country "was a major disappointment," "they couldn't adjust there," or "things just did not turn out the way they were supposed to." Therefore, the families came back to the Netherlands. Others also lived in their home country for six months or longer, but not with the intention to stay permanently. Some Turkish and Moroccan respondents were sent by their parents to attend primary or secondary school there, in order to improve their language skills and to get to know the homeland culture (cf. Kasinitz et al. 2008: 155). A few Surinamese and Turkish respondents chose to go to their country of origin themselves to do a traineeship.

One-third of the middle-class migrants who have been abroad went to countries other than their country of origin, in most cases to study there. Common destinations of these respondents are the US, the UK (especially London), Belgium, Germany, and some other European countries. Among the knowledge workers who previously studied or worked abroad, destinations in North America and (North-Western) Europe stand out as well. Seven knowledge workers have lived in the Netherlands before, either as an exchange student or for work. Although some of the respondents have temporarily lived in Asia (mainly Japan and China), South America (particularly Brazil), or Africa (as a child, because of their father's job), countries on these continents are named far less often. If their curiosity for different countries and cultures were the main reason for knowledge workers to move abroad, somewhat more exotic destinations (from a Western point of view) could have been expected.

The above makes clear that, while the knowledge workers and the middle-class migrants differ from one another with regard to their number of stays abroad and their most common destinations, they are similar in that they generally went to places with which they were to some extent familiar (cf. Castles and Miller 2003: 26; Savage et al. 2005: 186). American knowledge workers going to England and vice versa, inter-European movements, and middle-class migrants temporarily moving to their (parents') home country make up a large part of the total number of reported stays abroad. The importance of prior links with the receiving country also becomes visible in the respondents' motives for coming to the Netherlands.

Coming to the Netherlands

For most of the middle-class migrants, it was their parents' decision to go to the Netherlands. A large majority of the Turkish and Moroccan respondents are children of former guest workers. In accordance with the general migration patterns of these groups, their fathers moved to the Netherlands in the 1960s or 1970s to work there. Most of the fathers came directly from their homeland; others first lived in Italy, Spain, France, or Belgium (cf. Cottaar and Bouras 2009: 73). And whereas some directly settled in Rotterdam, others first lived in other Dutch cities, such as Breda, Tilburg, and Gouda. Although they had planned to return to their home country within a few years, eventually they brought in their wives. Some of the respondents came together with their mothers; others followed them later, and again others were born in the Netherlands. For many of the Surinamese respondents as well, coming to the Netherlands was their parents' choice. Often, their parents had decided to leave Surinam before or right after the country achieved its independence in 1975. These respondents explain that their parents' decision was a logical one: the two countries have a historical bond, they spoke Dutch, and often other relatives already lived in the Netherlands.

Some of the middle-class respondents – more or less – decided themselves to come to the Netherlands. Twelve respondents, mainly women, came because their partners lived there. In almost all these cases, the partners were migrants as well, coming from the same countries as the respondents. Some of the 'marriage migrants' came at an early age. One Turkish respondent, for instance, was only fifteen when she came to Rotterdam to live with her partner. Some respondents came to the Netherlands with a temporary stay in mind. In these cases, the presence of relatives and other links with the destination country played an important role.

> I came to the Netherlands because of my grandfather's funeral. Then I decided to study here, and I stayed. (Male middle-class migrant, 33, Surinamese origin)

> I came here to study. I had a Dutch passport, and the education system in Surinam is similar to the Dutch system, so that matched very well. I planned to stay here for four years, and then to return home. (Female middle-class migrant, 52, Surinamese-Venezuelan origin)

> The idea was to go on an adventure trip with one of my friends. Our first choice was Australia, our second any country in Europe. But in that period, my friend's father passed away, so my friend decided to stay in Turkey. I didn't dare to go to Australia by myself, so I decided to go to Europe. My aunt and one of my brothers lived in the Netherlands, so it was easy to go there. Finally, I studied here and I didn't return to Turkey. (Male middle-class migrant, 45, Turkish origin)

Regarding the degree to which coming to the Netherlands was a personal decision, the knowledge workers can be divided into three categories. For about one-third, it was the company they (or their partners) work for that decided to transfer them to a division in the Netherlands. This corresponds with what Guarnizo and Smith (1998: 3) call "transnationalism from above."

> My employer decided to send me here. It wasn't really a personal choice. I was interviewed in the New York office, and they figured, since I have a European passport [he has a French passport], it was a good idea to send me. (Male knowledge worker, 24, German-Dutch origin)

> There was no choice. There was an opening here, and my husband's company decided that it was a good one for him, so he came. (Female trailing spouse, 43, Indian origin)

Another third of the knowledge workers came to the Netherlands on their own account. Their movements can be seen as an example of transnationalism "from below" (Guarnizo and Smith 1998: 3). These respondents – mostly architects and academics (cf. Kennedy 2004: 160) – were not transferred by their companies, but rather applied for a job in the Netherlands themselves. They saw the Netherlands, and Rotterdam in particular, as a strategic location regarding their field of expertise.

> I've been here before, and I think the Netherlands is a good place to study logistics. My supervisor from my town in Turkey suggested that I apply for this position, and after a couple of interviews I was accepted. (Female knowledge worker, 26, Turkish origin)

> Particularly in Rotterdam, there's a lot of interesting architecture firms that do the type of work that I am interested in. I applied from abroad to a few of the places I re-

> ally liked. And then a couple of them gave me offers, and I picked one of them. (Male knowledge worker, 42, American origin)

Although these two categories are opposites with respect to the knowledge workers' agency in making the decision to move abroad, they have in common that their job was the main reason for going to the Netherlands instead of somewhere else. In this sense, these knowledge workers look more like organization men whose movements are determined by their occupation, than cosmopolitans who travel because they want to get to know different countries and cultures.

Several scholars have criticized the above/below dichotomy, since "both transnational ties and the agents who build them can rarely be strictly characterized as one or the other" (Mahler and Hansing 2005: 128). The term "transnationalism of the middle" has been introduced to refer to this intersection on middle levels of agency (Mahler and Hansing 2005: 141; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007: 142). The last category of knowledge workers indeed proves to be somewhat in between the other two regarding the degree to which moving to the Netherlands was their own decision. In the case of these respondents, their (partners') company gave them the opportunity to move abroad and often offered a few different options. Their motivations for choosing the Netherlands show that, although the quality of the job offer obviously played an important role, geographical proximity and cultural familiarity were decisive as well.

> I came here because my boyfriend was offered a job. We chose the Netherlands, because I wanted to go somewhere ideally not too far from the UK. I wanted to go somewhere that I felt was an interesting place to live, with a nice reputation, and a nice environment: somewhere different, without being too far away. (Female trailing spouse, 28, South African-English origin)

> In Germany, I worked for the same company as I work for now. I was a bit fed up with the work there, because I couldn't really grow. They told me they couldn't offer me promotion in the company in Germany right now, but they asked me if I was open to working in a foreign country. At this stage it was only Rotterdam, and maybe later on America. So I directly accepted it. I knew Holland from holidays before and it was already one of my favorite countries. (Male knowledge worker, 32, German origin)

> We had the opportunity and I thought it would be nice for my son to live where I was born, and to see my family as well. (Male knowledge worker, 44, Dutch origin)

These examples show that the distinction between what Tilly (1978: 53-4) calls "chain migration," based on prior links with the country of settlement, and "career migration," based on job opportunities, is not a sharp one. Next to purely economic reasons, pre-existing social and cultural links are important in explaining why the knowledge workers and middle-class migrants came to the Netherlands. In the next section, I again look at the importance of economic and socio-cultural considerations, but this time regarding the migrants' future migration plans.

Should I stay or should I go?

According to Colic-Peisker – whom I already mentioned because of the 'three-countries rule' she adopts – knowledge workers should be differentiated from "settlers" or "immigrants" who "move from a less to a more developed country with 'permanent settlement' in mind," and who "are expected to go through a process of 'incorporation' and 'acculturation'" (2010: 267-8). This statement, which reflects the idea that knowledge workers are clearly different from 'classic' migrant groups (cf. Kennedy 2004: 162; Favell 2008: 100), contains at least two misconceptions.[45] First, migrants who have *de facto* settled somewhere permanently did not always have permanent settlement in mind when they arrived, and second, knowledge workers are not detached from processes of incorporation and acculturation in the country of settlement. I will discuss both points in more detail below.

The appeal of temporariness

In Colic-Peisker's terms, the middle-class respondents in this research are permanent settlers, whereas the knowledge workers are temporary guests. Although Colic-Peisker suggests that this distinction is based on the *intentions* with which both

[45] A third misconception is that movements from less to more developed countries imply permanent settlement. India and China, for instance, are considered to be less developed than the Netherlands, according to IMF and UN standards. However, an important part of the knowledge workers in the Netherlands come from these countries (cf. IND 2009: 4; Burgers and Touburg, forthcoming).

groups moved to their current destination, her assumption about 'classic' migrants is really based on *outcomes*. Of course, many of the Turks and Moroccans who moved to the Netherlands or other European countries in the 1960s and 1970s, with hindsight, can be called permanent settlers. The intention of these guest workers, however, was to stay only temporarily.[46] The quotations in the previous section show that some of the middle-class migrants who came to the Netherlands also had a temporary stay in mind; they initially came for family matters, studies, or holidays. Moreover, after having lived in the Netherlands for decades, many of the middle-class migrants still do not consider their stay to be a permanent one. Even respondents who were born in the Netherlands or went there at an early age think about 'returning' one day.

Of the 74 first-generation migrants – that is, the migrants who came to the Netherlands after the age of twelve – 42 respondents say that they would certainly like to return to their country of origin in the future, 24 say maybe, and only 8 say they would not. The 1.5- and second-generation migrants, 151 in total, are more or less evenly distributed over the three answering categories: 48 say they would, 60 maybe, and 43 not. The first-generation respondents, who are generally somewhat older, not only have a stronger willingness to return, but also appear to be more prepared to go back (cf. Cassarino 2004: 271).[47] For most of the 1.5- and second-generation respondents, returning is something for the further future. The following statements are made by first-, 1.5-, and second-generation migrants, respectively.

> I didn't come to the Netherlands with the idea that I would stay here for the rest of my life. I will certainly go back; I have a house in Surinam. (Male middle-class migrant, 53, Surinamese origin)

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[46] The question of whether migrants will stay only for a few years, for a longer time, or even permanently, is also highly relevant in the case of immigrants from Eastern and Central Europe who work in countries such as the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands (cf. Weltevrede et al. 2009: 126; Burgers et al. 2010: 36).

[47] The number of Surinamese, Turkish, and Moroccan migrants that actually return to their home country is relatively small. Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009b: 7) present national figures of how many first- and second-generation Surinamese, Turks, and Moroccans emigrated from the Netherlands in the past decades. Among all three groups, most emigrants belong to the first generation. In 2008, 2,700 Turkish, 2,000 Moroccan, and 1,600 Surinamese first-generation migrants moved outside the Netherlands. Among second-generation migrants, this was 1,400 Turks, 1,700 Moroccans, and 1,000 Surinamese. The report does not give information about the destination countries of these emigrants.

> It is my dream to return. Everybody has that dream, don't you think? My mother has a house there, and I want to renovate it, so we can all live there in the future. It is in my head, but I don't know if it will become reality. (Female middle-class migrant, 39, Surinamese origin)

> I want to grow old in Morocco. After all, it is my fatherland. My cousins live there, they are a part of me. I have a strong bond with them and I would like to spend more time with them. I am saying this now, but I could always change my mind about it. That's why I say 'maybe'. (Female middle-class migrant, 27, Moroccan origin)

The "six months mantra" that Raj (2003: 172) found among middle-class South Asian families in London is also often heard among the respondents in this research. Many would like to spend half of the year in the Netherlands and the other half in their country of origin, so they can combine the benefits of both countries. Most of them, however, will not be able to make this dream come true until they are retired. Some – mainly Turkish – respondents do have plans to continue their career in their country of origin. One respondent, for instance, is currently negotiating with a company in Turkey that has offered him a job, while some others have plans to start a business there themselves. Most middle-class respondents, and almost all Surinamese and Moroccan ones, however, do not think they could find a satisfactory job in their country of origin. As I discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the sectors in which the middle-class respondents work are mainly oriented to the Dutch local or national level. Their jobs are not easily transferable to other countries, which, combined with a general lack of economic opportunities in their home countries, makes them stay.

> I haven't attended school in Morocco, I do not have the right diplomas, so the chance that I could find a job there would be very small. (Female middle-class migrant, 28, Moroccan origin)

> I want to go when I am very old. The climate, the atmosphere, those really appeal to me. But I wouldn't want to go now, the economic opportunities are bad. (Female middle-class migrant, 37, Surinamese origin)

> To be honest, I am only here for financial reasons. I have a job here, an income. In Turkey, it would not be easy to get a job. (Female middle-class migrant, 27, Turkish origin)

Compared with the middle-class migrants, the careers of the knowledge workers are much less restricted by national boundaries. For them, finding a job somewhere else is a realistic option, which makes it easier to realize a temporary stay in different countries.

> A lot depends on if I would be able to grow further, work wise. If I see other opportunities elsewhere, I'll pursue them. It wasn't a conscious choice to move to the Netherlands as such, so I'll sort of reevaluate to be here each time, as I did when I signed the new contract for another year and a half. I'll reevaluate and if it is still satisfactory, then I'll stay. (Female knowledge worker, 28, South African origin)

Similar to many of the middle-class migrants' parents, the knowledge workers came to the Netherlands with the intention to work there for a few years. In discussing their future plans, many of them stress that sooner or later, they will either return home, or move on to another country. However, several knowledge workers have already extended their stay once or more, which for some can be a threat to their self-image as a 'passer-by'.

> To be honest, I would like to move, because I think I stayed longer than I thought I would. And that's something psychological, I just had a deadline in my head, and that was already a long time ago. (Female knowledge worker, 27, Portuguese origin)

The knowledge workers were asked when, according to their (partner's) contract, their stay in the Netherlands ends. About one-third of the respondents have contracts that state that their stay ends after a total of two or three years (cf. Beaverstock 2005: 252). Some others will only stay for a year or have contracts for between four and seven years. In the contracts of more than a third of the respondents, no final date is set. Many respondents, independent of their contracts, do not know for sure when they will leave. Apart from the fact that the companies they work for can decide that they have to stay longer, the respondents themselves often also have certain reasons to postpone their departure. Of the respondents, 37 say they certainly

would like to extend their stay in the Netherlands, 28 say maybe, and 10 not. While the settlement intentions of the middle-class migrants' are less permanent than Colic-Peisker (2010: 267-8) suggests, the settlement outcomes of the knowledge workers' might be less temporary than expected.[48] In addition to considerations concerning their jobs, for both groups of migrants, family and other community-related matters play an important role in their future plans.

The experience of incorporation

In deciding to stay or leave, the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers often make comparisons between their life in the Netherlands and in their country of origin. In the case of the migrant middle class, often-named reasons to move are the homeland's warmth (both in terms of its weather and culture), the presence of relatives, and the fact that the respondents want to go back to their 'roots'. The main motives for staying are related to their incorporation into Dutch society. Apart from the fact that they work in the Netherlands, they also indicate that their closest family members and friends live there, and that they are more used to the Dutch customs than to those in their country of origin. Some respondents say they are, in various ways, too "Hollandized" (in Dutch: "vernederlandst") to live in their country of origin permanently. Often, their decisions are based on a mix of factors, which they have carefully thought through.

> When I am retired, I might go back to Turkey, looking for a quiet place to enjoy my old age pension. My children will be grown up by then, before that I cannot return. Turkey is the place where my roots are, I wasn't born in the Netherlands [she came to the Netherlands when she was three years old]; I am Turkish, I know the country and its culture. It would be a logical choice to go there. But I'm not sure if I will ever return, anyway not in the near future. I have migrated more than once in my life, and

[48] National figures on the length of stay of knowledge workers in the Netherlands are not available. On behalf of the City of Amsterdam, the consultancy firm *Decisio* analyzed the length of stay of migrants in Amsterdam who settled in the Netherlands in 2004. This group of so-called "new internationals" mainly consisted of migrants from the UK, the US, and Germany. In 2006, about 80 percent of the migrants that were followed still lived in Amsterdam; in 2009, this was still about 40 percent (Decisio 2010: 12). The category of new internationals not only includes 'free movers' from the EU and knowledge workers from countries outside the EU, but also family migrants and international students, and is thus not exactly comparable with the category of knowledge workers in this research.

> I do not want to lose the stability that I have now. I have a job, a family. In Turkey, I wouldn't have the economic freedom that I have here; not everyone can pay for a psychologist there, it's something for the elite. So it would be difficult for me to have a successful career there. (Female middle-class migrant, 37, Turkish origin)

In contrast with their image of being footloose cosmopolitans or organization men who are only part of an occupational community, also for most of the knowledge workers, integration – a term many knowledge workers use – proves to be an important issue. In discussing their reasons for staying or leaving, they often only briefly mention their work. Since for many of them it is likely that they can find a job either in the Netherlands or somewhere else, employment appears to be more of a basic condition rather than the most decisive factor. Similar to the middle-class migrants, the knowledge workers who have children put their family's well-being first (cf. Favell 2008: 159). Some respondents claim it is in their children's interest to stay in the Netherlands somewhat longer, or even permanently. Others think it might be better to return to their home country, because they expect to receive more family support there.

> The experience so far has been overall quite positive. Both my husband and I have lived in many countries, so living abroad is not such a big challenge. But when you have a child it actually brings a different dimension. How should my child be raised? That is the big question. We are somewhat transient here, even if we decide to stay five more years. We are not staying twenty years. But I don't want to be pulling my daughter halfway through primary school to a different country. That is the main decision factor. (Female trailing spouse, 39, American-French origin)

> My wife and I are thinking about staying longer. The environment here is better than in Korea, because in the Korean society there is a lot of competition. It is hard and stressful. For me it is okay here, but for my wife it is important to make some good friends. I think, then, she also wants to stay longer. In that case I have to leave the company, because our company will transfer me after three years. So, if I want to stay here, I have to give up my career with this company. That is also a factor to consider. But I think for our two-year-old daughter, this environment would be great, better than in Korea. (Male knowledge worker, 32, Korean origin)

> Staying here longer is certainly an option I'm open to. The company already questioned if I'd like to stay on local terms, but I haven't decided yet. My wife is having a baby in February, so we want to see how that pans out; it may be logistically better to move back to the UK, where we've got the most important family and friends around. (Male knowledge worker, 38, English origin)

Having a relationship with a Dutch person is another factor of influence (cf. Favell 2008: 69). Eight respondents currently have a Dutch partner, whom most of them met during their stay in the Netherlands.

> I have a Dutch partner, and we have a baby together. We both have a job here in the Netherlands, and we just see it as a natural thing to be here. For my partner, that's obvious, but for me also, after these four years. I feel very well accepted. We also have ideas about maybe going somewhere else, but for the time being we are staying here. (Female knowledge worker, 35, Polish origin)

> If you had asked me a couple of months ago if I would like to stay here, I would have said yes, because I had a Dutch girlfriend. But now, I don't really have a tie to Holland, apart from work. (Male knowledge worker, 31, Italian-Peruvian origin)

Next to family-related matters, other socio-cultural issues are important as well. Several knowledge workers stress that they have invested time and energy in becoming part of their new environment, and that, in the short turn, they do not want to go through that same process again. They are certainly open to new experiences, which, according to Hannerz (1990: 243), is typical for expatriates, but that does not mean that for this type of migrants, adapting to different countries and cultures is something that goes effortlessly (cf. Butcher 2010: 25). Like the Turkish middle-class migrant quoted earlier, they do not want to lose the stability they have achieved. The phenomenon of "cumulative inertia" – that is, migration probabilities decline as the length of stay increases (cf. Molho 1995: 123) – plays a role here. Many knowledge workers have formed all kinds of attachments to their country of residence, which influence their ideas about the future.

> After being here for two and a half years, I feel that I have already built something, and I don't want to lose that. I don't really like to say, 'Okay, in one year I am leav-

ing', because then I don't really get the best of it. So I will leave when I have to. (Female knowledge worker, 26, Portuguese origin)

Maybe I will stay here longer. I like to live here and also I made some effort to learn the language, to integrate, and that took some energy from me. And I don't only want to put energy in it; I also want something in return. You want to enjoy your stay a bit and you start to build up your life. But if it occurs that I get a good job offer in Germany or somewhere else, probably I wouldn't say no. (Female knowledge worker, 29, German origin)

The primary reason is that I enjoy my work. The second reason is that I can easily get by with English. And the third reason is that I already spent four years learning Dutch; I don't want to learn something else again. (Male knowledge worker, 50, Indian origin)

The importance of being part of society and feeling at home is also stressed by knowledge workers who experience difficulties in integrating into the Netherlands. Instead of enjoying the acquaintance with a new country or feeling comfortable in their expat bubble, these respondents are mainly characterized by disappointment. The language barrier often plays an important role in this perceived lack of social and cultural incorporation (cf. Favell 2008: 144).

I want to be closer to home; move to Asia. I don't like some things. The working culture is different from my own, quite tiring and frustrating. And in a personal sense, I have a problem with the weather and things like that. (Female knowledge worker, 31, Australian origin)

It is a really nice experience to be here, but I like to be with my friends and family. I see it more as a short-term way of experiencing something different, rather than something that would be my sort of life. And I also think that I will always feel a bit like an expat here; it is kind of difficult to feel that it is your real home. Also it has to do with the language, which is my fault. But the cultures are just different. (Female trailing spouse, 28, English origin)

I like Europe, but to be honest, I cannot say I like the Netherlands. Mainly because of the language; I don't speak Dutch. For instance, in the street, when I ask something to someone, they speak English, which is very good. But because I don't understand

> anything in Dutch, I feel isolated. I do not feel comfortable with that. (Female knowledge worker, 32, Japanese origin)

Many of the middle-class migrants have similar feelings of being excluded from Dutch society. Even though they speak the language, in many cases grew up in the Netherlands, and have Dutch citizenship, they still feel that they are outsiders. Compared with the knowledge workers, the middle-class migrants' grief is deeper and more politicized.

> The Netherlands is not a nice country to live in. I hate the Netherlands, I hate the weather, I hate the people. People here do not accept you. They do not accept your Turkish identity. The Dutch are very hypocritical. And there is racism here; 'allochtones' are being discriminated against. (Female middle-class migrant, 28, Turkish origin)

> In the future, I want to go back to Morocco. I do not feel safe in the Netherlands anymore, because of political issues and things that happen in society in general. You are not treated equally here, whatever you do and no matter how hard you work. At work, it's different; my work is the nicest thing here. At work, I do not have the feeling that I am not accepted, but society and politics give me that feeling. (Female middle-class migrant, 31, Moroccan origin)

Remarks like "It is my own fault," which some of the knowledge workers make, are not heard among these respondents. In their opinion, they have done everything they can to integrate into Dutch society, but still are not accepted by the majority population. This phenomenon has been called the "integration paradox": immigrants that can be regarded as the most integrated feel least accepted and most discriminated against (cf. Buijs et al. 2006; Gijsberts and Vervoort 2009). In the words of Hochschild (1995: 131), who writes about the disappointments of middle-class African Americans, they are "succeeding more and enjoying it less." One of the explanations for this paradox is that higher educated immigrants experience more difficulties in their careers than immigrants with a lower education level; they have higher ambitions, and thus can suffer greater disappointment (cf. Gijsberts and Vervoort 2009: 426). Although the Moroccan female cited above says she does not feel discriminated against at work, many others do. About one-third of the middle-class migrants say that they are at least sometimes confronted with discrimination in the la-

bor market. This is considerably more than those who feel discriminated against by public authorities (about 10 percent), but somewhat less than those who experience discrimination on the street or during shopping (about 40 percent). Among the knowledge workers, one in four respondents report discrimination on the street or in stores, followed by 16 percent who feel discriminated against by authorities. Compared with the middle-class migrants, the knowledge workers feel much less discriminated against in the labor market: only six knowledge workers say they ever experience discrimination at work. In the intermezzo after this chapter, which is about the career paths of fifteen female middle-class migrants, the experience of prejudice and discrimination is further addressed.

Another explanation for the integration paradox is that higher educated immigrants are better informed about politics and, consequently, more confronted with certain negative viewpoints on ethnic minorities. The respondents' opinions on the public debate about immigrants are further discussed in Chapter 4, where I deal with the migrants' position in the political sphere.

Conclusion

At the beginning of this chapter I introduced two dominant images of knowledge workers: footloose cosmopolitans, who feel comfortable anywhere, and organization men, whose lives are dominated by work. Most of the knowledge workers in this research do not match the first image. For many, their stay in the Netherlands is the first time they worked abroad. Those who lived abroad before often stayed in countries that were physically or culturally close to their home country. Moreover, the fact that they moved to the Netherlands in most cases had more to do with the nature of their job than with their own fascination for traveling. In this respect, many of the knowledge workers indeed look like organization men (cf. Hannerz 1990: 243; Colic-Peisker 2010: 473). The fact that their job was the main reason for coming to the Netherlands, however, does not imply economic considerations are also decisive for their return. In contrast with the idea of knowledge workers who are only part of an occupational culture, most respondents are in various ways incorporated into their new living environment.

A third image, which is not often used, proves to be more fruitful: knowledge workers as 'ordinary' migrants, who experience both inclusion and exclusion in their

host society. Although knowledge workers are often seen as very different from immigrants, they are remarkably alike in their reasons for moving abroad and their future prospects. Similar to the parents of many of the middle-class migrants in this research, the knowledge workers came to the Netherlands with the idea of working there temporarily. And comparable with the middle-class migrants who came to the Netherlands as adults, some of the knowledge workers also took into account non-economic factors in deciding where to live, such as prior familiarity with the country. In discussing their future migration plans, the knowledge workers also resemble the middle-class migrants, in that many make a cost-benefit analysis of staying in the Netherlands versus returning 'home'. In this respect, the knowledge workers have a more 'bi-local' or 'bi-national' outlook than often assumed. For both groups, family-related factors are important in deciding whether to stay or go. Having a partner and children in the Netherlands often is grounds for staying longer, whereas the larger network of relatives in the country of origin is a reason to leave. Another important issue is whether the migrants have the feeling that they are part of Dutch society, or rather outsiders who belong somewhere else. In the intermezzo that follows, about the roads to success of fifteen female middle-class migrants, I will further focus on feelings of inclusion and exclusion in the economic sphere. In the next chapters, I will also investigate their identification in the political and socio-cultural spheres.

In addition to the similarities between both groups of migrants, of course, some important differences exist as well. Although the knowledge workers are not as unattached to their host society as might have been expected, they are still more geographically mobile than the middle-class migrants. This is largely related to their economic position; in the sectors in which the knowledge workers are employed, it is easier to develop a transnational career than in the locally oriented sectors in which a large part of the middle-class migrants work. Although migrants in both groups show a *willingness* to return, the knowledge workers have a higher *readiness* (cf. Cassarino 2004: 271). The middle-class migrants who want to move generally have plans to do so after their retirement, while the knowledge workers see more opportunities to continue their career either in their home country or somewhere else. Regarding their employment, the knowledge workers are indeed less incorporated into the Netherlands than many of the 'classic' migrants.

Intermezzo I

Successful Immigrant Women as Role Models

After having discussed the general employment characteristics of the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers in Chapter 3, in this first intermezzo, I will take a closer look at the career paths of fifteen female middle-class migrants who were interviewed for a qualitative research project in 2008.[49] I was asked to carry out this project, which was initiated by *Social Platform Rotterdam* (SPR), at that time a think tank that advised the local government on social policy issues. According to SPR's board members, successful immigrant women needed to be brought to public attention, since they can inspire others to conquer the "glass ceiling" or escape the "sticky living room floor" (cf. Özdemir et al. 2007). The idea was that a small group of women from various ethnic backgrounds would be interviewed about their economic success and their role as positive examples, and that their stories would be made public together with their pictures. Since the subject of this assignment was related to the larger project on successful migrant groups, and I agreed with SPR that a positive message on integration was welcome next to all the pessimistic ones, I decided to do the research. The personal stories of these women as published in the final report surely are inspiring (see Van Bochove 2008). At the same time, however, they made me skeptical about the whole idea of labeling successful immigrants as role models. In this intermezzo, I will explain why.

Struggle and support on the way to success

Whereas attention to role models has a long tradition in the US, in the Netherlands this is a more recent phenomenon (cf. Terwijn 2007). The growing belief that role models can contribute to the positive development of immigrant youth or women not only becomes apparent in the increasing popularity of mentoring or buddy programs but also in publications in which successful immigrants speak about their ca-

[49] For more information about these interviews and the composition of the respondent group, see the section 'Conducting the fieldwork' in Chapter 2 and Table A2 in the Appendix.

reers and the barriers they had to overcome. [50] The individuals portrayed in such publications show that regardless of background, it is possible to reach the top.

Although the fifteen women that were interviewed for the SPR project do not necessarily characterize themselves as successful – either because they still have a lot of unfulfilled ambitions or because to them success is more than just having a good job – their stories about their childhood, education, and career paths indeed send the message: never give up. Many of the women grew up in lower-class families and were the first to go to college. In school, in the labor market, and sometimes also at home, they had to deal with prejudice, often based on a combination of skin color, religion, gender, and class. The women talk about their strong determination to overcome such obstacles. A Moroccan woman, for instance, who combines a strong Muslim identity with a successful career as a staff member of a humanitarian organization, says about her childhood:

> I was brought up very traditionally. But there always was a little voice inside my head that said that the way women were treated in my environment was very unfair. I remember my mother said something about what women are supposed to do, and I said: 'Well, if that is Islam, if that is how God wanted it, then I don't want to be a Muslim.' I really said it like that. (Female middle-class migrant, 42, Moroccan origin)

Women who experienced negative stereotypical images in school say that rather than beginning to doubt their own talents, such prejudice just made them want to prove themselves even more.

> In primary school, I was someone who had an average mark of seven out of ten, but I had to go to the Mavo [an intermediate level of secondary education], and I said: 'This cannot be.' Other children, who had sixes instead of sevens, were sent to the Havo [a higher level of education]. Probably because their parents were managers, or dentists, do you know what I mean? My parents were just ordinary hard-working people, who never had an education, who worked for a cleaning service. I don't know if that was the reason, but it inspired me. I thought: 'I want to get the maxi-

[50] The popularity of mentoring and buddy programs is, for instance, shown by 'The Social Agenda', a list of promising solutions for persistent problems in Dutch society, selected by academics, professionals and readers of the newspaper *De Volkskrant*. On top of the final list stood the recommendation, "Give everyone at the bottom of society a mentor" (see http://www.vkblog.nl/ bericht/60137/De_ Sociale_Agenda).

> mum out of it.' I saw pupils who had lower grades and I thought: 'Why can you go to the Havo? Why does the teacher believe you can do it, and I can't?' (Female middle-class migrant, 32, Cape Verdean origin)

> School has really made me a fighter. The teachers always had the image: 'You are a foreigner, you are a woman; you are not allowed to study anyway, so stay humble.' But I thought: 'Well, OK, you can say that, but have I tried it? No! So you might have that image of me, but I won't fulfill it!' (Female middle-class migrant, 37, Turkish origin)

Examples of labor market discrimination – an issue that was already briefly mentioned in Chapter 3 – particularly when applying for a first job, are also referred to. According to the Cape Verdean woman quoted below, however, her diploma proved to be a powerful weapon against racial discrimination.

> I remember that there were two of us. I was together with a Dutch lady with long blond hair, and we sat opposite two men. And these men totally ignored me during that job interview. That was very odd. They ignored me for about fifteen minutes or maybe even longer. They were only looking at that blond girl and asked her all the questions. Then, they looked at the two résumés and at the other girl again, and asked: 'And who is the one that has higher vocational education?' That was the first time that I said something, I said: 'I have.' Then, they turned to me and concentrated on me for the rest of the interview. (Female middle-class migrant, 37, Cape Verdean origin)

The message so far seems to be that to become successful, it takes willpower to deal with low expectations at home or at school and a diploma to overcome prejudice in the labor market. This positive, Barack Obama-like message can be criticized, however, for laying the responsibility of failure or success wholly on the shoulders of individuals, implying that 'if you really want it, you can do it' (cf. Prins 2000: 87). Even though success stories are especially attractive when the main character is a self-made man or woman, the stories of the fifteen women show that reality is more complex. Instead of emphasizing only their own agency in their success, almost all the women also stress the importance of structural factors, such as having a supportive network. The Turkish woman who said that school has made her a fighter, for instance, talks about the support of her parents.

> My parents were just workers, who belonged to the first-generation Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. They have always worked very hard, and they always encouraged me: 'If you can study, and you want it, by all means, do it.' My father and mother both finished primary school in Turkey. But after that, they couldn't continue their education. They both came from the countryside, but they really encouraged us to study. And so we did. (Female middle-class migrant, 37, Turkish origin)

Similarly, the Moroccan woman who did not want to become a stay-at-home mother stresses the importance of colleagues who believed in her.

> I have to say that I have always had people around me who appreciated my capacities and who supported me in developing them further. It is very important to have people around you, at work and in your own environment, who really say what you are good at. And that they appreciate what you are doing. That appreciation is vital, you get the feeling: 'OK, I am good at something.' And all those remarks from people around you make your confidence grow. The more people you meet, the more feedback you receive about the things you do, and the stronger you become. (Female middle-class migrant, 42, Moroccan origin)

Based on their own experiences, the fifteen women emphasize the importance of perseverance, credentials, and external support in achieving socioeconomic success. Most of them think that they, being women with an immigrant background, had to work harder to get there than the average native Dutch person. However, although the women can relate to immigrant women or youth who are making their first steps on the labor market, they do not necessarily see themselves as positive role models for them.

"Being an immigrant role model? Please, no!"

In the Netherlands, particularly boys of Moroccan origin – who are often associated with trouble – are said to need good examples from their own community. In recent years, several successful Moroccan immigrants have been – either formally or informally – appointed as role models. Ibrahim Afellay, who is part of the Dutch national football team, for example, was used as an official role model by the *Dutch Football*

Association, KNVB.[51] Others, like Ahmed Aboutaleb, mayor of Rotterdam, rapper Ali B, and stand-up comedian Najib Amhali, have no official function as role model, but still are often confronted with their responsibilities as being good examples for the Moroccan-Dutch youth. Not all of them seem to totally embrace this ascribed role, however. Amhali, for instance, once said in an interview: "I show that it is possible, and of course it is nice when you inspire people. But I don't want to be a role model. Please, no."[52] Being asked about their position as role models, many of the fifteen women react in similar ways. Where does this reluctance come from?

In judging the 'role model' phenomenon, the women make a distinction between role models as mentors and as motivators.[53] Most of the women are familiar with mentoring. In their family circle or at work, they are personally involved in helping and coaching others.

> I have nieces and nephews; they are my brother's children. They are all studying as well. I have always guided and stimulated them, particularly the boys, because I experienced great problems myself with being labeled as an 'allochtone'. I always spoke up for my nephews, and I have stimulated them, saying: 'You are going to finish your education and if necessary, I will go with you everywhere.' (Female middle-class migrant, 37, Turkish origin)

> Coaching appeals to me, but more in a business context: working on a project with a group of colleagues, transferring knowledge. At the company I work for, everybody has a coach. So I have someone that I coach, and another one is coaching me. That is nice, to help somebody to move forward, yes, that is all right. (Female middle-class migrant, 30, Moroccan origin)

Some of the women also see themselves as motivators, that is to say, as public role models who inspire people they do not know personally. One Surinamese woman, for instance, sometimes gives lectures for large audiences about her experiences with setting up her own business. However, most of the women have more trust in the

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[51] See http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2698/Sport/article/detail/766164/2006/01/31/Afellay-rolmodelvan-voetbalbond.dhtml.

[52] See CJP Magazine, Volume 6, December 2007 (http://www.snippr.nl/Snippr/30955/).

[53] See Gibson (2002: 137), who makes a distinction between "role models" (what I call 'motivators') and "mentors." The term role model in the way I use it encompasses both motivators and mentors.

effects of one-on-one coaching than distant motivation. Although the women agreed that their stories were being published in the SPR report, many of them did not want to be portrayed as potential role models. Some, for this reason, were not very enthusiastic about their picture being taken. One of them explains why she posed for the camera with the back of her head.

> By letting my picture be taken, I would easily be labeled as a role model, and I am not sure if I would like that. You are then classified in a certain way, and I must say that I am not easily classified. (Female middle-class migrant, 38, Moroccan origin)

Being a mentor for people in their close network of family, friends, or colleagues is something most of the women are positive about. Being labeled as a motivator for immigrants, however, many reject.

> I think you should not pick role models based on someone's background. I think you should pick a role model based on what someone is like, and how he or she acts, and then you see something special in them, or not. But to make a choice based on someone's background, I don't know why you should do that. You can still be two totally different persons who do two totally different things in life. I think it is nice, don't get me wrong, to be a role model, but then I want to be one based on me as a person, for the people around me, that I see every day or who I can really coach. That appeals more to me than being a role model for, say, Moroccan girls. (Female middle-class migrant, 30, Moroccan origin)

> People are classified in a certain way, instead of looking at them as individuals. You get the label that you are a woman, or an 'allochtone', and I ask myself what has that to do with me being in this position, do you understand? That is not how I stand in life; I don't look at people as men or women, or as being of color or not. No, I look at their characters. (Female middle-class migrant, 32, Surinamese-Dutch origin)

> Whenever I am portrayed as a black woman, I get terribly annoyed, like I don't have any capacities which made me get to this position. I am me, and yes, I am a woman, and yes, I have a color, and I am proud of that. That is all very nice, but everything I have achieved, I have achieved thanks to my brains and to what other people taught me. (Female middle-class migrant, 35, Surinamese-Dutch origin)

The women's unwillingness to be labeled a 'female immigrant role model' does not imply that gender and ethnicity are unimportant to their self-identity. Their statements do make clear that the women think such characteristics should not play a prominent role in the economic sphere. Some of the women have experienced at school that the teacher's expectations depended more on ascribed characteristics than on their grades, which made them want to prove their capacities even more. Now that they have made many of their ambitions come true, for them, it feels like a step back to present themselves as role models based on the fact that they are 'female', 'black', or 'Moroccan'. Although being born in a lower-class immigrant family has shaped who they are today, they want to be judged on their own merits.

4. The Multiplicity of Citizenship

The installation of two state secretaries in the Dutch government in 2007 caused a heated political debate on dual citizenship. Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom (PVV) found the appointment of Moroccan-born Ahmed Aboutaleb – who would later on become the mayor of Rotterdam – and Nebahat Albayrak, of Turkish origin, highly problematic, since "a blind man can see that dual nationality leads to dual loyalty." According to him, not only the "islamization" of the Dutch government was a fact, but also the infiltration of the Moroccan and Turkish states into the heart of Dutch politics.[54] Although the PVV – as usual – phrased its viewpoints rather strongly, other parties shared its concerns. Mark Rutte, at the time of writing the Dutch Prime Minister and back then a member of the parliament for the Liberal Party (VVD), asked Albayrak to set a positive example by giving up her Turkish citizenship and pleaded for legislation to abolish the possibility of dual nationalities altogether.[55]

Politicians such as Wilders and Rutte make two implicit assumptions about the nature of migrants' citizenship. First, they believe that different aspects of citizenship naturally go together. People who have a passport of a certain country are assumed to be also politically involved in and to identify with that country. Second, they think that migrants – at least those of the 'classic' type, on which this debate concentrates – live 'dual lives' that threaten their full-fledged citizenship in, and thus loyalty to, the Netherlands (cf. Ghorashi 2003: 140). Based on academic literature on citizenship and transnationalism, both assumptions can be questioned. Bosniak (2006: 31) has argued that the different dimensions of citizenship – she distinguishes between formal status, rights, political practices, and processes of identification – do not always coincide. For instance, one can have formal citizenship without actually enjoying certain rights. From transnational migration studies, moreover, it is known that involvement in one country does not have to obstruct involvement in another (cf. Snel et al. 2006; Van Bochove et al. 2010a). Transnational migration scholars and

[54] These statements are translated from a column in Dutch that Geert Wilders wrote. See for the complete column, http://www.pvv.nl/index.php/in-de-media/opinie/351-column-wilders-dubbele-nationaliteit-geen stijlnl.html, 20 February 2007.

[55] See https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20062007-2634-2731.html. Rutte did not ask Aboutaleb to give up his second passport, probably because he knows that the Moroccan state does not allow that.

Dutch politicians, however, have one important similarity. Both are convinced that migrants' political ties are best characterized in terms of the distinction between 'homeland politics' and 'host-country politics'. Whereas expatriates are portrayed as people who do not have specific national ties (e.g. Colic-Peisker 2010), 'classic' migrants are generally studied through a bi-national lens (cf. Lucassen 2006).

In this chapter, I will adopt Bosniak's multidimensional approach to citizenship and investigate how different dimensions of citizenship are connected to one another in the cases of knowledge workers and middle-class migrants. As is customary with transnational migration studies, this study will look at the spatial scale of these dimensions. However, instead of focusing only on the migrants' bi-national involvement, I will also take into account forms of citizenship below and above the national level. I will start with an examination of the nationalities of the two groups of migrants and their relevance in both instrumental and emotional terms. Then, I will look at the migrants' political practices related to the Netherlands, their home country, and the 'vertical' or 'truly' transnational level. Next, I explore the extent to which migrants identify themselves as citizens of a certain country, and how these identifications relate to alternative forms of belonging. In the concluding section, I will discuss the interaction between the different dimensions of citizenship and reflect on the importance of transnational political involvement.[56]

Citizenship as a formal status

Similar to other scholars (e.g. Bauböck 2006: 16; Koopmans et al. 2005: 7; Bloemraad et al. 2008: 156), Bosniak (2006: 19-20) makes a distinction between (1) citizenship as a formal legal *status*, or "juridical membership in an organized political community"; (2) citizenship as the possession and enjoyment of certain *rights*; (3) citizenship as an *activity*, or "the practice of active engagement in the life of the political community"; and (4) citizenship as a process of *identification*, or "the way in which people experience themselves in collective terms." The first two dimensions focus on a passive or "formal" sense of citizenship (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010: 697), and are seen as central to a political interpretation of the concept (cf. Turner 2000: 131). The third and fourth dimension involve an active or "moral" sense of citizenship (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010: 697) and are considered to be the sociological definition of citizen-

[56] This chapter is partly based on Van Bochove et al. (2010a) and Van Bochove (2012).

ship (Isin 2000: 5). In this chapter, I mainly focus on citizenship as a status, an activity, and an identity.[57]

According to Bosniak (2006), the dimensions of citizenship differ from one another in terms of the degree to which they are influenced by processes of transnationalization or post-nationalization (cf. Soysal 1994; Ong 1999). Bosniak argues that compared to the other dimensions, citizenship as a formal status is most closely related to the nation-state. Even European citizenship, which is often seen as a form of citizenship beyond nation-state borders, is still firmly rooted in national membership. Moreover, the existence of dual or multiple citizenships is more an indication of bi- or multi-nationalization, than of post-nationalization (cf. Bosniak 2006: 25). Nevertheless, concerns about European integration and dual nationalities are usually based on the idea that the sovereignty of the individual nation-state is threatened. In this section, I will investigate how common multiple nationalities actually are among the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers.[58] Moreover, I will go into the reasons they give for acquiring or keeping a certain nationality, such as gaining the right to vote or expressing feelings of belonging.

Possessing one or more passports

Table 4.1 shows that most of the respondents in this research fall into one of the following categories: (1) they only have Dutch nationality (which is the case for almost all Surinamese middle-class migrants); (2) they have dual Dutch-homeland nationality (almost all Turkish and Moroccan middle-class migrants fall into this category); or (3) they only have the nationality of their country of origin (which includes a large

[57] The rights citizens have are not discussed as a separate dimension, since the relationship between having a formal status and possessing and enjoying certain rights has already been extensively dealt with by others (e.g. Bosniak 2006; Castles and Davidson 2000; Holston 1999).

[58] I use the terms 'citizenship' and 'nationality' interchangeably. Although this is common practice (cf. Howard 2005: 697), various authors have argued that in a strict sense, the two should be distinguished. Brettell (2006: 97) argues that whereas citizenship refers to "a political status that accords certain political, economic, and social rights and responsibilities," nationality is "common identification with other members of a community, to a shared worldview, set or practices, and institutions." Bauböck (2006: 17), on the other hand, claims that nationality refers to "the international and external aspects of the relation between an individual and a sovereign state" whereas citizenship "pertains to the internal aspects of this relation that are regulated by domestic law." Since such differences are not central to the purposes of this chapter, I do not make a distinction between the two terms.

majority of the knowledge workers). The vast majority of Surinamese in the Netherlands only have Dutch citizenship (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2009a: 57). With a few exceptions, the Surinamese respondents are Dutch citizens from birth. Many of them were born when Surinam was still a Dutch colony. After the country gained its independence in 1975, they, or their parents, had to choose between Surinamese and Dutch citizenship, since Surinamese law does not permit multiple nationalities. Because the respondents already lived in the Netherlands, or wanted to go there, they chose to remain Dutch citizens. The second-generation respondents were born as Dutch nationals, because their parents also were Dutch citizens. Only two respondents have a Surinamese passport. The Surinamese respondent that falls into the category 'Other' has two nationalities: Dutch and American. During her marriage to an American citizen, her mother applied for American citizenship for her and her daughter.

Although, similar to the Surinamese nationality law, Dutch law does not accept multiple nationalities, there are in actual practice many exceptions (cf. De Hart 2005).[59] According to figures of *The Netherlands Institute for Social Research* (SCP), about half of the Turkish and Moroccan population in the Netherlands have dual citizenship (cf. Dagevos 2008: 12-3). The percentage of dual citizens among the Turkish and Moroccan middle-class migrants in this research is even higher. The fact that a low percentage of the respondents have only a Turkish or Moroccan passport can, at least partly, be explained by the fact that many of the respondents are second-generation immigrants, who are more often Dutch citizens (Dagevos 2008: 11). The fact that Moroccan emigrants and their children cannot give up their homeland nationality is reflected by the absence of Moroccan respondents who only have Dutch citizenship. Some of them say they have not renewed their Moroccan passports, but that, according to Moroccan law, they remain Moroccan nationals. Although some of

[59] Migrants or children of migrants can acquire citizenship by two procedures: naturalization or option. In the case of naturalization, several exceptions exist to the renouncement requirement (in Dutch: 'afstandseis'), for instance when the countries of origin make it impossible for emigrants to relinquish citizenship (such as Morocco and Greece). Nationals of another country who marry a Dutch person can also naturalize without having to give up their first nationality. For refugees, another exception is made. In the case of the option procedure – which is, for instance, possible for those who were born in the Netherlands or live there since the age of four – until 2010, there was no renouncement requirement (see the website of the Dutch Government, www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/nederlandse-nationaliteit/dubbele-nationaliteit). In this chapter, I will use the term 'naturalization' for both procedures.

the Turkish and Moroccan respondents were born with both nationalities, most of them adopted Dutch nationality in their childhood or early adulthood.

Table 4.1: The migrants' nationality or nationalities, percentages

	Surinamese middle-class migrants	**Turkish middle-class migrants**	**Moroccan middle-class migrants**	**Knowledge workers**
Only Dutch	96.0	5.3	-	1.3
Only home country	2.7	1.3	1.3	86.7
Dual Dutch-home country	-	93.3	98.7	1.3
Other	1.3	-	-	10.7
N	**75**	**75**	**75**	**75**

In contrast with Colic-Peisker's (2010: 479) "transnational knowledge workers," of whom half have two or more nationalities, most of the knowledge workers in this research have only the nationality of their country of origin. In Chapter 2, I already introduced the most important countries in this respect, such as the US, the UK, Japan, and Germany. One respondent was born in the Netherlands and has Dutch citizenship. Two others also have Dutch nationality. One of them naturalized as soon as he had lived in the Netherlands for five years. He could retain his Pakistani nationality.[60] The other is placed in the category 'Other', because her national background is more complicated. Her father is Dutch and her mother Taiwanese. Because her father was an expatriate as well, this respondent has always been on the move. Consequently, her 'country of origin' is not easy to define. She is a Dutch national by birth – although born in France – and has adopted American citizenship during her stay in the US. Three respondents in the category 'Other' have two passports which reflect the national backgrounds of their parents. For instance, one respondent has a Lebanese father and a Czech mother. Three respondents of Indian origin were natu-

[60] Until 1951, the Pakistani nationality law did not permit multiple citizenships. Now, the government has dual nationality arrangements with sixteen countries, including the Netherlands. See https://best-citizenships.com/dual-citizenship-countries.htm.

ralized during their stay in a foreign country, i.e., the UK, Canada, and Australia. Since Indian law forbids dual nationality, these respondents no longer have an Indian passport. One respondent in this category, who was born in Hungary but is of Greek origin, declares she was stateless until she acquired Canadian citizenship at age 35.

Reasons for acquiring and retaining nationalities

The presence of thousands of knowledge workers from all over the world who do not have Dutch nationality and thus – in the rhetoric of various politicians – are loyal to a country other than the Netherlands, so far has not been subject to public debate. The fact that many Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, in addition to their Dutch passport, also have a passport of their country of origin, however, has, as I stated earlier, been a much-discussed topic in past decades. Although particularly those parties that are proponents of an exclusionary immigration policy make statements against multiple citizenships, such statements can be seen as a call for assimilation (cf. Castles and Miller 2003: 249-50). Immigrants who already live in the Netherlands are asked to choose unambiguously for and be loyal to their country of settlement. According to this view, a nationality is not just a formal status, but also a sign of identification. Such assumptions, however, are rarely based on empirical research into the meanings immigrants assign to their nationality or nationalities. Like Brettell (2006) and the research institute of the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, WODC (Wubs et al. 2008), I have looked at the reasons why immigrants – in this case particularly middle-class Turks and Moroccans – chose to adopt the host country nationality and/or to retain their home country nationality.

Most of the motives mentioned by immigrants can be classified as instrumental rather than emotional (cf. Wubs et al. 2008: 58). Whereas in his research on business immigrants in Canada, Marger (2006: 895) found that respondents "rarely admit to seeking citizenship only for tactical reasons," middle-class Turks and Moroccans do stress instrumental motives. Of the approximately 140 reasons named for acquiring Dutch nationality, more than 110 concern practical or legal matters. Many respondents say they decided to naturalize because "it makes life easier." For instance, they do not have to deal any longer with all kinds of formalities regarding a residence permit. A few respondents have naturalized because of their work: for some

jobs – particularly in the police and justice sector – Dutch citizenship is required. The most frequently named reason, however, is that a Dutch passport makes it easier to travel abroad.

> I have a Dutch passport since 2002. I started traveling more often and then a Dutch passport is very practical. That makes a great difference in the number of visas you need. (Female middle-class migrant, 27, Moroccan origin)

> I took the Dutch passport because it makes everything easier. For me, it has no emotional value at all. I go abroad often and then a Dutch passport is really convenient. (Female middle-class migrant, 39, Turkish origin)

Having Dutch nationality also facilitates cross-border activities in other ways. One Moroccan middle-class migrant, for instance, adopted Dutch nationality because she wanted to marry a man who lived in Morocco. For a young Turkish man this was also an important reason to naturalize; he says he might want to marry someone from Turkey in the future. The requirements for marriage migration are less strict for Dutch citizens than for nationals of other countries. More generally, acquiring the same rights as the majority of the population is mentioned as a reason to adopt Dutch citizenship. Although some of these rights make it easier to maintain homeland ties – for example, Dutch nationals are allowed to stay abroad for a longer period of time – most of them concern participation in the host country itself. Some respondents refer to the right to vote, while others mention social rights such as student grants or social security.

Instrumental reasons – either practical or legal – also play an important role in maintaining the homeland nationality. Similar to the Moroccan respondents, some Turkish respondents say that it is difficult to renounce Turkish citizenship. Some of them tried to do so, but came to the conclusion that it takes less time to renew their Turkish passport once in a while, than to try to get rid of it. Other Turkish respondents mention that giving up Turkish citizenship would mean losing their inheritance rights.

Also among the knowledge workers, there is a "pragmatic attitude" (cf. Brettell 2006: 81) toward naturalization and homeland nationality. Because many of them already have a passport with which they can travel easily and their stay in the Neth-

erlands is meant to be only temporary, they do not see a need to become a Dutch citizen.

> Holland is part of the EU; it is not necessary to change passports because it has no added benefits. (Female trailing spouse, 44, English origin)

Similarly, the knowledge worker who only has Dutch nationality and for whom Canada is his new home country does not think naturalizing as a Canadian is necessary.

> I never thought about giving up my Dutch passport. I could have been Canadian and Dutch, but that would just double the fees. The Dutch passport is good to travel on. (Male knowledge worker, 44, Dutch origin)

The dominance of pragmatic reasons to acquire or retain a certain nationality does not mean that emotional motives are absent altogether. Among the middle-class migrants, some respondents say that their passport has symbolic value.

> My dual nationality is a reflection of who I am: partly Dutch, partly Turkish. (Male middle-class migrant, 31, Turkish origin)

> I have Dutch nationality since 2001, because I am 'Hollandized', I feel a strong bond with the Netherlands. (Female middle-class migrant, 28, Moroccan origin)

> Dutch nationality is easy for arranging some things. But I was glad that I could keep my Turkish nationality. If I really had to choose, I would choose Turkish nationality. My blood is Turkish, so my Turkish passport is important to me. (Male middle-class migrant, 30, Turkish origin)

Later in this chapter, I will further discuss the issue of citizenship in terms of identity. I will explore to what extent the respondents, regardless of their formal status, feel national, local, or world citizens. But first, I elaborate upon their political participation.

Citizenship as a political activity

In current debates on citizenship, both in politics and academic literature, there seems to be a consensus that citizenship is more than just a formal status that is an entitlement to certain rights. According to Van Gunsteren (1998: 14), formal citizenship "ceased to be practically and theoretically interesting once it had been acquired by almost everyone, because it has lost its distinguishing qualities." The alternative theories of citizenship he sets forth relate to active citizenship: a communitarian approach, focusing on loyalty to a historically developed community, and a republican approach, emphasizing involvement in the political arena (Van Gunsteren 1998: 19-21). Bosniak (2006: 25) argues that with regard to these active dimensions, the claims of denationalized citizenship are particularly plausible. Here, I will deal with the republican vision on citizenship and look at the relative importance of various kinds of political practices and the spatial levels they inhabit. Although, so far, migrants' transnational political involvement has been mainly studied on a bi-national level, I will also pay attention to border-transcending political activities.

Involvement in conventional and unconventional practices

According to Martiniello (2006: 85), in the scholarly European literature, migrants were for a long time considered to be 'apolitical' or 'politically apathetic'. Guest workers' passive attitude toward politics was explained by their exclusion from the electoral process and their lack of experience with democracy. However, Martiniello (2006: 87) argues that migrants actually "have always been involved in politics either outside or at the margins of the political system of both their country of origin and their country of residence." Their political activities often remained unnoticed, since politics was conceptualized very narrowly as participation in elections and political parties. Although nowadays more attention is paid to migrants' political involvement, the emphasis is still on practices inside the formal political arena (Pero and Solomos 2010: 8). Since many of the former guest workers and their descendants have the right to participate in elections, the interest has shifted from the question of *whether* they vote, to the question *for whom* they vote. In the Netherlands, migrants' use of their active and passive voting rights is particularly discussed in terms of 'ethnic voting' and 'clientelism' (cf. Tillie 2006: 20).

Political involvement, however, is broader "than mere participation in periodic elections" (Rimmerman 2005: 59). Most knowledge workers, for example, do not have the right to vote in the Netherlands, but this does not mean that their attitude toward Dutch politics is *a priori* apathetic. Moreover, the fact that many middle-class migrants lack voting rights in their country of origin does not automatically imply that they are inactive in homeland politics altogether. In discussing the two groups of migrants' activities, I therefore make a distinction between practices inside and outside the "arenas prescribed for it" (Beck 1997: 98), or, in the classic terminology of Barnes and Kaase (1979), between "conventional" and "unconventional" political activities.

To assess participation in conventional political activities, respondents were asked if they voted in the most recent local, national, homeland, and/or European elections and if they are currently a member of, or a volunteer for, a political party. Regarding unconventional political activities, they were asked if they, in the past year, participated in a demonstration, a consumer boycott, or a petition. Table 4.2 gives a first impression of the relative importance of these various practices regardless of the spatial level they concern. The native Dutch respondents are included for comparison.

Table 4.2: The respondents' participation in conventional and unconventional political practices, percentages

	Middle-class migrants	**Knowledge workers**	**Middle-class native Dutch**
Conventional			
Voting in the elections	92.0	62.7	96.0
Being a member of a political party	17.8	2.7	13.0
Volunteering in a political party	9.8	-	5.0
Unconventional			
Participating in a demonstration	8.0	4.0	4.0
Boycotting a product	30.7	40.0	36.0
Signing a petition	36.4	20.0	25.0
N	**225**	**75**	**100**

The patterns of political participation are quite similar among the three groups of respondents. Voting is the most common activity among all groups, although the percentage of knowledge workers who voted in recent elections is considerably lower than that of the middle-class respondents. The other conventional political practices are much less common among all three groups and even almost absent in the case of the knowledge workers. Apart from voting, the most widespread political activities undertaken by the respondents are boycotting a product and signing a petition. Further analysis shows that about half of the respondents from the three groups have participated in at least one of these unconventional practices. As Inglehart and Catterberg (2002: 302) argued, such practices are actually "no longer unconventional but have become more or less normal actions for a large part of the citizenry." More important for the purposes of this research, however, is the spatial scale of the migrants' political activities.

Conventional politics: a one-country phenomenon

Although research on migrants' cross-border political involvement has expanded rapidly in recent years (cf. Smith and Bakker 2008: 14), this does not mean that the importance of the phenomenon itself has increased too. Many recent quantitative studies on migrants' homeland politics have drawn the conclusion that transnational political action is actually rather exceptional (e.g. Itzigsohn 2000; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Snel et al. 2006; Waldinger 2008). Migrants' political practices prove to be much more often directed to the country of settlement than to the country of origin (cf. Koopmans et al. 2005).

Table 4.3 shows that the middle-class migrants' conventional political practices are indeed almost all directed at the Netherlands.[61] Except for the five respondents who do not have Dutch nationality, all the middle-class migrants have the right to vote in both local and national elections. Of the five who are foreign nationals, one respondent does not have any voting rights in the Netherlands. The others do have the right to participate in local elections based on their legal stay in the Netherlands for at least five years. The respondents were asked if they voted in the most recent elections, which at the time were the Rotterdam municipal elections of

[61] In Tables 4.3 and 4.4, respondents are counted more than once if they have participated in one activity on different geographical levels. Since the categories are not mutually exclusive, I have chosen only to present absolute numbers in both tables, as well as in Table 4.5.

March 2006 and the national elections of November 2006. About 80 percent of the respondents report that they voted in the local elections, which is well above the municipal average of 58 percent (Tillie 2006). Although the probable overrepresentation of politically and socially active immigrants in this research can explain part of this outcome, the specific circumstances in the Rotterdam elections of 2006 also should be taken into account. The head-to-head contest between the Labor Party and Livable Rotterdam motivated many immigrants to cast their vote, in the hope that the latter party – with its, at least in their eyes, anti-immigrant sentiments – would not be part of the local administration for another term. Especially striking in this respect was the high percentage of Moroccans in Rotterdam who voted in 2006: turnout rates among Moroccans increased from 39 percent in 2002 to 58 percent in 2006 (Tillie 2006: 22). In the national elections at the end of 2006, a large majority of the middle-class migrants again cast their vote, and once more, many of them voted for the Labor Party. The respondents who are currently involved in a political party are also rather left-wing oriented (cf. Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008: 117). Next to the Labor Party, some are a member of or a volunteer for the Green Party, or for D66, which characterizes itself as a progressive, social-liberal party.

Table 4.3: Conventional political practices concerning the Netherlands and the homeland, absolute numbers

	The Netherlands	**Homeland**
Voting in the elections		
Middle-class migrants	207	6
Knowledge workers	2	45
Being a member of a political party		
Middle-class migrants	40	-
Knowledge workers	-	2
Volunteering in a political party		
Middle-class migrants	22	-
Knowledge workers	-	-

Only six middle-class migrants – all of them of Turkish origin – have participated in the most recent homeland elections. Although all of the 71 middle-class respondents

who have Turkish nationality officially have the right to vote in the Turkish national elections, many of them do not actually know this. Moreover, for those who do know, it is not easy to use this right. Since Turkish emigrants cannot vote at Turkish embassies or consulates in their country of settlement, they have to travel to Turkey to do so (cf. Kücükkosum 2011). The six respondents who voted did so at a polling station at the airport or at customs during their holidays in Turkey. Almost all of the Surinamese respondents only have Dutch nationality and cannot vote in homeland elections; the two respondents who still have Surinamese nationality did not vote either. Moroccan citizens abroad so far do not have the right to vote in homeland elections (cf. Ben-Layashi 2007). However, many of the Moroccan respondents say they have little trust in homeland political parties anyway, since actual power resides with the king (cf. Van Bochove et al. 2010a: 352). None of the middle-class migrants are currently involved in a homeland political party, neither as a member nor as a volunteer. They often have more confidence in projects run by NGOs than in political institutions. Memberships in, and voluntary work for, such organizations is further discussed in the next chapter, which deals with the migrants' activities and identifications in the socio-cultural sphere.

In addition to conventional practices directed at the Netherlands or the country of origin, about a third of the middle-class migrants say they have voted in the elections for the European Parliament in June 2004. Since none of the migrants' other – either conventional or unconventional – practices are directed at Europe or explicitly concern EU issues, the European level is not included in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4.[62]

In the case of the knowledge workers, conventional political practices are almost solely directed to the country of origin. This is not surprising, since many of the respondents arrived in the Netherlands quite recently and do not have the right to vote in Dutch elections. [63] Two knowledge workers who have Dutch nationality did vote in the national elections of 2006. One of them lived near a polling station and thought it was "nice to see how it worked." The other had just acquired Dutch na-

[62] In the survey used among the knowledge workers, respondents were not asked whether or not they voted in the European elections.

[63] EU citizens actually do have the right to vote in Dutch local elections, regardless of their length of stay (see http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/229&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en). However, none of the EU citizens interviewed in this research mentioned this right. Since the project coordinators, including myself, were not familiar with this rule either, we did not ask about it in the interviews.

tionality and found it important to use his obtained rights. None of the respondents is involved in a Dutch political party. Two knowledge workers – both American citizens – are members of a homeland political party. One is a member of the US Green Party and the other of the Democrats Abroad, which is the overseas branch of the US Democratic Party. Regarding their home country national elections, most of the knowledge workers say they are eligible to vote, others do not know this for sure, and again others say they lost their voting rights because they no longer have the nationality. Many respondents state that they do not have the right to vote in their home country's local elections, because they are no longer located or registered there. Since it would be too much to discuss here all the different home countries' regulations regarding voting rights for citizens abroad, I will concentrate on their actual participation in these elections.

About one-third of the knowledge workers voted in both their home country's local and national elections; many of these respondents still lived there at that time. Another third only voted in the national elections; some of them did so in the consulate in the Netherlands, others were in their country of origin for holidays. The remainder did not vote either nationally or locally. Apart from two Brazilian respondents who say that the law obliges them to vote, most others who voted did so because they wanted to exert influence on political developments in their home country. A Finnish respondent, for example, says: "I still care about how the country is doing; I don't want it to be ruled by idiots." Others see voting as their "duty as a citizen" or as a "privilege." Explanations for not voting are mainly practical in nature, such as, "I didn't know how to vote from here," "I cannot vote overseas: I would have to fly to Taiwan," "I didn't arrange my postal vote in time," "I forgot about it." and "It's too much stuff: it wasn't worth the effort." One respondent fits the earlier mentioned stereotypical image that migrants are not used to the democratic process of voting since they do not have it at home (cf. Martiniello 2006: 86).

> I think I have never voted in my whole life. No, I never got informed to vote, but I do have the right, so they say. But nobody said to me: 'Hey, you can go to that place to bring out your vote, to fill in a form, and to put it in a box.' No, I never got that information. I cannot vote for the president, or for the head of the district, or the mayor. Yes, I can probably vote whether we should put the table over here or over there. (Male knowledge worker, 35, Chinese origin)

This Chinese knowledge worker says that if he had the right to vote in the Netherlands, he "would definitely use it." According to the conventional definition of politics, he would thus cease to be apolitical as soon as he gained political rights. However, his current lack of opportunities to participate in formal politics does not necessarily mean that he is politically inactive altogether. To gain broader understanding of political involvement and its spatial scale, I will turn to activities that are less restricted by national regulations.

Unconventional politics: beyond bi-nationalism

Based on their research on the political claims making of immigrants in various European countries, Koopmans et al. (2005: 127-8) conclude that it is exactly in countries where immigrants have a weak citizenship status, such as Switzerland, that homeland political claims are most prevalent.[64] Although my research differs from Koopmans et al.'s in that I compare different migrant groups within one particular country, so far my results point in the same directions as theirs. The middle-class migrants, who almost all have full political rights in the Netherlands, are much more active in Dutch local and national politics than in homeland politics. The political practices of the knowledge workers, almost all of whom lack formal citizenship in the Netherlands, are mainly directed to their country of origin. However, before concluding that national and transnational political practices are largely substitutes (cf. Koopmans et al. 2005: 143), activities from which people cannot be excluded based on their citizenship status should also be studied. If we look at 'unconventional' political practices, are the middle-class migrants still largely focused on the Netherlands and the knowledge workers on their home country?

The respondents were asked if they have participated in one of the three designated unconventional practices in the past year, and if so, where they did this, and what issue was involved.[65] Based on their descriptions, the geographical scale of

[64] The authors use "political claims" as a designation for activities in the public sphere which are directed toward expressing political demands or mobilizing others to undertake action. Various actors – such as migrant groups – seek to advance their interests by such claims (Koopmans et al. 2005: 24).

[65] Five middle-class migrants and a knowledge worker who participated in a petition in the past year did not remember what their action was about. One middle-class migrant who participated in a boycott action did not remember the aim of her action. Another one did not want to disclose this.

their activities can be determined.[66] Table 4.4 displays the practices concerning Dutch or homeland issues.

Table 4.4: Unconventional political practices concerning the Netherlands and the homeland, absolute numbers

	The Netherlands	**Homeland**
Participating in a demonstration		
Middle-class migrants	8	6
Knowledge workers	2	1
Signing a petition		
Middle-class migrants	47	4
Knowledge workers	4	3
Boycotting a product		
Middle-class migrants	2	1
Knowledge workers	1	1

In the case of participating in a demonstration and boycotting a product, a similar number of reported actions are directed at the Netherlands and the countries of origin. Among the middle-class migrants, signing a petition much more often concerns Dutch local or national issues than homeland issues. In the case of the knowledge workers, this difference does not exist. Some respondents' activities concern both countries. For instance, they have participated in a demonstration directed at the home country and in the same year signed a petition concerning a Dutch issue. Middle-class migrants' petitions concerning the country of settlement include, for

[66] Regarding the geographical scale of unconventional political practices, a distinction can be made between the questions of *where* a certain practice takes place, to *whom* it is directed, and *what* kind of issue it refers to (cf. Koopmans et al. 2005: 254-5). In some cases, the location, the addressee, and the issue will concern the same geographical level. For instance, a demonstration taking place in the Netherlands directed to the Dutch government about the national health system can be coded as a 'country of settlement' demonstration. Likewise, an online petition directed to the Israeli government about the situation in Gaza can be coded as a 'transnational' petition. However, in other cases, different geographical levels come together in a single practice (cf. Tarrow 2005: 15). For example, a demonstration in the Netherlands can be directed to the Dutch government's policy concerning the war in Iraq. In this article, the question of what issue a certain practice concerns will be decisive in determining its geographical scale, because it is this question that is most informative about the nature of respondents' political involvement.

instance, actions against the Dutch immigration and integration policy or in favor of the establishment of a local youth centre. The knowledge workers' petitions concerning the Netherlands in all cases relate to local issues, such as against replacing trees in their neighborhood or support for a Rotterdam art organization. Middle-class migrants' country-of-settlement demonstrations concern, among other things, calls for higher wages and protests against government cuts. One knowledge worker also participated in a demonstration directed at the Netherlands. Again, this concerned a local issue, namely the establishment of a helicopter landing pad in Rotterdam, which the respondent opposed. Examples of middle-class migrants' unconventional practices related to homeland issues are attending a demonstration for cheaper airline tickets to Surinam, signing a petition against the proposal of abolishing dual nationality and a petition in favor of the opening of a medical research centre in Turkey. Concerning homeland issues, the knowledge workers mentioned, for instance, a demonstration at the Greek embassy in The Hague against the death of a boy killed by policemen in Greece, a petition directed at the Polish government to abolish the double taxes that Polish workers abroad have to pay, and a petition to unseat the Brazilian president.

In discussing the migrants' unconventional practices, up to now, I have followed the dominant bi-national approach. However, a comparison between Table 4.2 – which presented the respondents' participation in various practices regardless of their spatial scale – and Table 4.4 makes clear that the whole story is not yet told. Table 4.2 demonstrated, for instance, that 69 middle-class migrants and 30 knowledge workers participated in a consumer boycott action in the past year. According to Table 4.4, of the total number of reported boycotts, only 5 concern Dutch or homeland issues. To gain a fuller understanding of unconventional practices, a third spatial level needs to be introduced: the 'truly' transnational level. With this term, I refer to practices vertically beyond the borders of both the receiving and the sending countries (cf. Lucassen 2006; Morawska 2009).

The demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts showed in Table 4.5 concern issues such as the war in Iraq, the stoning of people in Africa and Asia, the violation of refugees' human rights, the conditions of the labor force in third world countries, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and animal abuse. Although studies on migrants' transnational political activities usually focus only on homeland politics, with regard to

unconventional practices, the 'truly' transnational level proves to be much more important.

Table 4.5: Unconventional political practices concerning the 'truly' transnational level, absolute numbers

	'Truly' transnational
Participating in a demonstration	
Middle-class migrants	6
Knowledge workers	-
Signing a petition	
Middle-class migrants	32
Knowledge workers	7
Boycotting a product	
Middle-class migrants	65
Knowledge workers	30

Whereas only 7 of the petitions reported by the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers concern homeland issues, 39 have to do with issues beyond national borders. And while 2 boycotts are directed at the home country, 95 are border-transcending. Regarding the discussion of whether national and transnational political activities are substitutes, it should be remarked that many of the middle-class migrants who participate in 'truly' transnational political practices are also involved in local or national activities, such as voting. Since the migrants' border-transcending practices concern a wide range of issues, and this type of transnational involvement has so far been understudied, I dedicate the intermezzo at the end of this chapter to a further classification of 'truly' transnational boycotts.

Citizenship as an identity

Citizenship and identity are often contrasted. For instance, citizenship is said to be "more a concept of status than identity" (Isin and Wood 1999: 19) and about "universal" rights instead of "particular" identities (Hussain and Bagguley 2005: 409). However, despite such differences, identity plays an important role in current citi-

zenship debates. According to Turner (2000: 133), "the question of contested collective identity in a context of radical pluralization" is the most central issue in contemporary political theory about citizenship. Van Gunsteren (1998: 63) argues that discussions about who 'we' are and what holds 'us' together arise exactly "where such identity is not an easy and self-evident reality." In the Netherlands, as in other countries, in the past years, much has been said about the meaning of national identity. The heat of this debate is particularly illustrated by the criticism directed at the Dutch princess Máxima in 2007. The princess, who is of Argentinean origin, said that, after having lived in the Netherlands for seven years, she had still not found *the* Dutch identity. According to her, the Netherlands consists of many different identities, which cannot be grasped by one cliché.[67] After her statements, various politicians rushed to say that, of course, a specific Dutch identity exists. In this section, I will investigate what being and feeling Dutch means to the migrants in this research, and what other national, local, or border-transcending feelings of belonging they have. Are the identifications of middle-class migrants really divided between the Netherlands and their home country, as can be expected based on statements of politicians and transnational migration scholars? And are the knowledge workers really "liberated" from attachments to the nation in which they were born, as some scholars (e.g. Colic-Peisker 2010: 484) suggest?

Identifying as a Dutch or homeland citizen

Isin and Wood (1999: 20) argue that citizenship and identity are both group markers, but that the former carries legal weight, whereas the latter carries social and cultural weight. The importance of this difference becomes clear in the respondents' remarks about their national identifications. Earlier in this chapter, I demonstrated that nationality for most of the respondents is nothing more than a practical matter. For them, being Dutch (or Moroccan, or Chinese, for that matter) in a legal sense is not the same as feeling Dutch (or Moroccan, or Chinese) in a socio-cultural sense. When respondents say that they feel connected to their country of origin, most of the time this has little to do with their political connection to that country, as the following statements show.

[67] The speech with English subtitles can be viewed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zt0pHmZuDz0.

> The Moroccan nationality cannot be abandoned, but if it was possible I would do it. I feel more connected to the Netherlands. I am not that patriotic toward the Moroccan state. Besides, you can be a Moroccan without having a Moroccan passport. It's more about what you eat, what music you listen to, and the way you dress. (Female middle-class migrant, 37, Moroccan origin)

> I feel close to America. I am always going to be American. But when I think about my relationship with America right now, it's very different than when I lived there. So at this point in time I live outside of the US and my relationship is a bit, let's say, strained. I care for a lot of people there but I don't have a strong relationship with the country. I feel closer to the people than to the country. (Female knowledge worker, 27, American origin)

> According to the law, I am a Dutchman. I have all the rights. But I am also a Surinamese; I hunger for Surinam. (Male middle-class migrant, 44, Surinamese origin)

Table 4.6 shows that when being asked about their primary sense of belonging, the homeland identity is the most frequently chosen answer category among both the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers. More than one-third of the middle-class migrants say they primarily identify themselves as a Surinamese, Turk, or Moroccan. One in six respondents choose the hyphenated identity option, such as Moroccan-Dutch. Although based on their image as cosmopolitans, knowledge workers could be expected to identify themselves less in national terms, 31 of the 75 respondents feel like home country nationals in the first place. It might not be surprising that none of the knowledge workers say they feel Dutch in the first place. However, the fact that only 13 of the 225 middle-class migrants choose this option needs further explanation.

Table 4.6: Answers to the question, "What do you feel yourself to be in the first place?," percentages

	Middle-class migrants	**Knowledge workers**	**Middle-class native Dutch**
Citizen of Rotterdam/ 'Rotterdammer'	8.9	1.3	11.0
Dutchman/Dutchwoman	5.8	-	49.0
Member of own ethnic/ national group	34.7	41.3	-
Hyphenated Dutch-own group	16.4	-	-
Foreigner/'Allochtone'	2.2	10.7	-
Expat	-	10.7	-
European	0.9	6.7	8.0
World citizen/Cosmopolitan	9.3	21.3	18.0
Follower of a religion	14.2	4.0	8.0
Other	7.6	4.0	6.0
N	**225**	**75**	**100**

Note. In the middle-class migrants' survey, the 'Expat' option was not on the list as one of the answer categories. In the knowledge worker survey, this was the case for the hyphenated option. In the case of the middle-class native Dutch, no migrant-related categories were included.

In addition to the question about self-identification, the respondents were asked to what degree they feel close to the Netherlands and to their home country. About 85 percent of the middle-class migrants answered 'close' or 'very close' in the case of the Netherlands, and about 70 percent did so in the case of the country of origin. By comparison, of the knowledge workers, about 53 percent feel (very) close to the Netherlands and about 85 percent to the home country. However, although the middle-class migrants are almost all legally Dutch and generally feel close to the Netherlands, they do not consider themselves 'real' Dutchman (cf. Duyvendak 2011: 103). Comparable to what Ameli (2002: 196) and Hussain and Bagguley (2005: 410) write about 'Britishness', to many migrants, 'Dutchness' is an ethnic identity, reserved for native, white, non-Muslim people. The middle-class migrants were asked to what extent they agree or disagree with the statements "I feel myself to be a real Surinamese/Turk/Moroccan" and "I feel myself to be a real Dutch(wo)man." Where-

as almost 60 percent of the respondents agree or totally agree with the first statement, only about 30 percent do so with the second. From the explanations they give for their answers, it appears that the respondents do want to feel Dutch, but that others exclude them from this identity.

> I want to feel like a real Dutchman, but because others don't see me that way, I can't. (Male middle-class migrant, 55, Surinamese origin)

> I would like to feel like a Dutchman, but because of the way other people approach me, I feel Moroccan. (Male middle-class migrant, 31, Moroccan origin)

One female trailing spouse who is excluded from the sample because she had already lived in the Netherlands for about fifteen years makes a similar remark.

> I think I can describe myself as a Dutchwoman, but because of my looks nobody thinks I am Dutch. In America, everyone is American. They will not say 'you are Chinese', or 'you are Turkish'. But in Rotterdam, I feel the people think 'you are Chinese', even if you belong to the second or third generation. (Female trailing spouse, 51, Chinese origin)

Although other respondents also refer to the US as a more inclusive society, Kasinitz et al. (2008: 338) actually found that many African-American youths in New York similarly "used the term 'American' to describe something they felt excluded from" and equated being American with "the white mainstream." Whereas the migrants in this research can largely decide themselves what nationality they acquire and what political activities they undertake, national identification is an aspect of citizenship that they do not control themselves. As Berger and Berger (1972: 62) put it, "Only if an identity is confirmed by others it is possible for that identity to be real to the individual holding it" (see also Verkuyten 2005: 56). This is not only true for the respondents' identification as Dutchmen, but also for their homeland identities (cf. Raj 2003: 2). Whereas in the Dutch context nobody can deny the middle-class migrants their Surinamese, Turkish, or Moroccan origin, on holidays in their country of origin, this identity is also questioned.

> When I am in Surinam, I want to feel like a resident of the country. However, the people there see me as a tourist, so I feel like that. Right away, they sense that I don't live there. At the market, they will count me higher prices and say things like: 'The Dutchman will buy it anyway.' (Male middle-class migrant, 50, Surinamese origin)

In the Netherlands, instead of as Dutch, many middle-class migrants think they are perceived as 'allochtones' who essentially do not belong to the Netherlands. Especially since the rise of right-wing politicians such as Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders, they have the feeling that, regardless of their formal status, they are not treated as full-fledged Dutch citizens.

> I am fed up with this country and with Europe. As an 'allochtone' you have to prove yourself two or three times more, you get underestimated a lot. I don't want that anymore. Since Wilders, it has become worse. I ask myself if my children have a future in this country. (Male middle-class migrant, 52, Surinamese origin)

> It is not always nice to live in the Netherlands if you are an 'allochtone' and certainly not if you are a Muslim. Particularly since about six years ago, with the rise of Pim Fortuyn, we are seen as second-class citizens. (Female middle-class migrant, 31, Moroccan origin)

> The last few years, I feel less at home in the Netherlands. Nevertheless I feel attached to this country. If I go on holiday, after a few weeks I am getting homesick. But I do not always feel welcome here. People think in terms of 'we' and 'them' and politicians encourage that. (Female middle-class migrant, 26, Moroccan origin)

The knowledge workers generally do not know much about Dutch politics. When they do know a politician or a political party, it is usually Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom. That is to say, many do not know the exact names, but refer to them as "the irritating xenophobic guy," "the guy that bleaches his hair," "that albino guy, the fascist," and his "extreme right party." Some of the knowledge workers say they worry about these developments. However, since they do not consider themselves to be Dutch anyway – some do not even see themselves as residents of the Netherlands – they regard the political climate as something that affects 'immigrants' more than 'expats'. Many knowledge workers do have the feeling that the Netherlands is a ra-

ther closed community, but they base this opinion largely on their experiences in the socio-cultural sphere, as I will discuss in the next chapter.

Identifying as a Rotterdam or world citizen

Instead of being loyal to two political communities, many of the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers are actually ambivalent toward both their countries of origin and settlement (cf. Smith and Bakker 2008: 212). Particularly the middle-class migrants are not only critical of the anti-immigrant sentiments in Dutch political debate, but also about the political situation in their home country. Since national identifications are often problematic, some of the respondents prefer to describe themselves as urban citizens or world citizens. As Table 4.6 already showed, about 18 percent of the middle-class migrants identify themselves as 'Rotterdammers' or 'cosmopolitans' in the first place. Among the knowledge workers, the cosmopolitan identity is particularly popular: more than 20 percent choose this option. Although identification with Rotterdam can be said to refer to a local sense of belonging, and as a world citizen to a global sense of belonging, for the migrants both spatial levels symbolize ethnic and cultural diversity. Compare the following statements.

> I feel connected with Rotterdam; I wouldn't want to live in any other city. I began to love this city. In Rotterdam, if you want to have *nasi* [an Indonesian rice dish] or kebab at four o'clock in the morning, you can just get it. (Male middle-class migrant, 44, Surinamese origin)

> Specifically in Rotterdam – in other places it is different – a huge part of the population is foreign, so being a foreigner myself, I don't feel like I stick out particularly or that my presence is unusual. There is a significant presence of people from all over the world; that is something that I enjoy. (Male knowledge worker, 38, Italian origin)

> I find it difficult to say if I feel more Moroccan or Dutch. As a matter of fact, I do not think the term 'feeling' is really helpful. In Morocco, I feel Dutch, and in the Netherlands, I feel Moroccan. Actually I feel myself to be a 'Rotterdammer', a Muslim, a Moroccan, and a Dutchman. I feel like a world citizen. If it was up to me, all national borders would disappear. (Female middle-class migrant, 41, Moroccan origin)

> I know that I am a foreigner, but we have this thing here with my friends that we are 'Rotterdammers'. So, if I had to describe myself in Holland, I would say 'Rotterdammer'. Maybe just for fun, but it feels a bit like it. I also feel a bit like a world citizen; I always travel. If you ask me if I feel Brazilian, yeah, I lived there most of my life and that is part of what I am. But I feel more international. I feel like I never fitted there so well, and I never fit here so well. So I don't know if I fit places. (Female knowledge worker, 29, Brazilian origin)

Previous research showed that Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Amsterdam and Rotterdam more often strongly identify with the city of residence than with the Netherlands (cf. Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008: 93; Groenewold 2008: 110). Compared with national identifications, sub-national and supra-national identifications are more encompassing. Migrants cannot easily be excluded from identifying themselves as 'Rotterdammer' or world citizen based on such characteristics as country of birth, skin color, or religion. However, the anti-immigrant sentiments that the respondents describe on the national level are also felt locally, perhaps especially in Rotterdam. Moreover, local and transnational identifications should not be seen as alternatives to national identifications. Although identities can be contradictory (cf. Weeks 1990: 23; De Swaan 2007: 41), in many cases, they are complementary. Both points are illustrated by the following statements.

> For years, I felt myself to be a citizen of the city. But that changed some years ago. In the past, when I had been in Belgium for family visit and the train to Rotterdam passed the mosque, it really felt like coming home. But now, people see me as an 'allochtone'. (Female middle-class migrant, 41, Moroccan origin)

> I feel myself to be a 'Rotterdammer' in the first place, although I will always stay a Turk. It's like that wall over there. You can say: 'It's a yellow wall.' But it still remains a wall. Turkey is your fatherland; you are a Turk. But you live here, you work here, so this is your country. (Male middle-class migrant, 36, Turkish origin)

According to Groenewold (2008: 110), multiple identifications are the rule rather than the exception. However, his research among second-generation Turks and Moroccans shows that a strong identification with Islam is more easily combined with a strong local identity than with a Dutch one. In Chapter 5, local and transnational

identifications are further discussed, with special attention to socio-cultural attachments, for instance based on family ties, memories, religion, or ethnic 'roots'.

Conclusion

In the political debate in the Netherlands as well as elsewhere, dual nationalities are seen by a number of politicians as an obstacle to migrants' full integration into the host society. The assumption is that citizenship is an all-or-nothing matter: having a certain nationality presumes being politically active in and identifying with the nation-state involved. However, the results of this research confirm Bosniak's (2006: 31) argument that different dimensions of citizenship do not naturally go together.

First of all, citizenship as a formal status and as an identity do not always coincide. For most of the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers, having a certain nationality is a practical matter. The middle-class migrants see their Dutch passport mainly as a travel document, which is similar to how the knowledge workers perceive their homeland nationality. Some middle-class migrants say that their passport does have symbolic value; they see their formal status as a confirmation of their bond with the Netherlands, their home country, or both. However, many migrants argue that emotional attachments are independent of having a certain nationality. The migrants' identification with their home country often has a socio-cultural rather than political character. Moreover, even though almost all of the middle-class migrants have Dutch nationality, only few of them have the feeling that they are 'really' Dutch. Even the Surinamese respondents, who almost all have only Dutch nationality, often primarily identify themselves as Surinamese. Many migrants feel that native Dutch people exclude them from Dutch identity.

Moreover, being a formal member of, or identifying with, the country of origin does not automatically imply homeland political participation. Although many middle-class migrants primarily identify themselves as Surinamese, Turkish, or Moroccan, and a majority of the Turks and Moroccans have dual citizenship, their political activities are much more often directed to the Netherlands than to their country of origin. Among the knowledge workers, homeland political involvement is more common: many of them have voted in recent elections. However, voting in homeland elections can be difficult, for instance for those who are obliged to travel to their home country in order to cast their vote. This is also an important reason

why Turkish middle-class migrants, who almost all have the right to vote in the Turkish elections, rarely use this right. Compared with conventional political practices such as voting, unconventional political practices are less tied to formal citizenship and often do not require traveling abroad. The two groups of migrants' unconventional practices rarely concern homeland issues. When the middle-class migrants sign a petition, for instance, this concerns a Dutch local or national issue more than ten times as often as a homeland issue. Even more often, however, both groups of migrants' unconventional practices cannot be classified in terms of host-country or home-country politics. These practices concern issues that transcend national borders, such as environmental problems or human rights issues.

Next to the fact that the different dimensions of citizenship do not form a coherent whole, the importance of 'vertical' transnational political involvement is a second important finding of this chapter. Border-transcending practices are usually overlooked in studies on migrants' political transnationalism. Similar to the political debate, in the academic literature, migrants are seen as people whose citizenship is divided between two nation-states. However, in addition to citizenship as a political activity, citizenship as an identity also often transcends the countries of origin and settlement. Some of the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers see themselves primarily as world citizens, who do not fit in a particular national framework. Migrants who strongly identify with Rotterdam give similar explanations, coming down to the fact that they feel at home in a super-diverse environment. Although citizenship practices and identifications below and above the nation-state level are no substitute for national involvement, they do form an important part of the migrants' position in the political sphere and therefore deserve more attention. It might be still too early to talk about the existence of "transnational citizenship" (Fox 2005: 194, cf. Itzigsohn 2000: 1148), but certain dimensions of citizenship truly are transnational. This last point is central to the second intermezzo, where I scrutinize the issues that both groups of migrants address when participating in a consumer boycott.

Intermezzo II

Boycotting: A 'Truly' Transnational Affair

A glance at the internet shows that on the social networking site Facebook alone, more than seven million pages are dedicated to consumer boycotts. Examples of topics are "Boycott BP for not taking responsibility for the oil spill," "Boycott Campbell Soup for their certification of their products as halal and supporting The Muslim Brotherhood," "Boycott the whale killers," "Boycott McDonalds for siding with homophobic bigots," and "All of us who hate Jennifer Lopez – Boycott celebrities wearing fur." There are even several "Boycott Facebook" pages on Facebook. In Chapter 4, it became clear that among the respondents in this research, participating in boycott actions is remarkably common. I already argued that many of the respondents' boycotts concern border-transcending instead of Dutch or homeland issues. In this intermezzo, I will explain what their 'truly' transnational actions are about exactly.[68]

"I don't wear Nike shoes because of child labor"

In his extensive study on consumer boycotts in the US, Friedman (1999: 4) defines a boycott as "an attempt by one or more parties to achieve certain objectives by urging individual consumers to refrain from making selected purchases in the marketplace." Although Friedman (1999: 8) argues that transnational boycotts occur "far less frequently" than national or local ones, compared to other political activities, the boycotts found in this research appear to be exceptionally unbound. Almost all of the respondents who have participated in a boycott action – whether they are middle-class migrants, knowledge workers, or native Dutch – boycotted products because of border-transcending issues. Similar to many of the actions announced on Facebook, an important part of the respondents' boycotts concern issues related to universal human rights, animal welfare, and the environment. Initiatives or organizations that address issues like these are often referred to as indicators of "compassion becoming global" (Stevenson 2003: 120-1) or the "cosmopolitanization" of societies (Beck 2000: 97).

[68] This intermezzo is largely based on Van Bochove (2012).

> I don't really boycott products, but I do keep an eye on corporate responsibility. If I know that a product is unsustainable or unethical, I don't buy it. IKEA, for instance, uses child labor, so I don't shop there anymore. (Male middle-class migrant, 44, Moroccan origin)

> If I know that a certain company uses child labor, I don't buy their products. For instance, I would not wear Nike shoes. (Male middle-class native Dutch, 38)

> Some products you just do not eat or use, because you know bad things have happened with it. For instance, I do not eat tuna, because dolphins are killed in the nets used to catch tuna. (Female middle-class migrant, 38, Surinamese origin)

> I stopped eating *foie gras* in the past year, because of animal rights. And I try not to buy plastic cups, because of environmental reasons. I know it is naïve, but I feel good about it. (Female knowledge worker, 27, Portuguese origin)

> Every time I go shopping I'm very careful about the meat products I'm buying, to be sure they're not factory farmed, or that kind of stuff. (Male knowledge worker, 38, English origin)

Many of the boycotts based on such global compassion can be characterized as "buycotts" (cf. Friedman 1999: 201). These actions are not so much concerned with punishing certain firms or products for their misdeeds, but rather with rewarding those that are believed to be sustainable or ethically responsible.

> I try to be conscious of what I buy and what I do not buy. So I buy Max Havelaar products, because they are fair trade. (Female middle-class migrant, 30, Turkish origin)

> I use 'green energy'. It was a lot of trouble getting it, but I think in this way you really can exert influence, more than through politics. If everyone in the Netherlands would use green energy, this would really be a signal. (Female middle-class native Dutch, 37)

> I only buy cosmetic products at the Body Shop, because they are animal friendly. (Female middle-class migrant, 41, Turkish origin)

> Yes, I keep it at the back of my head. If I have a choice between two things, I choose the environment-friendly one, for instance, recycled paper. (Male knowledge worker, 26, Czech-Lebanese origin)

"I don't drink Coca-Cola because of Israel"

In addition to the above-described boycotts, middle-class migrants especially report actions that have to do with ethnic and religious issues. One of the boycotts described by various middle-class migrants is based on a story that has reached the status of an urban legend.[69] According to this story, which has circulated since 1996, the American designer Tommy Hilfiger made racist statements in the Oprah Winfrey Show. He is believed to have said that his clothes are not meant for African-Americans, Latinos, and other ethnic minorities. Although Hilfiger and Winfrey have both denied that this interview ever took place, some respondents still boycott Hilfiger's products.

> I boycott Tommy Hilfiger because he has said that non-whites shouldn't wear his clothes. I don't care that he denies to have said this. The Germans have denied a lot as well. (Female middle-class migrant, 31, Surinamese origin)

> I boycott Tommy Hilfiger, because he said: 'If I had known that blacks and Latinos would wear my clothes, I would never have made them.' (Female middle-class migrant, 41, Moroccan origin)

Whereas the Tommy Hilfiger boycott is aimed at punishing a specific company, many other boycotts target foreign governments. Through the marketplace, the migrants try to influence certain countries' policies. Friedman (1999: 14) calls such boycotts "transformational boycotts," because "their objective is to transform issues concerned with objectionable practices external to the marketplace (such as a foreign government's oppressive policies) into consumer-accessible marketplace issues." Some Surinamese migrants of African descent, for example, say they boycott South African products because of the country's continuing policy of apartheid.

[69] See, for instance, http://urbanlegends.about.com/od/tommyhilfiger/a/tommy_hilfiger.htm.

> I boycott South African politics by means of boycotting its products, such as South African wine. Some people say South Africa is an equal society now, but I don't believe that. Power still is not equally distributed. (Male middle-class migrant, 50, Surinamese origin)

> I boycott South African products. That is deeply rooted in me. For instance, I do not buy South African wine. It is not a just society. (Female middle-class migrant, 63, Surinamese origin)

Moroccan and Turkish middle-class migrants' actions are often directed against the perceived imperialistic policies of America and Israel. Two Surinamese middle-class migrants and one knowledge worker from Albania, who consider themselves Muslims, also participate in actions directed to these countries. Feelings of hostility toward America and Israel are closely related and mainly have to do with the situation in the Middle East. Although Giddens (2002: xix) argues that anti-Americanism is mainly found in Islamic nations and in poor African countries in which American capitalism is seen as the source of their poverty, the findings of this research indicate that such sentiments also exist among socioeconomically successful Muslims in western societies. The main reasons respondents boycott American products are the country's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the war in Iraq. One Moroccan respondent explicitly says he never buys "products of Jewish manufacturers." More often, however, these boycotts target companies which are seen as symbols of the United States, such as McDonald's and Coca-Cola.

> I boycott American products. I don't buy Coca-Cola because America is involved in several wars and supports Israel. (Female middle-class migrant, 24, Surinamese origin)

Another well-known border-transcending issue related to religion is the cartoon controversy. In 2005, the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published cartoons of the prophet Muhammad, which "were being reprinted in fifty countries" and led to "anti-Danish demonstrations and boycotts virtually across the Islamic world in early 2006" (Nederveen Pieterse 2007: 180). Some Moroccan and Turkish middle-class migrants have joined these actions. However, it was not always easy for them to find Danish products to boycott. For instance, a Turkish respondent said he has boycott-

ed Dove soap, a Danish product according to him, whereas a Moroccan respondent has boycotted the same soap, because it was said to be a product from Israel. The Dove brand is actually Dutch in origin. Paradoxically, in shaping their transnational identities, these respondents are searching for national symbols that often prove difficult to find in a globalized world.

Although many middle-class migrants participate in boycotts, not all of them are convinced that these actions will really make a difference.

> I used to boycott Coca-Cola and McDonald's, because they financially support the state of Israel, so Israel can continue its warfare. But to me, it's all or nothing. If you boycott these companies, there are 101 other companies you should boycott. But I don't, so I stopped boycotting altogether. I asked myself if my one Euro would make any difference. Not that I eat at McDonald's that often now, but I do drink Coca-Cola. It's just the best coke there is. (Female middle-class migrant, 26, Moroccan origin)

However, because they do not have many alternatives with which to exert influence on these transnational issues, many respondents say boycotting products is better than doing nothing.

> I boycott Israeli products, because I disagree with Israel's policy and I don't want to support it by buying its products. It's probably nonsense. I don't know if it helps at all. But at least I do something. (Female middle-class migrant, 35, Moroccan origin)

The difference between Nike and Coca-Cola: universalistic versus particularistic boycotts

The middle-class migrants, knowledge workers, and native Dutch are very similar with regard to the extent to which they are involved in boycott actions. However, important differences exist concerning the nature of their actions. Although all boycotts described in this intermezzo are 'truly' transnational, they do not form a homogenous category. On the one hand, there are 'universalistic' boycotts, for instance directed at Nike and IKEA, which reflect global compassion with people, animals, and the planet itself (cf. Koinova 2010: 156). On the other hand, more 'particularistic' boycotts exist, directed at brands such as Tommy Hilfiger, Coca-Cola, and McDon-

ald's. These boycotts are based on solidarity with people with whom the boycotter shares specific characteristics, such as being 'immigrant', 'black', or 'Muslim'. Whereas universalistic boycotts are common among all three respondent groups, particularistic boycotts are mainly found among the middle-class migrants. Although Della Porta (2005: 200) argues that activism is increasingly based on "flexible" and "tolerant" identities instead of on experienced stigmatization and the "need to build a 'we'," among these migrants, exclusive identities based on ethnicity and religion are still important. The pan-ethnic and pan-religious solidarity they express might be a form of what Morawska (2009: 197) calls "oppositional transnationalism," which is a reaction to prejudice and exclusion experienced in the country of settlement.

5. Communal Bonds in the City and Beyond

In transnational migration studies, it is generally argued that even more so than their economic position or political participation, migrants' socio-cultural lives are influenced by transnationalism. However, it often remains unclear what is exactly meant by the 'socio-cultural' domain or sphere. This sphere serves as a sort of residual category, including not only cross-border family ties and memberships in homeland organizations, but also "participation in homeland culture" (Morawska 2009: 154), "media and commodity consumption" (Vertovec 2001: 575), "visiting cultural events with artists from the country of origin" (Snel et al. 2006: 289), and, particularly, "the formation of meanings, identities and values" (Itzigsohn et al. 1999: 332).

Regarding the study of socio-cultural involvement, scholars of transnationalism could benefit from the more systematic classifications of different communal bonds developed in urban studies. Van der Land (2007: 447), for instance, draws a distinction between three ideal-typical "urban ties of the new middle class": ties through *proximity*, based on origin, family, and neighborhood; ties through *participation*, based on involvement in civil society; and ties through *consumption*, based on leisure activities. This classification overlaps with Amin and Thrift's (2002: 45) ideas about "new forms of human sociality." Not only does the use of typologies make the field of urban studies interesting to consider, but so does its focus on practices that take place 'here and now'. In studying the incorporation of migrants, this means that whereas transnational migration studies emphasizes the importance of new communication technologies in keeping in touch with distant others, urban studies usually pays more attention to the face-to-face contacts migrants have, either with natives or within local ethnic 'enclaves' (cf. Bolt and Van Kempen 2010).

The question arises whether migrants' socio-cultural ties do indeed cross national boundaries very easily, as transnational migration studies suggest, or whether in fact local practices, which are central to urban studies, stand out. Instead of either adopting a transnational or an urban perspective, in studying the two groups of migrants' socio-cultural involvement, I will combine the strengths of both approaches. I will largely follow Van der Land's typology of urban ties, paying attention to family bonds, involvement in civil society, and leisure activities. Rather than either focusing on the local or cross-border level, I will empirically investigate the spatial scale of these ties. In addition to Van der Land's typology, and in accordance with transna-

tional migration studies, I will not only pay attention to concrete practices, but also to more abstract feelings of belonging. Moreover, in addition to what the migrants *do* or *feel*, and what *spatial levels* these activities and identifications concern, I will also focus on *how* they maintain such ties ('real' or 'virtual' contacts), and with *whom* ('natives' or 'compatriots').

I will start where the previous chapter left off, discussing the migrants' identifications. I already argued that feelings of belonging to the Netherlands, Rotterdam, and the home country are generally based more on socio-cultural ties than on political ones. Here, I will investigate with what other places the migrants feel a special bond, and for what reasons. The two most important bases for their 'place attachment' – social networks and cultural familiarity – also play a key role in the remainder of the chapter, which deals with concrete activities. After having further explained Van der Land's typology, I will first discuss the migrants' relations with their family and friends. I look at where these people live and, in the case of partners and friends, what national background they have. Regarding distant relatives and friends, I will look at how often the migrants keep in touch with them and in what ways they do so. Then, I will turn to the migrants' participation in civil society, focusing on voluntary work and donations. I will pay attention to the spatial scale on which these activities take place, as well as to the type of organizations ('homeland', 'ethnic', or 'mainstream') they concern. Finally, I will look at the spatial scale and nature of leisure activities, such as shopping and going out, and draw conclusions about the importance of both spatial and cultural proximity in understanding both groups of migrants' socio-cultural involvement.

Place attachment: the importance of cultural identifications and social contacts

At the end of Chapter 4, I discussed identity as a dimension of citizenship. Here, I will further scrutinize processes of identification, but now with a particular focus on social and cultural grounds for belonging. That is not the only difference between my approach of identity here and the one I adopted in the previous chapter. Whereas in Chapter 4, I looked at the migrants' self-identity and how this is influenced by others, here I focus on the migrants' 'place attachment', which can be defined as "the bonding that occurs between individuals and their meaningful environments" (Scannell and Gifford 2010: 1). Another, and perhaps even more important, differ-

ence relates to the way in which identifications are measured. In the previous chapter, I referred to the migrants' responses to closed-ended questions about their feelings of belonging. The migrants were asked what their primary self-identity is: 'Dutchman', 'Rotterdammer', 'world citizen', 'Surinamese', 'American', 'Chinese', and so on. Such questions are commonly used in quantitative studies about ethnic or national identification (cf. Snel et al. 2006: 296; Groenewold 2008: 109; Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008: 92). The respondents' answers provided interesting information about the relative importance of different categories, especially when combined with the explanations they gave for their answers. Here, however, I adopt a more inductive approach, which leaves more room for finding unexpected types of attachments.

The respondents were asked if there are any cities or countries with which they feel a special bond and, if so, for what reasons. Since identification with Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and the home country had already received much attention in earlier questions, the respondents were asked to exclude these places. A large majority of the respondents could name at least one city or country to which they are attached. The mentioned places vary enormously with regard to their spatial distance from the migrants' current place of residence: from a suburb in the Rotterdam area to a village in Italy, and from Istanbul to New York. This finding confirms the importance of a transnational approach: feelings of belonging are clearly not restricted to the country of residence (cf. Duyvendak 2011: 12). However, even more interesting than the exact location of the named places is the question of why the migrants feel a special bond with them. It proves that abstract notions about a shared culture or common 'roots' are important, but also concrete experiences and social contacts. Below, I will further explain both – complementary rather than competitive – bases for the migrants' place attachment.

Attachments based on imagined communities

Many respondents feel a special bond with a certain city, country, or region in the world, because the culture or origin of the people who live there is similar to their own. The attachments to these places are not so much based on regular visits or contacts with people who live there, but rather on the places' symbolic value for a certain "imagined community." This concept, introduced by Benedict Anderson, refers to the fact that "the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of

their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the mind of each lives the image of their communion" (1983: 6). In the minds of many of the respondents, distant communities exist based on a shared religion, ethnic background, homeland culture, or cosmopolitan outlook.

Many middle-class migrants who are Muslims, and particularly those of Moroccan origin, say they feel a special bond with Mecca, Saudi Arabia, or the Islamic or Arabic world in general, because of their religion (cf. Scannell and Gifford 2010: 2). These ties are similar to the pan-religious ties on which boycott actions are often based; however, instead of political solidarity, the respondents here emphasize cultural similarity.

> I feel very close to Mecca and Saudi Arabia. I have a spiritual bond with Mecca, because I pray toward the East every day. (Female middle-class migrant, 27, Moroccan origin)

> With Mecca, in Saudi Arabia. I feel connected with this place, because it is part of the Five Pillars of Islam. It is the place that symbolizes Islam. (Female middle-class migrant, 25, Moroccan origin)

Among the Surinamese respondents of African descent, pan-ethnic boycotts based on solidarity with blacks in South Africa proved to be common. One of the respondents also mentions the African continent with regard to her place attachment.

> With Africa. This connection is not that strong, but still, my roots are there and I really felt at home when I was there for holidays. (Female middle-class migrant, 51, Surinamese origin)

Pan-ethnic place attachment, however, is more common among Hindustani-Surinamese. Many of them say that they feel a special bond with India, not only because of their religion, but particularly because of their 'roots' or cultural heritage.

> I have a bond with India, because of the culture and religion. And my ancestors originate from India. They were shipped to Surinam as contract workers. (Female middle-class migrant, 34, Surinamese origin)

> I feel close to India, because I am Hindu, and my ancestors come from there. I go there once every one or two years, because of the cultural heritage. I watch Bollywood films, I sing the songs, and I speak the language. (Male middle-class migrant, 57, Surinamese origin)

Although place attachment based on pan-religious and pan-ethnic identifications are sometimes related to past visits to Mecca, Africa, or India, in most cases, the respondents have never actually been there. This is different for migrants who feel a bond with a certain country or city because its population, culture, or physical environment reminds them of their country of origin.

> I have been to the South of Spain very often, to Andalusia: Malaga and Granada. I like the atmosphere there. There is not a big contrast between the Arabic people and the Spanish people there, they look the same. And at the University of Granada, you will see a lot of Moroccan youth. (Female middle-class migrant, 32, Moroccan origin)

> I feel close to Vienna, in Austria, because it is an old city and the people are Catholics as well and they have the same attitude as the French; they think almost in the same way. The buildings also look like those in Paris, and the cafes and restaurants too. Yeah, it is closest to Paris. (Female knowledge worker, 27, French origin)

Whereas the pan-ethnic and pan-religious attachments I described earlier are only common among the middle-class migrants, identification with foreign places based on perceived similarities to the homeland is also found among the knowledge workers. The French respondent quoted above refers to a feeling of 'pan-Catholicism'. However, even though almost two-thirds of the knowledge workers are Christians, pan-religious place attachment is exceptional among this group.

A final type of place attachment based on imagined bonds is reflected by respondents who say they feel close to cities as New York, London, and, popular among Turkish respondents, Istanbul. This type is similar to the others in that respondents refer to cultural aspects of these cities. However, instead of being based on a shared religion, ethnic background, or homeland culture (i.e., 'people like me live there'), the attachment to these cities relates to diversity (i.e., 'all kinds of people live there') (cf. Lewicka 2011: 211).

> I like London, because it's a melting pot of many different cultures, it's a modern city, and you can really develop any kind of interest there. I also like New York very much, you never get bored there. And Toronto, I love it, it's well organized, clean, and has a mix of cultures. (Female knowledge worker, 37, Italian origin)
>
> Definitely New York, because there's so much energy. And because of its ethnic mix and history. (Female trailing spouse, 40, Greek origin)
>
> Istanbul, because every person can find something there he or she likes. We have all religions. It is a nice, multicultural city. (Female middle-class migrant, 45, Turkish origin)

In Chapter 4, I already mentioned the fact that some respondents identify themselves as world citizens, cosmopolitans, or 'Rotterdammers', which for them are terms that stress their multiple identities; they do not fit into a single category based on nationality, ethnic background, or religion. Here, similarly, and in accordance with what Florida (2002: 249) wrote about the "creative class," it proves that many middle-class migrants and knowledge workers "prefer places that are diverse, tolerant and open to new ideas." Often, attachment to cosmopolitan cities originates from holidays; in some other cases, respondents – mainly knowledge workers but also a few middle-class migrants – studied or worked there for a while.

Attachments based on concrete experiences and contacts

In the case of place attachment based on imagined communities, the same cities or countries were often mentioned several times, which reflects the collective nature of these abstract identifications. The place attachment that I discuss here is much more personal and concrete. In many cases, the migrants lived in the places that they name, either as a child, for studies, or for work. Others got to know a certain place because their parents, partner, or other relatives live or used to live there. Two different subtypes can be distinguished: attachments based on past experiences and those based on current social contacts.

Several migrants feel a special bond with a place because of certain milestones of the past, such as studying, marrying, having a child, or growing up somewhere (cf. Scannell and Gifford 2010: 2). In the case of the middle-class migrants,

these places are often cities in the Netherlands or their country of origin. The knowledge workers mention cities in a variety of countries.

> I also feel close to Enschede, in Twente [a region in the eastern part of the Netherlands]. I lived there for ten years, which made it part of my life. I have a certain feeling for that part of the country. When I watch football, I always support FC Twente. (Female middle-class migrant, 25, Turkish origin)

> I have been to Florence in Italy several times. The first time I was a student, the second time I went there for my company, and the third time I went there for my honeymoon, this summer. So it is like a memory place for me. (Female trailing spouse, 40, Japanese origin)

> Leuven, or Belgium as a whole. I have been there for two years and these were, let's say, very difficult years. I was there to study and I faced a lot of difficulties. It is an experience I will never forget. So I am much attached to that place, although I have never revisited it since I am in Rotterdam. (Male knowledge worker, 35, Chinese origin)

The migrants quoted above often have lived in the places that they name and were part of social networks there, but their current attachment is more based on memories than on still existing contacts. This is different for many other respondents who say they feel a special bond with a certain place, because they have relatives or friends living there (cf. Burholt and Naylor 2005: 113; Scannell and Gifford 2010: 4). This is the only type of place attachment that includes regular contacts with specific people, who often (but not always) live in the country of origin or settlement.

> I would say Wroclaw in Poland, the city where I studied. That's the first place that comes to my mind, because most of my friends live there. I think if I go back to Poland, I will live there too. (Female knowledge worker, 26, Polish origin)

> I feel very closely connected to Lekkerkerk [a town not far from Rotterdam], because I grew up there. My father still has a farm there and I have many friends and acquaintances there. I even have a Dutch granny there. I know her since I was little and I really see her as my grandmother. (Female middle-class migrant, 27, Moroccan origin)

> Meknes, where my parents come from. I want to go there every year. My friends and relatives live there and I feel really attached to them. (Female middle-class migrant, 21, Moroccan origin)

Since this type of place attachment is based on regular contacts with significant others, when such contacts transform – for instance, because a friend moves – this also brings about changes in the identification with a certain city or country. A Romanian knowledge worker, for instance, describes how her school-based network faded away over time and changed her place attachment.

> I also feel a special bond with the little village Duino, where I went to high school in Italy. I started to feel very close to it for a period of time, but when the network sort of goes away you feel less connected. And that is what happened with that city. The community that made that place special is no longer there. So the connection remains, you still feel at home, but it doesn't feel the same. (Female knowledge worker, 28, Romanian origin)

Place attachment based on social contacts can thus easily change into attachment based on past experiences. Different foundations for place attachment should not be seen as substitutes, however. Attachment to a certain place based on an 'imagined community' can go together with a more personal bond with that same place. Identification with 'cosmopolitan' cities such as New York or Istanbul, for instance, is sometimes combined with concrete contacts there. And Muslims who once visited Mecca or Hindustani-Surinamese who went to India combine pan-religious and pan-ethnic place attachment with attachment based on concrete experiences. The analytical distinction I made between two main types of place attachment is important, however, because it shows the relevance of looking both at identifications and activities. Feelings of belonging often transcend national borders, without being based on past or present practices. Such transnational identifications usually do not receive attention in urban studies about communal bonds, which focus more on everyday activities. On the other hand, concrete place-based experiences and relations prove to be relevant, which is sometimes forgotten in studies on transnational flows or liquid migration.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will focus on the migrants' contacts and activities in the socio-cultural sphere. In analyzing the spatial scale of such relations

and practices, the combination of an urban and a transnational approach will again prove to be important. I will show that compared with the identifications discussed above, many socio-cultural activities are much more based on geographic proximity.

The spatial scale of traditional ties: networks of family and friends

In his study on the urban ties of the "new middle class," Van der Land (2007: 478) examines in what ways people – specifically "highly educated professionals and managers working in knowledge occupations" who work in Rotterdam but not necessarily live there – are connected to the city. Since the migrants in this research have a middle-class position (be it conceptualized in a somewhat different way) and my research also focuses on Rotterdam, Van der Land's study provides a fruitful starting point for analyzing the two groups of migrants' communal bonds. According to Van der Land, the urban ties of the new middle class can be classified into three ideal-types. Although these ties are based on different types of society and, connected to this, differ with regard to their geographical scope, each of the three can be found in contemporary society. Ties through *proximity* are typical for rural or 'traditional' societies. Social relations in this type of society are based on a shared origin, family, or neighborhood. Ties through *participation*, such as involvement in civil society, are less place-bound and typical for industrial or 'modern' societies. Finally, ties through *consumption* are characteristic for post-industrial or what I will call 'post-modern' societies. These ties are more individualistic and flexible than the modern ones and even less connected to a certain place.

In this section and the two that follow, similar to Van der Land, I will investigate the importance of propinquity in the migrants' contacts with relatives and friends, in their activities in civil society, and in their consumption patterns. However, whereas Van der Land mainly focuses on the question of to what extent people who live in a suburb are connected to the city, I will combine an urban perspective with a transnational one. Instead of assuming that family or friendship ties are proximate – which, especially in the case of migrants, is not self-evident – I will investigate the spatial scale of such relations. In addition to Van der Land, who does not make a distinction between natives and immigrants, I will also look at the importance of cultural proximity. Religious and ethnic bonds proved to play an im-

portant role in the migrants' identifications. I will investigate if such bonds are also reflected in their socio-cultural relations and practices.

This section starts with the two groups of migrants' love relationships, answering the questions of whether they have a partner and, if so, where these partners live and what their national or ethnic background is. Then, I will look at the place of residence of the migrants' relatives and, even more informative about their local, national, or transnational orientation, of their friends. I will investigate whether the migrants maintain friendships with people in Rotterdam, elsewhere in the Netherlands, in their home country, or in other countries, and what nationality or ethnic background these friends have. Apart from the place of residence of friends and relatives, I will also look at the frequency of contact with those who live abroad and the means of communication.

Local love: the partners' countries of residence and origin

In studies that focus on transnationalism or globalization, much attention is paid to love relationships across borders. Discussions about 'classic' migrants' relationships mainly focus on "transnational marriages," that is to say, migrants' marriages with a partner who lives in the country of origin (e.g. Strassburger 2004; Beck-Gernsheim 2007). In public debate, this issue is often framed in terms of "import brides" (cf. Schinkel 2011: 99). In the case of transnational professionals, such as academics, the attention centers on what Elliott and Urry (2010: 85) call "intimate relationships at-a-distance," also referred to as long-distance relationship or simply LDRs. The question is posed how partners who live most of the time in different countries shape their relationships. However, despite this increasing attention to transnational or mobile love, it is known from geographical studies that physical proximity is still important for both the formation and the continuation of relationships. Based on data conducted in the Netherlands, Haandrikman et al. (2008: 393), for instance, show that the average distance before cohabitation between partners who started living together in 2004 was 23 km (about 14 miles), and for almost half of the partners, it was only 6 km (less than 4 miles). It is not without reason that Bossard's (1932: 222) statement, "Cupid may have wings, but apparently they are not adapted for long flights," is still often approvingly cited in literature on partner choice (e.g. Haandrikman et al. 2008: 387; Rivera et al. 2010: 105). Moreover, although the *Center*

for the Study of Long Distance Relationships argues that, thanks to new communication technologies such as webcams, LDRs are more easily maintained than ever before, the center's own data show that in 2005, only about 2.9 percent of US marriage actually were LDRs, denoting that during their marriage, partners were separated by a "considerable distance" (on average 125 miles or about 200 km).[70] Here, I will investigate the role of spatial and cultural proximity in the two groups of migrants' current family situation, addressing the questions of where their partners currently live and what their countries of origin are.

Of the 225 middle-class migrants, 80 are married, 56 have a partner but are not married, and 89 are single. The distribution over these categories is broadly similar for the 75 knowledge workers: 33 are married, 15 are unmarried but do have a partner, and 27 are single. Half of the middle-class migrants who have a partner but are not married cohabit. Most of the other partners live elsewhere in Rotterdam; some others elsewhere in the Netherlands. The husband of one recently married Moroccan female still lives in Morocco, but he will come to Rotterdam as a 'marriage migrant' as soon as he has the necessary documents. Six knowledge workers, of whom four are married, currently have a long-distance relationship. Two of them, both married men, came to Rotterdam while their wives stayed behind in South Korea and Germany. Three others, of whom one is a married woman, have met their partner during a previous stay abroad. These spouses live relatively close by: in Brussels, Luxembourg, and Paris. Finally, one female trailing spouse still lives in Rotterdam while her husband has already moved to his next destination: England. She stayed behind for some additional months, because their son needs to finish his school year. However, 41 of the 48 knowledge workers who have a partner live together. The partner of one female knowledge worker lives in Amsterdam. Most of the respondents' children also live at home. In total, 31 knowledge workers have children. Among the middle-class migrants, this number is 113.

Table 5.1 shows the countries of origin of the respondents' spouses. The native Dutch respondents are added for comparison.

[70] See www.waiit.com/Long_Distance_Relationships_Statistics.

Table 5.1: The respondents' spouses' country of origin, percentages of the total number of respondents who currently are in a relationship

	Middle-class migrants	**Knowledge workers**	**Middle-class native Dutch**
Own country of origin	74.8	52.1	78.5
The Netherlands	11.1	16.7	-
Other country	14.1	31.3	21.5
N	**135**	**48**	**65**

Note. One of the 136 middle-class migrants did not want to disclose the origin of his partner, because according to him, this was of no relevance.

Almost three quarters of the middle-class migrants have a partner of the same national background. In accordance with existing literature, I will call such relationships 'ethnic endogamous' or just 'endogamous'. Transnational marriages are not that widespread: they make up a quarter of the middle-class migrants' endogamous relationships. These 'migration marriages' mainly involve Turkish and Moroccan respondents, and not so much Surinamese (cf. Bijl et al. 2005). The remainder of the middle-class migrants who are in an endogamous relationship met their partner in the Netherlands; these partners are mainly 1.5- and second-generation immigrants. According to national figures, in 2002, almost 90 percent of the Turkish and Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands who were married had a co-ethnic partner, with no large differences between the first and second generation. Among Surinamese migrants, the share of endogamous marriages was considerably lower: around 60 percent among the first, and 40 percent among the second generation (Van Huis 2007: 29). The differences between the Surinamese, Turkish, and Moroccan respondents in this research point in the same direction, but are less pronounced. The Moroccan respondents stand out with 39 of the 45 reported relationships being endogamous (close to the national figure of 90 percent). The Turkish respondents follow with 33 of the 43 relationships (about 77 percent) involving a partner of Turkish origin. Among the Surinamese respondents, 30 out of the 48 relationships involve a co-

ethnic partner (which matches the national percentage of around 60 among first-generation Surinamese).[71]

The higher rates of inter-ethnic marriages among Surinamese migrants are often explained by a mix of cultural and socioeconomic factors. First of all, Surinamese are arguably more similar to the native Dutch with regard to their linguistic and religious background than are migrants from Turkey and Morocco (cf. Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2007: 375). Second, next to general language skills, educational attainment is known to influence partner selection. Higher educated migrants are more likely to marry a member of the out-group, not only because they are generally more tolerant toward other groups, but also because they are less likely to meet co-ethnics in the settings where they participate, such as higher education and highly skilled jobs (cf. Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2007: 376; Chiswick and Houseworth 2011: 160). The fact that most of the middle-class migrants in this research – who are all fluent in Dutch and relatively highly educated – have an ethnically endogamous relationship suggests that cultural factors are of particular importance here.

Among the middle-class migrants, six Surinamese, six Turkish, and three Moroccan respondents have a native Dutch partner. In Chapter 3, I already mentioned that this is also the case for eight knowledge workers. Apart from one knowledge worker from Pakistan who has a Dutch wife, these respondents come from European countries, such as Poland, England, Spain, and Portugal. Compared with the middle-class migrants, among the knowledge workers, exogamous or mixed relationships are more common.[72] Mixed relationships with a non-Dutch partner make up about a third of the total number of relationships within this group. Again, this involves many mixed-European relationships, for instance German-Spanish, Romanian-Luxembourgian, English-Irish, English-French and Italian-Romanian. Often, these relationships were formed during a previous stay abroad. Although their "daily opportunities of meeting co-ethnics" were fewer (Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2007: 376, cf. Alba and Nee 2003: 100), they did meet many co-Europeans, or, in Favell's (2008) terminology, fellow "Eurostars." Almost none of the Japanese, Korean, and

[71] It should be remarked that whereas I focus on relationships in general, the national figures I referred to are based on marriages. It is often argued that norms of endogamy are less strictly applied to such "trial marriages" (cf. Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2007: 378).

[72] In Kennedy's research on "transnational professionals" in the building-design industry, 16 out of 25 respondents were in a mixed relationship (2004: 171).

Chinese respondents are in mixed relationships. The American respondents often also have an endogamous relationship.

The category of exogamous non-Dutch relationships among the middle-class migrants once more indicates the importance of cultural familiarity. Several Surinamese migrants have a partner who also comes from the Caribbean, particularly the Netherlands Antilles, or from Central America, such as El Salvador. The Turkish and Moroccan respondents mainly have relationships with fellow Muslims, for instance from Bosnia or Iran (cf. Ameli 2002: 178). Although it is less common than could be expected based on their religion and daily meeting opportunities, one Moroccan respondent has a Turkish partner. The importance of cultural similarity and meeting opportunities is also distinct in the case of the native Dutch respondents' relationships. Of the 65 respondents who have a partner, 51 have a native Dutch one.[73] Among the respondents who have a mixed relationship, four have a Surinamese partner. Others are, for instance, of Belgian, German, and Serbian origin.

Based on this section's findings, at least three conclusions can be drawn. First, although new communication technologies make it easier to maintain long-distance relationships, geographical proximity of the partner is the norm, even among the knowledge workers, whose stay in the Netherlands is intended to be temporary. Second, even though some of the middle-class migrants are involved in so-called transnational marriages, most of them have a partner who does have a migrant background, but who grew up in the Netherlands. Third, although the number of mixed relationships is relatively high among the knowledge workers, these relationships often involve partners who share a European background. All in all, the respondents' love relationships point to the continuous importance of national and cultural borders, and – as is the case for international economic relations, such as trade (cf. Dicken 2007: 169) – to regionalization rather than far-reaching globalization or transnationalism.

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[73] Although much is known about the percentages of first- and second-generation immigrants in the Netherlands who have endogamous or exogamous relationships, similar data about the native Dutch are difficult to find. According to CBS (2001), about 13 percent of the marriages in the Netherlands include at least one person that was born abroad. This percentage also covers marriages between two immigrants, but excludes marriages between a native Dutch person and a second-generation immigrant. Moreover, relationships outside marriage are not counted. The percentage of exogamous relationships found among the native Dutch respondents in this research is thus not completely comparable with the CBS percentage. However, it is probable that mixed relationships are overrepresented.

Having relatives and making friends in Rotterdam

The respondents not only provided information about their own families, but also about a wider circle of relatives, such as parents and siblings. According to Van der Land's typology, such 'traditional' ties are relatively place-bound (2007: 481). The literature on migrants' transnational ties, however, emphasizes the importance of cross-border family networks (cf. Sutton 2004).

Table 5.2 shows where most of the respondents' relatives live. Since about two-thirds of the middle-class respondents were either born in the Netherlands or moved there with their parents at a young age, it might not be surprising that for a majority of the Surinamese, Turkish, and Moroccan respondents, most relatives live in the Netherlands. What is striking, however, is that, in accordance with Van der Land's typology, the middle-class migrants' family networks are highly urban centered: Rotterdam is by far the most-mentioned place of residence. In 21 cases, the respondents even chose the option 'In the same neighborhood as I do', which in Table 5.2 is included in the category 'Rotterdam'. Among the native Dutch respondents, such urban concentrations are also found.

Table 5.2: Place of residence of most of the respondents' relatives, percentages

	Middle-class migrants	**Knowledge workers**	**Middle-class native Dutch**
Rotterdam	40.4	-	31.0
Elsewhere in the Netherlands	28.0	1.3	66.0
The country of origin	21.8	90.7	-
Another country or a mix of countries	9.8	8.0	3.0
N	**225**	**75**	**100**

The middle-class migrants who have one or both living parents often live close to them. In about one-third of the cases, the parents live in the same neighborhood. About a quarter of them live elsewhere in Rotterdam, while another quarter live elsewhere in the Netherlands. The remainder live in the country of origin; many of them lived in the Netherlands for a period of time, but returned. In addition, Turkish

and Moroccan middle-class migrants often have relatives in other countries that recruited guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s, such as Belgium, Germany, and France, while some Surinamese respondents have relatives in countries close to their home country, such as the Netherlands Antilles and the US. In the case of the knowledge workers, family networks are not proximate at all. Only the respondent who was born in the Netherlands himself has many relatives there. Most knowledge workers are not part of families that are scattered over the world; a majority of their relatives live in their country of origin.

Although the presence of relatives in different countries tells us something about the connections that the migrants have with different places, the question of where most of their friends live is even more interesting. Relatives remain relatives, no matter where they live. However, similar to partners, friends are the "families we choose" (Amin and Thrift 2002: 46). What is the role of spatial and cultural proximity in the case of friendships?

Table 5.3: Place of residence of most of the respondents' friends, percentages

	Middle-class migrants	**Knowledge workers**	**Middle-class native Dutch**
Rotterdam	72.0	18.7	72.0
Elsewhere in the Netherlands	20.9	8.0	21.0
The country of origin	0.9	57.3	-
Another country or a mix of countries	6.2	16.0	7.0
N	**225**	**75**	**100**

Table 5.3 proves that Rotterdam is vital for the friendships of middle-class migrants and native Dutch. Further analysis shows that for one-third of the middle-class migrants, both most of their relatives and most of their friends live in Rotterdam. The social networks of these respondents resemble Van der Land's (2007: 484) 'ties through physical proximity'. He argues that for people who have such ties, "The city of their birth and youth is the exclusive place where social ties develop and are sustained." In reality, of course, even these respondents' networks consist of a mix of people living in different cities and also often in different countries. Still, whereas

about one-fifth of the middle-class migrants state that most of their relatives live in the country of origin, in the case of their friends, this is only true for two respondents. With regard to the location of their relatives and friends, the knowledge workers are connected more to their homeland and less to the city of residence than the middle-class migrants. However, given their relatively short stay in the Netherlands, it is still remarkable that about a quarter of the knowledge workers say that a majority of their friends live in Rotterdam or elsewhere in the Netherlands.

If we look at the countries of origin of the respondents' friends, the importance of a shared migrant experience and national background becomes clear. Almost three quarters of the knowledge workers say that their friends in the Netherlands are mainly other expatriates. In some of these cases, their friends are predominantly co-nationals, but more often the knowledge workers' local social networks consist of people from all kinds of backgrounds (cf. Kennedy 2004: 157). With regard to their local friendships, it could be argued that many knowledge workers are part of an 'expat bubble', which can be seen as the upper-class version of an 'ethnic enclave'. However, although it is often suggested that such communities stem from expatriates' own preferences (cf. Cuperus 2009: 28; Butcher 2010: 27), for many of the respondents, this is actually not the case. The respondents appreciate the presence of other temporary migrants, for instance, because "they have a lot of parties" or "they help you with finding a house," but many knowledge workers say they would also like to have more native Dutch friends. Almost all knowledge workers have at least one Dutch friend (32 have exactly one; most of the others have between two and five), but many of them say that socializing with the Dutch is difficult. Speaking Dutch is often mentioned as the most important condition for integration in the Netherlands. Most of the knowledge workers do speak a little Dutch, but, in their opinion, not well enough to be incorporated into Dutch networks of friends. Some knowledge workers say they would like to improve their language skills, but they have the feeling that Dutch people, either consciously or unconsciously, try to keep them at a distance by refusing to speak Dutch to them. As Favell states, in such "language games," it is about "*who* has the power to decide *which* language shall be spoken and *when*" (2008: 144, original emphasis).

> They always talk to you in English, even if you try to speak Dutch. So I was always thinking, 'Hey, I am trying to learn your language, you don't want to listen to me?' It was really frustrating. You feel like they don't want you to integrate because they

> don't help you to learn to speak Dutch. Lots of them told me, 'You are French; you will go back to France anyway.' (Female knowledge worker, 27, French origin)

Besides language barriers, several knowledge workers mention the fact that it is not easy to become friends with the Dutch because of the strict boundaries between work and personal life and the closed nature of established circles of friends. Such remarks are mainly made by young knowledge workers who came to the Netherlands without a spouse.

> I think that the Dutch stay too much in their own communities; they should communicate more with expats. In the first years, colleagues never invited me to something. Only recently there was a group of people that invited me to dinners and parties. That's when I got to know Dutch people and got to know the culture. I think they really don't realize how hard it is for foreigners to make such contacts. (Female knowledge worker, 27, Portuguese origin)

> I experience the Netherlands to be a very closed society. To give you an idea, I went to a colleague's birthday party and I was the only person that she had not known for eight years or that wasn't family. People see no need to make new friends. I think that as soon as they've settled down, found a partner, have their family set up, they don't reach outside anymore. At the birthday party, I was just sitting in the corner, saying 'gefeliciteerd' ['congratulations'] to everyone. (Female knowledge worker, 28, South African origin)

The intermezzo at the end of this chapter further deals with problems that knowledge workers face in their daily contact with the Dutch. In the formation of friendships between middle-class migrants and native Dutch, language barriers do not play a role. However, many of the middle-class migrants' friends are (children of) immigrants as well. More than half of the respondents say that the majority of their friends are co-ethnics. More than a third have circles of friends that consist of a mix of all kinds of backgrounds. The remainder (23 respondents) mainly have native Dutch friends. Comparable with the process of partner selection, for both groups of migrants, spatial and cultural proximity proves to be important in the formation of friendships. However, whereas almost all respondents with partners live with or near them, in the case of relatives and friends, most knowledge workers and middle-

class migrants have various long-distance relationships. Below, I will further look into these cross-border social contacts.

Contacting distant relatives and friends

The internet is generally regarded as a major contributor to the formation and persistence of transnational social contacts. In their discussion of how globalization has transformed human relationships, Elliott and Urry (2010: 88) approvingly quote the economist and journalist Frances Cairncross (1997), who argues that the communications revolution has brought about "the death of distance." However, according to various studies that analyzed the internet as a means of communication between relatives and friends, its importance should not be overstated. Savage et al. (2003: 188), for instance, remark that when asked about their use of internet and email, it was "revealing that few respondents spoke with any feeling or substantial interest about these topics." In her study on the use of new information and communication technologies in "transnational families" – that is to say, families whose members live in different countries – Wilding (2006: 126) argues that the ways in which email is incorporated in ongoing patterns of everyday life is "interesting," "rather than exciting." According to her, the internet did not bring about major shifts in family contacts, but was rather seen as an opportunity to improve the overall quality and quantity of established contacts. Despite the advantages of internet compared with other means of communication, family members remained "keenly aware of their physical location at a great distance from their kin overseas" (Wilding 2006: 138). Actual family visits thus remained highly valued. Here, I will examine how often the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers keep in touch with distant relatives and friends and in what ways they do so. I will primarily focus on homeland contacts, since these prove to be more frequent than contacts with people in other countries.

Table 5.4 gives an overview of the respondents' contact with relatives and friends in the country of origin, regardless of how this contact takes place. The knowledge workers report a great frequency of contact; they all contact 'home' at least once a month and a large majority even do so at least once a week. Geographic distance does not seem to play a role here. Among the middle-class migrants, the situation is more diverse. About half of the respondents contact relatives or friends once or more a month; the others report more sporadic contacts.

Table 5.4: Frequency of contact with relatives and friends in country of origin, percentages

	Middle-class migrants	**Knowledge workers**
Once or more a week	20.0	81.3
Once or more a month	29.8	18.7
Once or more a year	33.3	-
Less than once a year	11.1	-
Never	4.4	-
Not applicable	1.3	-
N	**225**	**75**

The respondents were also asked what communication technologies they use in contacting these distant relatives and friends (Table 5.5). Vertovec (2004: 220) seems right when he argues that cheap calls "serve as a kind of social glue connecting small-scale social formations across the globe": telephoning is the most common means of communication among both migrant groups. Online chatting with people in the home country is done by about a quarter of the respondents from both groups. The other means of communication, however, are much more frequently used by knowledge workers. Particularly their use of email and Skype (used for video calls) stands out. Further analysis shows that compared with their homeland contacts, a larger part of the middle-class migrants use email to contact relatives and friends in other (mainly European) countries; more than two-thirds of the respondents do so. This probably has to do with the fact that their contacts in the country of origin are in many cases elderly people, such as their grandparents, who may not use internet, while their (younger) friends more often live in countries such as Germany and France. The knowledge workers' contacts with people in other countries are established in similar ways as their homeland contacts, be it that all means are used somewhat less often, since some of the respondents do not have relatives or friends in 'third' countries.

Table 5.5: Means of communication used for contacting relatives and friends in country of origin, percentages

	Middle-class migrants	**Knowledge workers**
Telephone	84.4	88.0
Email	45.8	81.3
Chat/MSN	26.7	28.0
Regular mail	6.2	17.3
Skype	4.4	48.0
N	**225**	**75**

When being asked about their use of different technologies, respondents often mentioned that one important means of communication was missing from the list: actual visits. Some middle-class migrants who said that they contact people in their home country once a year had already added that this contact takes place during their annual family visit. Although the ways in which people can keep in contact with distant others are constantly increasing, 'good old' visits are sometimes the only means used. Most respondents, however, combine 'virtual' and 'physical' visits. Table 5.6 shows the frequency of homeland visits for both migrant groups. The middle-class migrants were asked how often a year, on average, they visit their country of origin. The knowledge workers, who generally did not live in the Netherlands long enough to talk about yearly averages, were asked how often they have revisited their country of origin during their stay in the Netherlands. Based on the reported numbers, divided by the knowledge workers' length of stay, I calculated (hypothetical) averages per year.[74]

Annual visits prove to be the most common situation in both migrant groups. Almost half of the middle-class migrants revisit the country of origin less than once a year. This category includes relatively many Surinamese, who say they would like to visit Surinam more often, but because of the long distance and high prices of airline tickets, they do not. A 24-year-old female, who was born in Amsterdam and has never been to Surinam, says it is her dream to go back one day and even fantasizes

[74] It goes without saying that these hypothetical averages are more reliable in the case of a knowledge worker who has already lived in the Netherlands for six years, than for someone who only moved six months ago.

about building up a life there. Some others, however, such as a The Hague-born 25-year-old male, state that they have not been back because they do not have any bond with the country, referring to a lack of familial and cultural connections. The middle-class migrants who visit their country of origin more than once a year (about 17 percent) are mainly migrants with a Turkish background. The relatively short and cheap flights make it easier for them to visit relatives and friends back home. One respondent states she goes to Turkey about twelve times a year. This (by middle-class migrants' standards) extremely high number can be explained by the respondent's job: she works for a governmental organization that stimulates trade between the Netherlands and Turkey. Many of her visits are business-related. For most middle-class respondents, homeland visits are a combination of spending holidays and meeting relatives. A small number of Turkish respondents say they do not visit their relatives at all during their stay; they only go to Turkey for its nice beaches.

Table 5.6: Frequency of visits to country of origin, percentages

	Middle-class migrants	**Knowledge workers**
Never revisited	5.3	5.3
Less than once in every 5 years	10.2	-
Once in every 4 or 5 years	8.9	1.3
Once in every 2 or 3 years	21.8	5.3
Once a year	36.4	38.7
2 or 3 times a year	15.1	30.7
4 or 5 times a year	0.9	6.7
Between 6 and 10 times a year	0.9	9.3
Between 11 and 15 times a year	0.4	2.7
N	**225**	**75**

Among the knowledge workers, homeland visits generally occur more frequently; about half of the respondents visit the country of origin more than once a year, while only about 12 percent do so less than once a year. The four respondents who have not visited their homeland at all have been in the Netherlands for less than two years. Geographical distance again proves to be important: knowledge workers who visit their country of origin more than once a year almost all are Europeans (particu-

larly from the UK, Germany, and France). The knowledge workers who live relatively far from their home country, for instance Americans and Japanese, mainly return for special occasions, such as Christmas or weddings. European knowledge workers more often give reasons such as "I often visit my friends, because it is so close" and "It is easy to get there, so I do not have to miss anything."

With regard to homeland social contacts, it can be concluded that not only a more substantial part of knowledge workers' relatives and friends live in the country of origin, but also that their contacts with these people are generally much more frequent than in the case of the middle-class migrants. This not only suggests that migrants' social ties to the homeland indeed tend to lose their intensity across time (cf. Alba and Nee 2003: 151; Lucassen 2006: 21), but also that knowledge workers' focus is less "post-national" than is often assumed (cf. Kennedy 2004: 177). To maintain homeland contacts, both groups of migrants use telephone and internet. However, this long-distance communication is often combined with actual visits. Although internet "connects" people and helps them to "share" – as Facebook's slogan has it – such online contacts should not be seen as substitutes for physical visits, which are often regarded as vital so as to not miss out on anything (cf. Wilding 2006: 138). Frequent visits, however, are more feasible for migrants from, say, France or Turkey, than for those from South Africa or Surinam. Communication technologies in important ways have reduced the significance of geographical distance (cf. Harvey 1989; Giddens 1994), but its consequences are still real and felt. Distance is not dead; scholars like Cairncross (1997) and Elliott and Urry (2010) have buried it alive.[75]

The spatial scale of modern ties: involvement in civil society

Regarding the migrants' relations with their partners, relatives, and friends, Van der Land's (2007) notion of 'ties through proximity' is largely applicable to the middle-class migrants, of whom many have very localized social networks. The knowledge workers' social relations, however, are better characterized as 'ties despite distance'. These respondents came to the Netherlands because of their jobs instead of family reunification or family formation and have arrived more recently than the middle-class migrants, which can explain the fact that both their relatives and friends mainly live in the country of origin. In studying their so-called 'traditional' ties, a transna-

[75] Van der Waal et al. (2007) made a similar statement about the concept of 'class'.

tional perspective is thus crucial. Here, I will investigate the importance of geographical proximity for the second type of ties Van der Land discerns: 'ties through participation', which are developed in civil society.

Education is known to be a strong predictor for participation in civil society (cf. Klaver et al. 2005: 116). Hence, it can be expected that many of the respondents are involved in such activities. According to Van der Land (2007: 488), ties through participation are based on a 'modern' type of society and have a larger spatial scope than traditional ties. People who do not live in the city are often civically active there, because the city offers a wide range of organizations. Fischer's (1975) subcultural theory is relevant in this respect. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, this theory holds that large and diverse urban populations create a critical mass for all kinds of institutions, which further attract people from outside the city. Since the respondents in this research all live in or near Rotterdam, it is likely that their activities also take place there. According to the transnational migration approach, however, migrants' involvement in civil society should not be studied on a local or national, but on a transnational, level. Even though the organizations in which migrants are active are located in the country of settlement, they are often directed at the country of origin. Itzigsohn et al. (1999: 331) argue that the most common form of civil societal transnationalism is the home-town association, that is, "associations created by people from a certain town or region that gather to socialize and to help their town or village." They also refer to temporal initiatives, such as fundraising events for churches and schools in the homeland. Although the city of residence is important for creating a basis for such activities, scholars of transnationalism are more interested in the geographical scope of the organizations' objectives. In analyzing the two groups of migrants' involvement in civil society, I will therefore not only look at where the organizations that they are active in are located, but also at the aims of these organizations. In transnational migration studies, immigrant organizations that are directed at the country of settlement are sometimes also called 'transnational' (cf. Snel et al. 2006: 289). However, I will call an organization directed at, for instance, Moroccan youths in Rotterdam 'local' instead of 'transnational'.

Similar to Van der Land, I make a distinction between two types of civil society involvement: voluntary work for and donations to organizations. Table 5.7 shows the middle-class migrants' and knowledge workers' participation in these activities, regardless of the location and objectives of the organizations they concern.

Table 5.7: The respondents' involvement in civil society activities, percentages

	Middle-class migrants	**Knowledge workers**	**Middle-class native Dutch**
Currently a volunteer	51.1	37.3	45.0
Regularly donates money	44.9	37.3	56.0
N	**225**	**75**	**100**

Based on data conducted within the fifty largest municipalities in the Netherlands, Dekker (2008: 81) concludes that about 41 percent of the native Dutch urban population currently volunteer for an organization, compared with about 20 percent of the Surinamese, Turkish, and Moroccan population. In contrast to these findings, the middle-class migrants in this research are more active than the native Dutch. Since this partly has to do with the ways in which respondents were recruited (see Chapter 2), these percentages should not be seen as representative for the entire population of middle-class migrants in Rotterdam. Because practically all respondents donate money to an organization at some point, Table 5.7 only includes those who do so regularly or often. Similar to the case of political practices, the knowledge workers are somewhat less involved in civil society activities than the other respondent groups. Below, I will take a closer look at the nature of the respondents' activities.

Voluntary work: in the city and for the city

Most of the middle-class migrants who perform voluntary work do so for an immigrant organization (65 respondents), a school (25 respondents), a neighborhood organization, and a sports club (both 22 respondents). Other commonly mentioned organizations are political organizations and churches or mosques. Among the knowledge workers, these are a school (23 respondents), an expatriate organization (5 respondents), a religious organization, and a sports club (both 3 respondents). Apart from the immigrant and expatriate organizations, the native Dutch respondents are involved in similar organizations as the migrants. Since I am interested in the spatial scope of the migrants' civil society activities, the migrant organizations are particularly interesting: are these home-town associations, like the ones Itzigsohn et al. (1999) describe?

The answer is unambiguously no. A large majority of the migrant organizations in which the respondents volunteer are directed at the Rotterdam area; most of the others are directed at the Netherlands as a whole. The middle-class migrants often do voluntary work for organizations that facilitate the local or national integration or emancipation of ethnic minorities. Similar to the case of partner selection and the formation of friendships, cultural bonds prove to be important. Many of the migrant associations focus on a specific national or ethnic group, such as Ettaouhid, an organization that centers on the participation of Moroccans in Rotterdam, and Arth, which is a network organization for highly educated Hindustani-Surinamese in the Netherlands. Other organizations have a more general objective, such as Kosmopolis, which tries to stimulate dialogue between different population groups in Rotterdam. Some knowledge workers are also volunteers for a migrant organization, which, in their case, is based on a shared 'expat' experience. Instead of aiming at integration or emancipation, these organizations generally provide leisure activities, such as coffee mornings for spouses or monthly drinks. Memberships in such organizations are much more common than volunteering: 24 knowledge workers are currently a member, compared with 5 volunteers. Similar to the middle-class migrants' organizations, these associations are directed at migrants in the Netherlands, instead of at people in the home country or other countries. Some of these organizations are based on a shared national background, such as Pickwick, a British 'ladies club', while others focus on knowledge workers and their families in general.

Since expatriates are often characterized as consumers instead of contributors to civil society (e.g. Nijman 2007: 182; Sassen 1999: 192), it is surprising that more than a third of the knowledge workers are currently involved in voluntary work. Similar to what Fechter (2007: 50) found among expatriates in Indonesia, these volunteers are mainly trailing spouses. Of the 28 respondents who do voluntary work, 18 came to Rotterdam because of their partner's job. Of these spouses, 17 are volunteers in their children's school. This is also the case for six male knowledge workers. Most of the respondents' children go to international schools, such as the Rotterdam International Secondary School or the American International School of Rotterdam. Just like the immigrant and expatriate organizations, these schools are an expression of the fact that in the super-diverse city, a critical mass exists for a large range of local institutions (cf. Fischer 1975).

Even though an overwhelming majority of organizations are located and directed at the Netherlands, the practices that do involve the crossing of national borders deserve some attention. I will give a few examples, which add up to almost all of the transnational cases that the respondents mentioned. Two Moroccan middle-class respondents do voluntary work for NISM, an organization that focuses on poverty reduction and the development of a civil society in Morocco. Another Moroccan respondent is involved as a volunteer for the Karam Foundation, an organization that is dedicated to helping underprivileged children in Morocco and other countries (cf. Van Bochove et al. 2010a: 352). Two Surinamese middle-class respondents are board members of TIYE International, an organization that is supported by the United Nations and campaigns for the rights of women in various countries, including Surinam. Another Surinamese respondent is a volunteer for an organization founded by his grandmother, which supports the construction of an orphanage in India. A knowledge worker of mixed Italian-Peruvian origin mentioned the fact that he organized a party for abandoned children when he was in Peru for Christmas.

Donations: transnational monetarized solidarity

As became clear in the discussion about different types of political involvement in Chapter 4, some activities more easily cross or transcend national boundaries than others. Voting in the country of origin, for instance, usually requires more time and money than boycotting a certain product because of a transnational issue. Donating money to transnational civil society organizations is another way of showing cross-border solidarity without having to spend too much time on it. I will briefly discuss the nature of this "monetarized solidarity" (cf. Van der Land 2007: 489).

Table 5.7 (see page 155) showed that between about a third and half of the respondents regularly or often donate money to organizations. The respondents were asked to name the organizations to which they donate. Among all respondent groups, humanitarian and health organizations are the most common. Some of the health organizations have a primarily national scope, such as the Dutch Heart Foundation and the Dutch Cancer Foundation. Others, like Doctors Without Borders, do not. The humanitarian organizations that the respondents donate money to transcend national borders in a majority of cases. These include organizations such as UNICEF, Amnesty International, Red Cross and Red Crescent, World Vision Inter-

national (a Christian development organization, dedicated to "the world's most vulnerable people"), and Islamic Relief (which has a similar mission as World Vision).[76] Other often-mentioned organizations also deal with universalistic issues, such as environmental problems and the protection of nature (in many cases Greenpeace and WWF). Additionally, the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers were asked to indicate whether none, some, or most of the organizations they donate money to are directed at their home country. Of the middle-class migrants who ever donate money, 11 respondents answered that they mostly support homeland organizations, and 64 respondents said they support some. Various Turkish respondents, for instance, donate money to Deniz Feneri, an organization dedicated to "the needy people throughout Turkey."[77] Among the knowledge workers, supporting homeland charitable organizations is relatively more common: 13 respondents mainly support organizations in the country of origin and 21 some.

In conclusion, although Van der Land (2007: 488) rightly argues that activities in civil society are "not necessarily confined to urban space," the analysis of the respondents' voluntary work shows that, in practice, such activities often do take place in or near the city of residence. Only donations are often directed at the (horizontally or vertically) transnational level. Next, I will focus on the spatial scale of recreation and consumption.

The spatial scale of postmodern ties: leisure activities

Of the three ideal-typical ties he distinguishes, Van der Land argues that 'ties through consumption' are least based on geographical proximity. According to him, using urban leisure facilities has important symbolic value for people who live in suburbs (2007: 491). Elliott and Urry (2010: 115-116), who state that contemporary identities "are formed through purchasing," also argue that consumerism takes place "at a distance from neighbourhoods," but instead of being interested in the differences between the consumption patterns of urban and suburban residents, they adopt a more transnational perspective. These authors focus on the consumerism of the "super-rich," who are characterized by a "portable personhood" and lead "mobile lives." Such global elites, for instance, go to Monaco or Dubai, and, as Elliott and

[76] See www.wvi.org and www.islamic-relief.com.
[77] See www.denizfeneri.org.tr.

Urry remark, they certainly "Do buy" (2010: 114). Although most of the respondents in this research belong to the middle class rather than the super-rich, they can be expected to have sufficient financial capital to undertake leisure activities across borders.

Before I look at activities such as shopping and going out, first, a more institutionalized form of leisure should be mentioned. The respondents were not only asked if they do voluntary work for an organization, but also if they are member of a club or association. By far, the most often-mentioned organizations are sports clubs: 43 percent of the middle-class migrants and more than half of the knowledge workers are members of such an organization. Particularly among the knowledge workers, fitness clubs are extremely popular. Although not mentioned by Van der Land, fitness, similar to purchasing, is often argued to be part of the "postmodern self" (cf. Glassner 1989). Even more so than voluntary work for various organizations, memberships in sports clubs prove to be a local phenomenon. Almost all respondents use sport facilities close to their home or work. Such memberships, however, are more permanent than other leisure activities. It will be interesting to see where the migrants undertake activities that are said to have a "partial and flexible nature" (Van der Land 2007: 490, cf. Amin and Thrift 2002: 45).

Based on Van der Land's (2007: 492) operationalization of consumption, I distinguish among the following leisure activities: (1) dining out (that is, visiting a restaurant); (2) leisure shopping (excluding shopping for groceries and online shopping); (3) going out (activities such as visiting a café, pop concert, disco, and cinema); (4) recreational facilities (visiting, for instance, zoo, swimming pool, theme park, or public garden); and (5) cultural facilities (activities like visiting a museum, gallery, play, and classical concert). The respondents were first of all asked how often they use these different leisure facilities.[78] Among all groups, dining out and

[78] The answering categories used to measure the frequency of leisure activities were not exactly the same for the middle-class respondents and the knowledge workers. In the fieldwork among the middle-class migrants and native Dutch, the categories were: '0 times a year', '1-5 times a year', '5-10 times a year', and 'more than 10 times a year'. Because with hindsight, these categories were not precise enough, in the survey used for the knowledge workers, these categories were changed into: 'once or more a week', 'once or more a month', 'once or several times a year', 'less than once a year', and 'never'. The downside of this change is that the answers are not completely comparable. In my discussion of the frequencies, I equate the middle-class respondents' category of 'more than 10 times a year' with the sum of the knowledge workers' category of 'once or more a month' and 'once or more a week'.

shopping prove to be the most frequently done, and visiting cultural facilities the least frequently. In accordance with their image of 'big spenders' (cf. Nijman 2007; Sassen 1999), the knowledge workers report higher frequencies with regard to all leisure activities than the middle-class respondents do. For instance, almost all knowledge workers say they go to a restaurant at least once a month; among the middle-class native Dutch, this is about 80 percent, and among the middle-class migrants, 60 percent. About 85 percent of the knowledge workers go shopping once or more a month; among the middle-class migrants about three-quarters, and among the middle-class native Dutch about two-thirds. Particularly trailing spouses often go shopping: 15 of the 23 spouses do so once or more a week. The frequencies for going out demonstrate a similar pattern as those for shopping, be it that the knowledge workers and middle-class migrants do so somewhat less often. Recreational and cultural facilities are used at least monthly by about half of the knowledge workers, compared with about a third (and less than a third in the case of cultural facilities) of the middle-class respondents.

Next, the respondents were asked where they generally use leisure facilities: practically always in Rotterdam, in Rotterdam as well as in other places, or hardly ever in Rotterdam. Table 5.8 shows the percentages of respondents who say that they practically always visit facilities in Rotterdam.

Table 5.8: Respondents who practically always visit leisure facilities in Rotterdam, percentages

	Middle-class migrants	**Knowledge workers**	**Middle-class native Dutch**
Dining out	41.8	52.0	25.0
Leisure shopping	40.4	54.7	48.0
Going out	35.1	45.3	42.0
Recreational facilities	34.7	45.3	31.0
Cultural facilities	34.2	12.0	34.0
N	**225**	**75**	**100**

For each of the facilities, about a third of the middle-class respondents say that they almost always use them in Rotterdam; most others go to Rotterdam as well as other places. In the case of dining out and shopping, even a small majority of the knowledge workers almost always stay in Rotterdam. Many knowledge workers also mainly go out in Rotterdam and use recreational facilities there. Cultural facilities, however, are also often visited in other cities; 20 percent of the knowledge workers even say that they never do so in Rotterdam. A small number of respondents mainly visit recreational and cultural facilities, such as festivals or expositions, that show the work of homeland artists. About half of the migrants from both groups do so sometimes.

Rotterdam is a popular location to spend leisure time because it offers a proximate and diverse range of facilities. However, many respondents say they also like to visit other cities for recreation or consumption. After Rotterdam, the most popular location is Amsterdam. This city is seen as the Dutch alternative to distant 'cosmopolitan' cities such as New York, London, and Istanbul. The respondents, for instance, say that "Amsterdam looks like Istanbul," "it is more tolerant than Rotterdam," and "it's a city with a cosmopolitan character." Various middle-class migrants also name cities in the southern part of the Netherlands, such as Breda or Tilburg, and Belgian cities close to the Dutch border, like Antwerp. Many go there because they have relatives or friends living there, but also these cities' "good atmosphere" is often mentioned. Furthermore, respondents visit other places because Rotterdam does not have certain facilities (such as a beach or a theme park), or because they sometimes just like to see something different (cf. Elliott and Urry 2010: 119). Knowledge workers often visit The Hague, because of its large "international community," the accompanying "international bars and cafes," and "English-speaking culture." Some knowledge workers say that they want to get to know the Netherlands better and therefore try to visit as many different places as possible. For cultural facilities, many knowledge workers prefer cities other than Rotterdam. Some even mention going to London or Paris to enjoy the full package of high-class shopping, museums, dining, and drinks. Although such cross-border consumption patterns are quite exceptional, there does seem to be a difference in the perception of geographical distance between the two migrant groups. Several knowledge workers that come from other parts of the world (such as the US and India) say that living in the Netherlands for them means living in Europe. They want to see the rest of the

continent as well. For many middle-class migrants, however, some parts of the Netherlands are already too far away to visit. Compare the following statements.

> I want to give my children different experiences. That's why we visit so many places. I want to make the most out of living in Europe, before we have to go back to the United States. (Female trailing spouse, 34, American origin)

> The Netherlands is connected to all continental Europe, so it's easy to travel to different places by train, car, or plane. (Female knowledge worker, 36, American origin)

> The accessibility of a city plays an important role in my choice where to go. Groningen [a city in the upper north part of the Netherlands], for instance, is too far away. But The Hague or Amsterdam are perfectly accessible with a short travel time. (Male middle-class migrant, 24, Moroccan origin)

It can be concluded that, compared with activities in migrant associations, schools, and sports clubs, consumption is less concentrated in Rotterdam. Many respondents also go to other places in the Netherlands and sometimes even abroad. This has to do with the flexible nature of consumption patterns, compared to the more exclusive nature of civic or leisure organizations. If respondents, for instance, have seen enough of the shops or restaurants in Rotterdam for a while, they can easily go to Amsterdam or The Hague for a change. However, if they no longer enjoy a certain sports club in Rotterdam, they will probably change it for another one in Rotterdam, instead of Amsterdam. Despite the general flexibility of consumption, however, a large part of the leisure activities still take place close to the respondents' residence. Again, geographical proximity proves to be important.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I looked at the two groups of migrants' socio-cultural involvement, focusing on the local as well as transnational level, on activities as well as identifications, and on the questions of with whom and how such ties are maintained. Here, I will draw some general conclusions about the importance of spatial proximity and cultural familiarity and the added value of combining an urban and transnational perspective.

First, while some socio-cultural bonds easily cross or transcend national borders, many do not. Abstract identifications with certain places or people, contacts with relatives and friends by phone or email, and monetarized solidarity with charitable organizations are types of involvement for which geographical proximity is not very important. Many other socio-cultural contacts and activities, however, are highly restricted by geographical distance. Long-distance relationships, which could be expected to be common among the knowledge workers, are exceptional: most respondents who have a partner live with them. Moreover, although 'virtual' contacts with relatives and friends abroad are common, for most migrants, actual visits to the country of origin remain indispensable. When the homeland is on another continent, however, regular visits are generally not feasible. According to Van der Land's (2007) typology of urban ties, civil society activities and consumption are less place-bound than networks of family and friends. However, for these activities, spatial proximity actually proves to be even more important. Voluntary work for civil society organizations is almost entirely a local phenomenon. Not only are such organizations generally located in the city, they are also directed at the local population. Leisure activities such as shopping, going out, and visiting cultural facilities take place in the city of residence as well as elsewhere, but not so much abroad. Savage et al. (2005: 207) argue that, despite existing "global connections," one's residence probably remains "*the* crucial identifier of who you are" (original emphasis). Based on the results of this chapter, it can be concluded that the migrants' place of residence certainly determines a large part of their socio-cultural activities.

Second, next to physical proximity, this chapter showed the importance of cultural familiarity and a shared migration experience for the two groups of migrants' socio-cultural involvement (cf. Kasinitz et al. 2008: 229). In discussing their place attachment, it proved that many of the migrants feel a special bond with a certain city, country, or region, because of the symbolic value of these places for a religious, ethnic, or national 'imagined community'. Voluntary work often also takes place in migrant organizations, based on a shared ethnic, immigrant, or expatriate background. Furthermore, most of the respondents have co-ethnic relationships. Those who have a mixed relationship often have a co-religious or co-European partner. Most middle-class migrants also mainly have friends who share their own ethnic background. The knowledge workers' friends in the Netherlands are not necessarily co-ethnics, but most of them are fellow expatriates. Although both groups of

migrants often have native Dutch friends as well, the knowledge workers in particular say such friendships do not come about easily. This is mainly due to the language barrier, but also because of differences in culture, which often comes down to the fact that they experience Dutch society to be rather closed for newcomers. With regard to their socio-cultural involvement, it could be argued that many of the respondents are part of local 'ethnic enclaves' or 'expat bubbles'. By using these terms, however, one could easily underestimate the permeability of the migrants' communities. In the intermezzo that follows this chapter, the issue of partial inclusion in and exclusion from Dutch society is further discussed through the eyes of an American trailing spouse.

Third, and linked to the previous points, this chapter showed that instead of adopting either a transnational or an urban perspective in studying migrants' communal bonds, it is fruitful to combine the two. Without a transnational approach, the importance of border-transcending identifications and regular homeland contacts would not have been recognized. An urban approach is important because it shows that, despite all sorts of border crossings that occur, proximity – both physically and culturally – remains crucial for many concrete practices.

Intermezzo III

"I Am American, but My Home Is the Netherlands"

Elle is a woman in her thirties who has lived in Rotterdam, together with her husband and their three children, for two years. They moved from the US to the Netherlands because of the husband's job in the field of logistics. Although Elle would like to get a paid job in the near future, at the moment, she stays at home to take care of her children. As a volunteer, she is involved in *Xpats010*, an association that helps expatriates to find their way in Rotterdam. I got in contact with Elle through the association's website and planned to talk with her about the organization's activities and her vision of Rotterdam's expatriate communities. During our conversation, however, Elle not only introduced *Xpats010*, but also vividly told me about her own experiences as an American mother in a foreign country. Her story provides concrete examples of many of the issues I touched upon in Chapter 5. Instead of referring to some of her quotes in various chapters, I will present her complete story here, since it gives a valuable insight into the interplay among economic, political, and socio-cultural factors in developing a sense of belonging. Just as during our meeting in February 2009, I will let Elle do the talking.[79] An intermezzo about Dutch language, expat bubbles, Bush and Obama, and morality:

Love where you live

"X*pats010* is an expatriate group that started fifteen years ago as a group of moms and tots – mothers and their small ones – getting together and meeting, just trying to acclimate to living in a foreign country. It is an English-speaking group, and we will be speaking English the majority of the time. We do have people from everywhere,

[79] For reasons of privacy, I have chosen fictive names to refer to the informant and the association she works for (010 in *Xpats*010 stands for the local telephone code of Rotterdam), and left out details about her previous job and her husband's job. To increase the readability of her story, I have translated the Dutch words she occasionally used. For instance, I write 'candy' instead of 'snoepjes', 'Dutch language' instead of 'Nederlandse taal', and 'municipality' instead of 'gemeente'. Moreover, I have made some changes in the order in which she told her story, for instance when she came back to something that she had mentioned earlier. Apart from these adjustments, this is 'Elle''s own story.

from Saudi Arabia to Indonesia, but the main idea is that everyone speaks English at this group. Next to the moms and tots, there is also a social group without kids. The guys play poker, and the girls take cooking classes, that sort of thing.

It was funny, six weeks after I got here this lady of *Xpats010* left, and I was nominated to take her place as the coordinator. So I've been doing this for two years. Hopefully, someone else will take it over, because you want new ideas, new people. I'm looking for a new job. As soon as my youngest one goes to school, what am I going to do? You can only clean your house so much before you lose your mind, you know. Even though the Dutch do appreciate a clean house, so that's fine. But I'm hoping to find a job and, hopefully, someone will take over my work at *Xpats010*. If not, I would never just leave it, because it's important for people, it's really necessary. Expats come here, and they don't know how to shop, what the name for baking soda is, and so on. You have to just let people know that they are never alone. There are people struggling with this.

Our members are mainly expats who work for smaller companies. The larger companies such as Shell have their own expat associations, but the smaller ones do not have the budget for that. I always think it is funny when people come here, and they say, 'Why do these other ones even exist? We have everything here. We're so nice!' So people from a lot of companies come here. We have 75 to 80 members and their families. We have a website and a Yahoo chat, so we have everything that you need. I always say that *Xpats010* is for normal people. People who aren't too fancy. People aren't poor, of course. But just those normal people who want to have fun, want to do things, want to get along.

I don't want my children to be typical Americans in their closed bubble. It is very easy to become like that. I don't want my children to be close minded. Not to bad mouth, but if they go to the American school in the wealthy Hilligersberg district, they will have their American friends and their American bubble. In the US, we lived in a very ritzy neighborhood where there was like one percent black and a half percent Asian. Everyone was very affluent, and I don't want that for my children. I want them to know that according to our Constitution, everybody is free and equal. That is also why I wanted to move to Rotterdam instead of a suburb like Wassenaar, in the The Hague area, where many expats live. Because there are real people in Rotterdam, of different cultures, and they are hard working. At first it is hard to like the architecture in Rotterdam, but the minute you open these doors, the houses

are gorgeous. And it's the same with the people. The minute they invite you for coffee, it's forever. It's not like Americans, who sometimes say 'Oh, yeah, yeah', but then they don't have time for you again. The Dutch take the time. And I always tell them that I am an American and that 'een afspraak is niet nodig', you know, they do not have to make an appointment. They'll smell that I am baking cookies, and they come in and ask, 'Are you busy?' and I say, 'Come in, have a coffee, have some cookies', and they love that.

My children go to the international department of a Dutch school. So they learn in English, but they go to Dutch lessons three times a week. And all three of them speak Dutch perfectly. It helps, because they can play in the neighborhood better if they can speak the language. The Dutch are so smart with languages; they realize that English is the business language, so everybody knows English. Everybody says that it is not necessary to learn Dutch, but it does help you. People treat you better. I believe that if you live in a country, you should respect the people and learn their language. And the fact that my children learn another language before age nine opens up their synapses and receptors, so they can learn more languages. All my children speak English, Spanish, and Dutch, so all we need is some Chinese and some Arabic, and then we've got them all, ha-ha. I am really fond of learning the languages. My husband has an 'I don't care' attitude. He cannot focus on the Netherlands that much. He's always gone, he travels around the world. Which is a pity, huh? But it is what it is.

I think it's important that the children learn Dutch, but I do want them to be in an English speaking school, because in no other country do people speak Dutch, except for the Antilles, which we don't plan to go to. The *Xpats010* meetings for children are also in English. They play, and we do crafts, and we read books in English. We're just trying to promote them to speak their mother tongue. And I teach my children lessons in English on Sunday morning. They speak Dutch almost everywhere, and I don't want them to become weird kids when we go back to the States. 'They don't know how to speak', you know. It has proven to be a big problem with our friends. I often speak to people who moved back, and I ask, 'How is it?', and they say, 'It is more difficult integrating going back to your country than it was here'.

My kids are just fine. Absolutely. Oh my gosh, you can throw them in the middle of Zimbabwe, and they will say, 'I will stick this thing in my lip, OK?' My

five-year-old says, 'I'm an American, but my home is the Netherlands'. This is where he lives. And I did that on purpose. We stayed in the Netherlands for a year and a half before we even went back to America to visit. Because I wanted them to know that this is their home, this is where they live. America is for vacation, but this is their home. It can be confusing, I knew that, and I didn't want that to be a problem, because they are important little people. They need to feel like this is home. They need to love where they live.

I have been abroad before, but only for short periods of time. This is my first real expat experience: living there, going to the grocery store, being part of the society. I am not affected negatively by it. It's not a shocker to my system, you know, it's just not. You just go on. But it is not always easy integrating into a new country. People want to know why you are here, what you are doing. Which is their right, of course, but they can be a little bit nasty.

I can remember the first offensive thing a Dutch person said to me. It was Halloween, and I went to the grocery store to buy all the candy. I think I spent more than a hundred Euros, because it was not only for my kids, it was for the whole neighborhood. And the lady at the cash register said, 'That is a lot of candy', and I said, 'Yes, it's Halloween'. And she said, 'Yes, Americans love Halloween', and I said, 'Yes, it's a lot of fun'. Then she said, 'That's probably why you are all fat'. And I looked at myself and I looked at her, and I said, 'Are you part American?' And she went, 'Oh, oh, no…' A lot of times I find that the Dutch don't have the soft words. They don't have those in the language. I was like, 'I'm much smaller than you', you know.

A lot of trouble

"I remember one night, people had fireworks in the neighborhood. It was over the top, Americans cannot have big bombs like that. They don't sell that, it's illegal. It was four o'clock in the morning, and my husband went down. It was teenagers, and he said, 'Look guys, it is four o'clock in the morning, it's enough, do it tomorrow'. One of them said, 'I don't even know why you are here, blah blah blah, you are a foreigner, you need to go back, Yankee'. And my husband went to this guy's father. In America, a father would say, 'Excuse me for my son's behavior'. But the father didn't say anything. My husband looked at the son and said, 'I even pay more taxes

than your daddy makes. I'm putting into your system, I'm not taking out. You should be happy that I am here'.

Maybe the only Americans people ever see are the ones on TV, in those stupid programs. They always show the dumb people, never the Harvard graduate students. And I hate the idea that people think that all Americans come across like Bush. It is sad, it is so sad. I always tell my children that it is not that bad now, because we have Obama instead of Bush. Some people are so dumb, they hate your country because of one man. The funny thing is, we never say anything about your Prime Minister, Balkenende, who looks like Harry Potter. We are OK with him. And we live here and we pay the taxes, while they don't live in the US and don't pay the taxes. They have no right to treat us poorly unless we've been ugly to them. So my children have learned that, especially my nine-year-old. He'll make jokes around adults. He'll go through his bag, saying, 'Hold on for a second, I'm looking for weapons of mass destruction'. And then people realize, 'Yes, wait a minute, I'm being mean, I'm being wrong'.

People at the Municipality do not help you all the time. If you look Turkish or Moroccan, they are not friendly. I once had a friend who came from Texas, but she was Mexican. She and I went for a driver's license, we had the same process, yet they were questioning her and they didn't question me, because I'm white. So one time I asked, 'Why are there so many security guards here?' And the woman who worked there said, 'Well, lots of the time we send people back', and she seemed very proud of that. And I asked, 'Are you proud of that? That's pretty shameful'. I tell the truth, that's kind of an American thing, I tell them that they should be ashamed that they do not help those people. So I said, 'You, yourself, are you Indonesian?' And she said 'yes'. And I said, 'Well, you don't exactly have blond pony tails and wear wooden shoes, do you? This land should be for everybody, this is a great place'. I'll tell her, because what is she going to do, cry? I want to make people think about their existence. I've done that my whole life.

Last week I went to the shopping mall at Zuidplein, I had never been there before, it is huge. And there were these teenage girls spitting in front of the kids. And I said, 'Excuse me'. And my son was like, 'Mom, why do you even say that anymore?' And I said, 'You know what, because even though they don't say it, they know what it means'. And there was a dark-skinned guy, maybe Surinamese, I don't know, and he said, 'It's true, we do know what it means. The sad thing is we should

use it more'. And he patted me on my back, and I said, 'Thank you'. And my son said, 'I see, mom'. And I asked him, 'What do you see?' And he said, 'That if you continue to be nice, sometimes people will catch on'.

When I am treated like crap by a Dutch person, or by a person in the Netherlands, I don't want my children to see that. They already know that the attitude is not the same. They pick that up. That people don't say 'excuse me' or 'pardon' or 'I'm sorry'. The little kids here use cuss words, f-words. Children in the US wouldn't do that. We say 'yes ma'am' and 'no ma'am'. So, I am trying to teach my children our culture. They have to respect the other culture, which the Dutch don't do at this stage. They don't respect other people's cultures. And I want my children to be different than that. On the one hand, I want them to integrate, but on the other hand, I want them to retain the values and the morality. That can be tricky. That's why I want to focus on my children first and then find a job. A lot of people can do both, but with three young children, it's a lot of work. And especially in a new country, it's good that I'm there when school is out. There is a lot of trouble to get into in Holland.

Probably we will stay here for a total of five years, or maybe longer. My husband's position has to be here, for his company's taxes. With the economic crisis, it may be cheaper to leave us here than to move us back and to pay for someone else to move here. But I don't mind being in the Netherlands. And, luckily, we can afford to fly home."

6. Synthesis: Fragmented Belonging

In the preceding chapters and accompanying intermezzos, I have addressed the spatial scale of middle-class migrants' and knowledge workers' economic, political, and socio-cultural activities and identifications. I have looked at which geographical levels are important (Research Question 1), and what the differences and similarities are between the two groups of migrants (Research Question 2). Although each chapter focused on a particular sphere, multiple connections were demonstrated among involvement in the economic, political, and socio-cultural spheres (Research Question 3). In this final chapter, I will briefly recapitulate the most important findings and compare them with the statements I made in Chapter 1 about the substance, subjects, and spheres of transnationalism. This synthesis will lead to three main conclusions, all related to the fragmented nature of belonging. In the last part of this chapter, I will discuss the broader implications of my research for current academic and public debates with respect to the use of catch-all terms like transnationalism and integration and the distinction between 'desirable' and 'undesirable' migrants. I will also give recommendations for future research, based on interesting findings that call for further investigation as well as aspects of my theoretical and methodological approach that have proven fruitful here and can be valuable for others.

Recapitulating the spheres, subjects, and substance of transnational involvement

I started this book by discussing the concept of *transnational involvement*, consisting of transnational activities and identifications (cf. Snel et al. 2006: 289). Following Bosniak's (2006) approach of disentangling the term citizenship, I specified the concept by asking questions about its *substance*, *subjects*, and *spheres*. The first question was still general: What is meant by the concept of transnational involvement, i.e., what borders are crossed or transcended, and how does this term relate to other notions of immigrant incorporation, such as assimilation? The questions regarding the subjects and spheres of transnational involvement were more concrete, addressing the characteristics of people who perform transnational activities and identifications and the domains of their lives in which this phenomenon is important. In Sartori's (1970) terms, I started high on the ladder of abstraction – where range of explanation is more important than accuracy of description – and gradually descended. In this

synthesis, I will work the other way around. I first discuss my findings with regard to the spheres and subjects of transnational involvement and then return to the question of its substance.

I start with the answer to the question *where* transnational involvement takes place, summarizing the findings on the economic, political, and socio-cultural spheres. Based on this overview, it is possible to draw more general conclusions about the relationship among the three spheres. The first main conclusion of this study is that the involvement of the two groups of migrants is highly fragmented. They perform their – sometimes contradicting – roles of economic agents, citizens, and private persons on various spatial levels.

Next, I will deal with the question *who* performs transnational involvement. I will discuss the differences and similarities between the main subjects of this book: middle-class migrants and knowledge workers. In Chapter 1, I argued that both groups have a relatively high socioeconomic status, but differ with regard to their length of stay and citizenship status. I will address whether and how these variables influence the respondents' transnational involvement. The second main conclusion is that, although 'classic' and 'new' types of migrants are generally regarded as clearly very different, in many respects, they are in fact very similar.

Finally, I deal with the implications of my findings for the question *what* transnational involvement is. I will discuss the importance of 'vertical' transnational ties, which, contrary to the often-studied 'horizontal' transnational (or bi-national) ties, transcend the borders of the nation-state. I will also argue that next to transnational involvement, the local level has proven to be particularly important in the lives of the two groups of migrants. The simultaneous significance of the supranational and sub-national levels is the third main conclusion of this research.

The fragmented nature of belonging

In some respects, the approach I adopted in this research is rather unusual for a study on transnational involvement. Instead of focusing only on migrants' bi-national (or horizontal transnational) ties to the host and home country, I also studied their border-transcending (or vertical transnational) ties, such as pan-religious and pan-ethnic identifications (cf. Lucassen 2006), and their local involvement. Moreover, rather than comparing different ethnic groups, I focused on two types of

migrants that are not often studied in a comparative design, because they are assumed to be "clearly very different" (Favell 2008: 100, cf. Kennedy 2004: 161-2; Colic-Peisker 2010: 267-8). The analytical distinction I made between three domains or spheres that form the context of transnational involvement was quite conventional, however (cf. Portes et al. 1999; Vertovec 2001; Snel et al. 2006; Morawska 2009). It is known that transnational ties in the political sphere, for instance, differ in nature and extent from socio-cultural transnationalism. To this traditional approach I added a focus on the interplay between activities and identifications and on the relationships among the distinguished spheres. Here, I will discuss the core findings for each sphere and draw conclusions about their interaction.

The economic sphere

In the first empirical chapter, I examined the two groups of migrants' current labor market positions and the role of economic considerations in their past movements and future migration plans. Based on the literature on expatriates or transnational professionals, it is expected that knowledge workers move from one country to another much more often and for very different reasons than 'classic' migrants (cf. Hannerz 1990; Colic-Peisker 2010). The findings of this chapter show that, related to distinctions in their economic position, important differences certainly exist between the two groups of migrants. However, by only focusing on such differences, scholars have so far overlooked similarities that are at least equally important.

The knowledge workers and middle-class migrants are rather different with respect to the economic sectors in which they work. Whereas the knowledge workers are mainly employed in sectors and organizations that operate on a transnational level (such as the oil and gas industry, academic research, and architecture), the middle-class migrants' sectors and organizations are much more nationally – and in many cases locally – oriented (for instance, social work, the local government, and primary and secondary education). This difference is also visible in the migrants' past migration experiences and has consequences for their future prospects. Knowledge workers who lived abroad before – which is certainly not the case for all of them – often have done so because of their internationally-oriented studies or work, while the middle-class migrants more often temporarily lived abroad for family reasons. Many of the knowledge workers have the option to leave the Netherlands

in the near future to continue their career in their home country or somewhere else, whereas the jobs of most of the middle-class migrants are less easily transferable to other countries. Although many of the middle-class migrants would like to live in their country of origin in the future, they realize that, if at all, this will be only feasible after their retirement. For both of the migrant groups, their work is thus extremely important for their potential spatial mobility. Simply put, while the knowledge workers' jobs make them leave, the middle-class migrants' jobs make them stay.

However economic motives do not completely dominate both groups of migrants' movements across borders. The knowledge workers and middle-class migrants are remarkably similar with regard to the role that non-economic, particularly socio-cultural, factors play in their past and future decisions. Just as in the case of middle-class migrants, of whom some have returned to their country of origin for some time after their arrival in the Netherlands, most of the knowledge workers who have lived abroad before stayed in countries which were culturally familiar to them. And although for many migrants it was not entirely their own choice to leave their country of origin – often their parents decided to move (in the case of middle-class migrants) or their employer wanted them to go abroad (in the case of knowledge workers) – for the migrants who made their own decision, cultural familiarity and existing social contacts were often crucial for going to the Netherlands. In their reasons for wanting to stay in the Netherlands or to leave, social networks and cultural adaptation again play an essential role. In many cases, migrants of both groups want to stay longer because they are in various ways 'integrated'. Besides their job, they, for instance, own a house, have a partner who does not want to leave, have children who go to a local school, and are busy learning the language. Many do not want to lose this fragile stability any time soon. For others, their bond with relatives 'back home' or their warm feelings toward the homeland culture and climate are decisive for wanting to return. Although economic considerations are very important, they are not always decisive.

In the intermezzo at the end of Chapter 3, I diverged somewhat from the issue of spatial mobility to gain more in-depth knowledge about the social mobility and views on success of a specific subcategory in my sample: female middle-class migrants. I discussed the opinions of fifteen of these women about the idea that successful immigrant women are role models for others who share their ethnic or religious background but have a lower socioeconomic status. The women almost all

emphasize the fact that although they are proud of their 'roots', they think that in their career only achievements should count. They want to stand out because they have a successful business (be it ethnic or mainstream) or because they are always ready to help colleagues, but not because they happen to be 'female', 'black', or 'Muslim'.

The political sphere

In Chapter 4, I discussed the positions of the two groups of migrants in the political sphere and investigated the spatial scale of and the relationships among different dimensions of citizenship: citizenship as a formal status, an activity, and an identity. In Dutch political debate, it is often suggested that migrants who still have the nationality of their home country are not completely loyal to the Netherlands, since their formal status implies involvement in a foreign state. In the literature on migrants' political transnationalism, such claims about loyalty are generally not made. However, most scholars do seem to believe that migrants' political involvement is naturally bounded by national borders, be it those of the host or the home country. Based on my findings, both claims can be rejected.

First of all, different dimensions of citizenship do not naturally coincide. According to many of the migrants, their formal status has not much to do with their feelings of belonging: they see their passport(s) only as a practical matter. Although many of the middle-class migrants identify themselves as Surinamese, Turkish, or Moroccan, and a large part of the knowledge workers also self-identify as home-country nationals, these homeland identifications are more based on socio-cultural factors, such as speaking the language and having relatives there, than on political status. The middle-class migrants almost all have Dutch nationality – in the case of the Moroccan and most of the Turkish respondents combined with the nationality of their home country – but very few of them primarily identify themselves as Dutch. Although they feel connected to the Netherlands in many ways, they do not feel confirmed in their 'Dutchness' by politicians or 'ordinary' people in the street. Debates about failed integration and Muslim extremism give them the feeling that they will always be perceived as an 'allochtone'. The knowledge workers do not expect to be treated as Dutch(wo)men in the political sphere. Although several of them refer to the popularity of right-wing politician Geert Wilders, unlike the 'classic' migrants,

they are not personally offended by his viewpoints, but rather witness the debate from the sideline.

Compared to citizenship as an identity, 'conventional' political activities, such as voting, are more connected to having a formal citizenship status. While a large majority of the middle-class migrants have recently voted in the Dutch elections, almost all of the knowledge workers are excluded from this activity, since they do not have Dutch citizenship. About half of the knowledge workers did vote in the home-country national elections. However, for migrants from both groups, participating in homeland elections is often impossible (e.g., because they do not have the right to vote), and almost always difficult (e.g., because they have to travel to cast their vote). This at least partly explains why homeland political participation again and again proves to be exceptional (cf. Itzigsohn 2000; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Snel et al. 2006; Waldinger 2008).

Transnational political involvement is not altogether uncommon, however. Although scholars usually study only horizontal transnational ties – that is, migrants' homeland ties – in the political sphere, vertical transnational ties prove to be particularly important. This 'truly' transnational solidarity does not present itself in 'conventional' political practices, which to a large extent are tied to the nation-state, but rather in 'unconventional' practices, such as demonstrating, signing petitions, and boycotting products. The respondents' boycott actions in nearly all cases concern issues that transcend the national level. In the second intermezzo, where I scrutinized the exact aims of these actions, it became clear that many of the knowledge workers and middle-class migrants are involved in boycotts that concern universal human rights, animal rights, and global environmental problems. I called such transnational actions 'universalistic'. Among the middle-class migrants, however, another type of transnational solidarity is common as well. Many of these migrants are involved in more 'particularistic' boycotts, which are directed at countries (such as Israel and South Africa) or companies (such as Tommy Hilfiger) that are accused of suppressing or discriminating against Muslims, blacks, or immigrants elsewhere in the world. It would be interesting to investigate to what extent these pan-religious and pan-ethnic ties can be seen as a form of "oppositional transnationalism" (cf. Morawska 2009: 197), that is, as a reaction to negative stereotypes experienced in the country of settlement.

The socio-cultural sphere

The importance of social and cultural ties already became clear in Chapter 3 as reasons to stay in or go to a certain country and in Chapter 4 as sources of homeland identification and border-transcending political solidarity. In Chapter 5, I further examined the spatial scale of the migrants' socio-cultural involvement. In transnational migration studies, it is generally believed that in the socio-cultural sphere, homeland ties are of great importance. My findings show that although feelings of belonging indeed easily cross or transcend national borders, this is much less the case when it comes to socio-cultural activities, which are often tied to the city of residence.

Similar to their political identifications, the migrants' place attachment, that is, their emotional bond with certain cities, countries, or regions in the world, is often based on pan-religious (e.g., Mecca for Muslims), pan-ethnic (e.g., India for Hindustani-Surinamese), or cosmopolitan identifications (e.g., New York and London for migrants of all kinds of backgrounds). Such identifications are rather abstract; migrants generally do not have personal contacts in these places and sometimes even have never been there. Also in the case of place attachment based on milestones of the past, such as having studied somewhere, identifications are not based on current activities. Only when migrants feel a special bond with a certain place because they have relatives or friends living there, these feelings are accompanied by, or based on, actual social contacts. This shows that, similar to the case of citizenship, identifications and activities do not always coincide.

Compared to their identifications, the migrants' socio-cultural practices are much more localized. Based on insights from the field of urban studies, I made a distinction between three types of socio-cultural activities: contacts with relatives and friends, involvement in civil society, and leisure activities (cf. Van der Land 2007; Amin and Thrift 2002). In particular, the social networks of the middle-class migrants are located in the Rotterdam area. The knowledge workers, who did not come to the Netherlands with their parents and arrived recently, are more homeland-oriented in this respect. Although in transnational migration studies, much attention is paid to migrants' activities in so-called home-town associations, directed at localities in the country of origin (cf. Itzigsohn et al. 1999), a large majority of the respondents who currently perform voluntary work are involved in civil society organizations which are not only located in or near Rotterdam, but also directed at the local

population. Often, these organizations focus particularly on the local incorporation of ethnic minorities or expatriates. Only monetarized solidarity, in the form of donations to civil society organizations, often crosses or transcends national boundaries. Leisure activities, such as shopping and going out, mainly take place in the Netherlands, and again often in or close to the city of residence. This has, of course, first of all a practical reason: it costs too much time and money to go to Brussels or Paris every week. However, the story of the American trailing spouse Elle, discussed in the third intermezzo, indicates that knowledge workers also find it important to get to know their place of residence better; they want to feel like it is their home (cf. Duyvendak 2011: 13). Although they do not feel that they belong there in a formal, political sense, their daily lives are largely centered on Rotterdam.

The dynamic relationship between the three spheres

In the foregoing, I already briefly referred to the interactions among economic, political, and socio-cultural activities and identifications. Here, I will discuss this issue in more detail, comparing my findings with the ideas put forward by Bauböck (1996: 80), who argues that individuals have different, sometimes conflicting, roles in different domains of society: in the sphere of the market, they are economic actors, in the sphere of the state, citizens, and in the family sphere, private persons. My findings support, but also extend Bauböck's theoretical model.

This research shows that, indeed, tensions exist between the roles that the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers play in different spheres of life. In the case of the middle-class migrants, particularly their roles as economic agents and private persons can clash. While they are often proud of their ethnic background, have co-ethnic friends, and spend their free time as volunteers for an immigrant organization, as employees or entrepreneurs, these migrants wish to be judged only on their professional achievements and get annoyed or even offended when someone brings up their ethnic or immigrant background. In the case of the knowledge workers, the roles of citizens and private persons often contradict one another. In a political sense, these migrants do not feel that they belong to the Netherlands. Since they are not formal Dutch citizens, they do not expect to have the same rights as the Dutch: they see themselves as guests who will probably leave within a couple of years. However, when they have the feeling that they are treated as outsiders in the

socio-cultural sphere (for instance when Dutch friends speak to them in English while they want to learn Dutch), knowledge workers argue that they want to be addressed as equals.

In accordance with Bauböck's theoretical model, the aforementioned examples concern the relationship between the roles individuals play in different spheres. However, tensions can also exist within one particular sphere. Middle-class migrants who have a job in which they benefit from their immigrant background (such as a social worker working in a 'black' neighborhood), for instance, do not want to have the feeling that they are hired because of their ethnicity. And while Moroccan migrants have Moroccan citizenship, they cannot participate in the elections and generally do not identify with Moroccan politics.

A second contribution to Bauböck's model is attention to the interaction between roles that concern different geographical levels. So far, the examples either concern the relationship between roles within Dutch society (such as the interaction between being a local economic agent and a local private person) or between roles within the home country (such as different aspects of the role of homeland citizen). However, it is also important to consider the relationship between, for instance, being a transnational economic agent and a local private person. Although many of the knowledge workers say that they will leave the Netherlands if they see job opportunities elsewhere, they often have developed all kinds of socio-cultural ties during their stay that make moving any time soon less attractive. In the case of the middle-class migrants, local economic ties are an important reason for not moving to the country of origin, despite the fact that these migrants often long for their homeland in a socio-cultural sense.

The findings that roles within a certain sphere can collide and that roles often concern different spatial levels can be understood in terms of what Fenster (2005: 242) calls "multilayered expressions of belonging." She makes a distinction between three types of belonging, which basically boil down to official belonging, everyday sense of belonging, and symbolic belonging. The first form relates to processes of inclusion and exclusion organized by the nation-state: who is an official member and who is not? Everyday sense of belonging is based on everyday practices: "We all belong, because we all have repetitive daily uses of city spaces" (Fenster 2005: 253). This form has proven to be important among both migrant groups in this research: they may not be or feel like official members of the Netherlands, but they do feel that

they belong to the city, based on the fact that they live, work, meet friends, shop, and exercise there. Despite the fact that many migrants are involved in various cross-border and border-transcending activities, their everyday practices in large part take place close to their place of residence. Fenster also relates symbolic belonging particularly to the city. For instance, people feel close to a certain neighborhood because of their memories of growing up there or because of the presence of people who are like them. Although this type of local identification is common among the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers, their symbolic belonging often also concerns the horizontal and vertical transnational levels, based on ideas about a shared origin, religion, or cosmopolitan values.

All in all, the belonging of the two groups of migrants is characterized first of all by fragmentation. The migrants perform their – sometimes conflicting – roles as economic agents, citizens, and private persons on various spatial levels. In Fenster's terms, the national level regulates their *official* belonging, their practices on the local level give them an *everyday* sense of belonging, and the 'truly' transnational level is particularly relevant with respect to their *symbolic* belonging.

Striking similarities between 'classic' and 'new' migrants

In existing studies, migrants that represent traditional or 'classic' migrant patterns – such as the middle-class migrants in this research – and knowledge workers, who stand for a 'new', more fluid migration pattern, are often considered to be very different (cf. Hannerz 1990; Kennedy 2004; Favell 2008; Colic-Peisker 2010). However, such statements are based on assumptions rather than in-depth comparison and, therefore, in the words of Alba and Nee (2003: 67), "should not be too readily accepted."[80] The above discussion about the middle-class migrants' and knowledge workers' fragmented belonging with regard to the three distinguished spheres already shows that there are important resemblances between them. Here, I will further

[80] Alba and Nee (2003) also make a comparison between migrant groups that are often assumed to be very different, namely those who came to the US in the period between the 1830s and 1920s and those who arrived from the mid-1960s onwards. They question the common belief that, although important in earlier times, the notion of assimilation is not very relevant for contemporary immigrant groups. Based on a thorough investigation, they conclude that past and present migrants are actually in many ways alike. Lucassen (2005) draws a similar conclusion based on a comparison between "old" (those who arrived in the nineteenth and early twentieth century) and "new" migrants (those who arrived from the 1950s onwards) in Western-European countries.

scrutinize both the differences and similarities with regard to three variables that are generally seen as important in determining the extent to which migrants are active on a transnational level, as discussed in Chapter 1: socioeconomic status, length of stay, and citizenship status. The empirical findings clearly show that the role of these factors often differs from what one would expect. Although both groups of migrants share a relatively high socioeconomic status, differences exist in the transferability of their skills to other countries. Furthermore, despite their differences in length of stay and citizenship status, there are striking similarities between their transnational identifications.

Socioeconomic status

The two groups of migrants in this research were primarily selected based on their socioeconomic success.[81] Because of their relatively high education and job level, both groups were assumed to have the necessary means – e.g., contacts, money, and knowledge – to be active across borders (cf. Guarnizo et al. 2003). Based on my findings, I cannot conclude whether or not the knowledge workers and middle-class migrants are more transnationally active than migrant groups with a lower status, since these were not included in the comparison. My results do show that the relationship between socioeconomic status and transnational involvement is more complicated than often suggested, related to the facts that (1) education and job level should not be too readily equated with financial means, (2) many transnational activities do not require a high income, (3) money is often spent locally, and (4) next to education, job level, and income, economic sector should be taken into account.

Based on the fact that they almost all have jobs that require a university degree, it could be expected that the knowledge workers, even more so than the middle-class migrants, have sufficient means to be involved in cross-border activities. However, although the knowledge workers form quite a homogenous group regarding their employment level, large differences exist with respect to their salaries, re-

[81] As explained in Chapter 2, the middle-class migrants have jobs that require at least intermediate vocational education; most of them work on a higher vocational level. The knowledge workers are employed at least on a higher vocational level; most of their jobs require an academic degree. Furthermore, middle-class migrants who own a business in producer services were included, as well as trailing spouses, who were selected based on the socioeconomic position of their partners (in most cases: husbands).

lated to work experience (older knowledge workers earn more than younger ones) and type of company (large multinationals pay more than relatively small architecture offices). Many of the knowledge workers have an income that is comparable to that of many middle-class migrants and in that sense do not resemble the super-elite that Elliott and Urry (2010: 68) describe in their book *Mobile Lives*. The knowledge workers do seem to spend more money on contacts with relatives and friends in the country of origin than the middle-class migrants: they travel home much more frequently. However, the larger the geographical distance between their countries of origin and settlement, the less often such visits take place, which suggests that money does play a role here.

Second, many other forms of cross-border contacts do not require a particularly high income. A large part of the two groups of migrants' communication with relatives in their home country takes place through relatively cheap technologies, such as email, telephone, and Skype. The fact that the knowledge workers use such means more often than the middle-class migrants seems to be more related to differences in length of stay and the presence of many relatives and friends in the country of origin than to differences in socioeconomic status.

Third, the two groups of migrants spend a substantial part of their income in the city of residence. Their preference for cities which they see as cosmopolitan or having international allure is mainly expressed by visits to Amsterdam, rather than frequent trips to London or New York. In line with what advocates of an assimilation theory perspective argue, this questions the view that migrants who have more skills or money self-evidently spend these forms of capital on transnational practices. It would be interesting, however, to further investigate the relationship between class and the observed preference for what could be called 'cosmopolitan consumption'. As Norris (2000) has shown, cosmopolitan identities are strongly linked to a higher education level and are also more common among those who live in urban areas, are relatively young, and have an immigrant background. Should this form of cosmopolitanism, as Calhoun (2003) argues, be seen as "the class consciousness of frequent travelers"? Not only what people consume and where they do so is relevant in this respect, but also why they do *not* buy certain things. In other words, are consumer boycotts also related to a (upper) middle-class position?

Finally, my findings suggest that next to variables such as education, job level, and income, migrants' job type and the sector in which they work should be in-

cluded more often in research on transnational involvement. The most important difference between the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers in this research is not their level of education or employment, but the local or transnational orientation of the organizations they work for. For instance, a Moroccan middle-class migrant who is a policy maker at the local government in Rotterdam, who studied at the Erasmus University and who has a net monthly income of around 3,000 Euros can be expected to be more locally bound than a Portuguese knowledge worker who works for an internationally famous architecture office in Rotterdam and who also has a university degree and a similar income. The middle-class migrants generally do not see many opportunities to build a career in another country, whereas for the knowledge workers, this is a realistic option. In future research, it would be interesting to find out what such differences mean for people's (not necessarily migrants') contacts with colleagues and other business contacts in the country of residence and abroad and how this influences their overall transnational and local involvement.

Length of stay

It is often argued that transnational ties – generally interpreted as the ties migrants have with their country of origin – change over time, not only in strength, but also in nature (cf. Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Morawska 2009). Although this discussion is usually framed in terms of generational differences, in this research I compared two groups of migrants who partly overlap with regard to the generation to which they belong, but whose length of stay differs considerably.[82] The middle-class migrants generally have been in the Netherlands for most of their lives, while the knowledge workers have arrived recently. Two important conclusions can be drawn about the role of length of stay in the nature and extent of the two groups of migrants' transnational involvement: (1) Although length of stay appears to be important for the migrants' involvement in homeland activities, this is less the case for horizontal and vertical transnational identifications; (2) Next to length of stay or generation, life-cycle stage should be taken into account more often.

[82] The middle-class migrants belong to the first, 1.5, and second generation. A comparison between these generational groups was not central to this study. Instead, I mainly focused on comparing the 'classic' and 'new' types of migrants.

The differences in homeland contacts between the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers seem to support the idea that bi-national ties weaken through the years. The knowledge workers generally contact people in the home country once or more a week, while many middle-class migrants only do so a few times a year. This partly has to do with the fact that the middle-class migrants' parents and siblings often also live in the Netherlands, whereas the knowledge workers' close relatives almost all live in the country of origin. However, a majority of the knowledge workers also mainly have friends in their home country, while this is exceptional among the middle-class migrants. Since relationships with friends – like love relationships – are often based on geographical proximity, it is likely that the knowledge workers' networks of friends will become more localized as they stay longer. Another example of a homeland activity that seems to be related to length of stay is voting in the elections. This is exceptional among the middle-class migrants who have the right to do so, while more than half of the knowledge workers have done so recently.

Regarding their home-country and host-country identifications, the two groups are much more similar. Both often feel that they 'belong' to the country of origin, but also acknowledge that this connection has changed because of their absence from there. Although they have been in the Netherlands for only a relatively short period of time, adaptation to the country of settlement and a form of detachment from the country of origin already occur among the knowledge workers. Their everyday practices mainly take place in Rotterdam, and many of them want to learn Dutch, so they can socialize with the Dutch and become familiar with Dutch culture. However, many of them have the feeling that they are being excluded from Dutch social networks based on their intended short-term stay. This gives some the idea that they are not very welcome in the Netherlands. Based on their longer length of stay, it could be expected that the middle-class migrants no longer feel themselves to be (treated like) guests. However, although they give a more political explanation for it, many of the middle-class migrants – be it first, 1.5 or second generation – have a similar feeling of being excluded from Dutch society. Since they speak Dutch and have lived here long enough to know the Dutch mores, they do not have the idea that they should integrate more before being treated as equals. They often think it would be better to live in the country of origin, where they hope to be just like the others. However, many also realize that in their (parents') former homeland, they

will again stand out because of their Dutch ways of dressing, speaking, and behaving.

The fact that the knowledge workers and middle-class migrants are in many ways alike with regard to their (dis)identification with the Netherlands and the country of origin shows that length of stay or generation does not necessarily determine the strength of bi-national ties. This is also true for border-transcending identifications. When asked what is their primary identification, among the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers the homeland option was more common than options such as 'Muslim' or 'cosmopolitan'. However, in the open-ended questions, 'truly' transnational feelings of belonging proved to be important in both groups. Within the group of middle-class migrants, this was not only the case for those who belong to the second generation, as Morawska (2009: 192) suggests, but also for older generations, for instance first-generation Creole-Surinamese who feel a bond with South Africa based on their African 'roots'. Even though it can be said that the migrants' pan-ethnic, pan-religious, or universalistic identifications are not "thick" connections (Alba and Nee 2003: 276) – they are not based on frequent activities – this does not mean that such ties are irrelevant. In a time in which information about distant people who are in some way like 'us' is more readily available than ever before (cf. Foner 2000: 178), and national identifications are often problematic, ties beyond national borders might become increasingly important.

The above-discussed findings show that although generally a strict distinction is made between different immigrant generations, this does not always seem to be relevant. The middle-class migrants, who all have lived in the Netherlands for quite a long time but belong to different generations, have similar experiences regarding their incorporation into the Netherlands. However, there was at least one finding in which generation did seem to play an important role. When asked about their future plans, middle-class migrants who came to the Netherlands after the age of twelve seemed to be more certain about their wish to return than migrants who came at a younger age or were born in the Netherlands. For the younger generations, 'returning' to the country of origin is a dream for the far-away future, while the first-generation migrants often have already made concrete plans. Instead of generation, however, this might also be related to life-cycle stage. Most middle-class migrants who have a wish to return, regardless of their generation, say they will do so only after their retirement, since they do not expect to be able to find a suitable job

in the country of origin. The first-generation migrants are often closer to their pensionable age than the 1.5- and second-generation migrants, who are often only in their thirties or early forties. It would be interesting to see how many of the first-generation migrants actually do return and if the *willingness* to return of the subsequent generations will also transform into a *readiness* when they are older (cf. Cassarino 2004). The importance of life-cycle stage deserves more attention in future research, as it challenges the view that a linear negative relationship exists between length of stay and the strength of homeland ties.

Citizenship status

The middle-class migrants and knowledge workers do not only differ regarding their length of stay, but also with respect to their citizenship status. The middle-class migrants almost all have Dutch citizenship, often combined with the nationality of their home country. Only a few knowledge workers have Dutch nationality; most others only have a homeland nationality. The question is what this means for their transnational involvement. Some authors argue that having the nationality of the country of settlement facilitates integration, which, in turn, weakens homeland ties (cf. Koopmans et al. 2005). Others concentrate on the role that receiving states play in restricting migrants' homeland ties, particularly (but not only) among those who have a weak status (cf. Waldinger 2008). In accordance with the first view, this research shows that the middle-class migrants mainly participate in the Dutch national and local elections, while the knowledge workers do so almost exclusively in homeland elections. However, my findings contribute to both views in three important respects: (1) Rather than the country of settlement, the countries of origin often create barriers for cross-border activities; (2) Adopting the nationality of the country of settlement facilitates certain cross-border practices; (3) For various forms of local and transnational involvement, having a certain passport is not required.

First of all, home countries often do not make it easy for emigrants to participate in homeland elections. Moroccan migrants do not have the right to vote, because they do not live in Morocco. Turks and Taiwanese have to go to Turkey and Taiwan to vote, since their countries of origin do not permit voting from overseas. Belgians and Brazilians, on the other hand, are obliged to vote, even if they live abroad. So, instead of barriers in the country of settlement against homeland partici-

pation, as described by Waldinger, many respondents talk about obstacles (or incentives) in the country of origin.

Second, although having Dutch citizenship implies that migrants gain certain rights in the Netherlands that non-citizens do not have, and naturalization thus facilitates integration in this respect, having formal citizenship also makes it possible to engage in various cross-border activities. Many of the middle-class migrants say that the most important reason for them to adopt Dutch nationality was the fact that it makes traveling abroad easier. With a Dutch passport, they can more easily visit other European countries or the US than with a Surinamese, Turkish, or Moroccan passport. Some migrants also mention the fact that for Dutch nationals it is easier to marry someone from abroad than for non-citizens. Paradoxically, adopting Dutch nationality eases marrying a home-country national, which is probably one of most intense bi-national activities one can think of.

Third, although important for certain activities, being a citizen of a certain country is not essential for all types of involvement. The knowledge workers, for instance, generally do not see a need to become Dutch citizens, not only because they only intend to stay temporarily, but also since naturalization according to them has not much added value. They already live, work, and spend their leisure time in the Netherlands, for which formal citizenship is not required. Of course, these migrants have a formal residence permit based on their importance for the knowledge-based economy and thus differ from 'undesired' migrants, such as irregular migrants, who are excluded from al kinds of institutions. But even in the case of political involvement – which is often believed to be strongly tied to membership in the nation-state – formal citizenship is not always a necessary condition. Regardless of their status, the migrants can, and actually do, participate in practices such as demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts, directed at the local, national, and, particularly, 'truly' transnational level.

The value of comparing different types of migrants

This research shows that, indeed, differences exist between 'classic' and 'new' types of migrants. Although the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers both have a relatively high socioeconomic status, because of differences in the transferability of their skills, the knowledge workers are potentially more geographically mobile than

the middle-class migrants. Consequently, the wish to return to the home country, which is found among migrants from both groups, more likely leads to an actual return in the case of knowledge workers. The fact that the knowledge workers have arrived quite recently, whereas the middle-class migrants have lived in the Netherlands for a great part of their lives or were even born there, is important for the frequency and intensity of their homeland contacts with relatives and friends. Furthermore, related to their citizenship status, middle-class migrants are mainly active in conventional political practices in the Netherlands, while the knowledge workers are in this respect more homeland-oriented.

However, apart from these differences, the two groups of migrants prove to be much more similar than is generally assumed. The fact that the knowledge workers are in various ways more involved in their country of origin than the middle-class migrants already shows that the image of expatriates as cosmopolitans with a post-national outlook is at best only partly true. Moreover, knowledge workers are not the only type of migrants who feel connected to certain people or places based on border-transcending identifications; the middle-class migrants' feelings of belonging often also go beyond the borders of their countries of origin and settlement. Since studies on highly skilled professionals are particularly interested in the vertical type of transnational involvement, while the literature on 'classic' migrants' transnational involvement focuses on horizontal ties, the fact that both types of migrants actually combine bi-national and 'truly' transnational activities and identifications has so far been disregarded.

Next to similarities in the nature of their transnational involvement, both groups of migrants are also alike with regard to their local incorporation. Just like the middle-class migrants, the knowledge workers are in various ways attached to their place of residence, not only as a result of intentional choices, such as following a language course, but also as an unintended consequence of living, working, raising children, and spending leisure time there (cf. Foner 2000: 185; Alba and Nee 2003: 218). Although potentially hyper-mobile, the past movements and future plans of many knowledge workers show that their migration and settlement patterns in actual practice are not that different from those of 'classic' migrants.

Although the lack of comparative research concerning different types of migrants suggests that such comparisons are irrelevant or even inappropriate, my research shows that the middle-class migrants' involvement on different geographical

levels and with regard to different social spheres is better understood when compared to the involvement of knowledge workers, and vice versa. Migrants who differ with regard to their country of origin, migration history, and the way they are perceived by the receiving society, but who share a relatively high socioeconomic status, go through similar processes of local incorporation and have similar – vertical and horizontal – transnational identifications. These results are a challenge to the conventional practice in transnational migration studies of comparing the bi-national involvement of migrants who belong to different ethnic groups. Both the focus on ethnic or national background and on ties with the nation-state are part of what has been called "methodological nationalism" (cf. Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; Glick Schiller et al. 2006). In the next section, I will further discuss the importance of including sub-national and supra-national levels in studying transnational involvement. Here, I will draw some conclusions about the importance of looking through a 'migration' or a 'mobility', instead of an 'ethnic', lens.

Following Glick Schiller et al. (2006: 613), who argue that ethnic groups should neither be the unit of analysis nor the sole subject of study, and Van Meeteren (2010: 215), who states that researchers should not try to determine in advance which communities are relevant for individuals, in this research, I only paid attention to ethnic or national background when this seemed to be important in the migrants' lives. The migrants, for instance, identify themselves primarily in terms of their national origin, have friends who are co-ethnics, and participate in civil society organizations that are based on a shared ethnic origin. However, these identifications and practices are found among both 'classic' and 'new' types of migrants and are thus not exclusive to migrants with a particular ethnic background. A conventional comparison of, say, Turkish and Moroccan middle-class migrants, or American and German knowledge workers, would probably not have led to such striking conclusions, but only to the reproduction of assumed ethnic differences.

Even more important than the conclusion that ethnic background plays a role in certain types of involvement is the finding that for many other activities and identifications, ethnicity or country of origin is not that relevant. Both groups of migrants, for instance, participate in civil society organizations which are directed at immigrants or expatriates in general, regardless of their ethnic background. Political solidarity and different types of place attachment often also transcend ethnic boundaries. Frequently undertaken leisure activities, such as visiting a fitness club, shop-

ping, and going out, have even less to do with ethnicity. In research that adopts an ethnic perspective, such mainstream activities are often overlooked. With my focus on different types of migrants rather than on ethnic groups, I do not mean to deny the relevance of ethnic background as a factor that influences the nature of migrants' incorporation. However, my findings show that many important patterns of local, (bi-)national, and transnational involvement are not related to migrants' ethnic or national background.

The importance of 'truly' transnational involvement and local incorporation

After having discussed this research's main findings regarding the distinguished spheres and having drawn conclusions about the comparison between the main subjects, I now move on to the most abstract question posed at the start of this book: What is the substance of transnationalism? In this study, I chose to focus mainly on transnationalism as a performance, as something that people – not only, but particularly, migrants – do (cf. Carling 2007: 33). Although I also looked at the influence of transnationalism "from above," for instance initiated by corporations, I primarily paid attention to individuals' transnational involvement "from below" (cf. Guarnizo and Smith 1998: 3). However, only stating that transnational involvement consists of individuals' transnational activities and identifications is still rather vague, since it does not yet make clear what is actually meant by 'transnational'. In Chapter 1, I discussed two lines of criticism regarding this term. The first was that it is superfluous, since existing theories on processes of assimilation or integration already explain the existence of transnational involvement. The second critique concerned the fact that scholars of transnationalism usually look at migrants' homeland ties, whereas the prefix 'trans' in fact means 'beyond', which suggests that the focus should be on ties that transcend the national. Here, I will draw conclusions regarding both lines of criticism, starting with the second.

At first glance, transnational migration scholars seem to be right in their focus on homeland ties. The migrants in this research are in various ways bi-nationally oriented, as I discussed earlier in this chapter. Although it might be quite surprising to find such homeland ties also among second-generation migrants and expatriates, this was not the most remarkable result of this research. What particularly stood out was the fact that ties *beyond* the home country, which are generally ignored or oth-

erwise assumed to be very exceptional among immigrants (cf. Lucassen 2006), actually proved to be very common among both groups of migrants. Following Morawska (2009), I called such ties vertically transnational, as opposed to the horizontally transnational ties that are generally studied. Based on the instances of vertical transnational involvement that came to the fore in this research, the question arises as to what exactly is the difference between the two types of ties. Migrants who feel a bond with Mecca, India, and New York, or antipathy toward Israel, the US, or South Africa: are these not still examples of bi-local or bi-national, or at the most inter-local or multi-national, ties? In other words, are borders really transcended here?

The answer depends on what borders one is referring to. I argue that national borders are indeed transcended, but that other boundaries play a vital role in this type of ties. Only a small part of the vertical transnational ties that were found are entirely 'universalistic'. Examples are consumer boycotts based on global solidarity with people, animals, and the environment. Many of the other instances are more 'particularistic', that is, based on certain characteristics that the migrants share with some and that differentiates them from others. Although such (dis)identifications are expressed in ties with specific places, they are not inherently tied to a certain territory, as in the case of homeland ties. Rather, the migrants identify themselves with "imagined communities" (cf. Anderson 1983: 6) that are even more abstract than the nation-state, based on a perceived shared religion, skin color, history, or cosmopolitan attitude. Different from bi-national involvement, feelings of belonging beyond the national level are not often accompanied by regular contacts with or visits to these symbolic places. However, as I argued earlier, this does not mean that such identifications are necessarily weaker than those directed to one or more nation-states. Their imaginary nature might even make them more persistent, compared with identifications that are more activity-based and require investment of time and energy. In reaction to those who study transnationalism as a bi-national phenomenon, based on my findings it can be concluded that they overlook an important, and many-sided, second type of transnational involvement. My findings show that for a more complete understanding of the phenomenon, it is important to include vertical transnational ties on a more structural basis in transnational migration studies.

Another point of criticism is that transnationalism – regardless of the fact that it could better be called bi-nationalism – is nothing new and can be explained perfectly by the assimilation theory. According to Alba and Nee (2003: 11), assimilation

does not imply that all ethnic markers will eventually disappear, but rather that the ethnic origin of individuals "become less and less relevant in relation to the members of another ethnic group." Since, according to the authors, this is "by its nature a multigenerational process" (2003: 215), first- and second-generation migrants who still have a bond with their (parents') country of origin do not challenge the idea of gradual assimilation. Alba and Nee argue that among the migrants that came to the US in the 19th and early 20th century, homeland ties and a strong focus on the local ethnic community were still present among third- and sometimes even fourth-generation migrants. Today, these groups of, for instance, German, Italian, Polish, and Japanese origin are considered to be examples of successful assimilation.

Based on the finding that the migrants in this research combine transnational and local activities and identifications, the importance of assimilation as Alba and Nee describe it can neither be confirmed nor rejected, since the migrants are (children) of migrants, and not (great-)grandchildren. However, migrants' adaptation to the country of settlement already starts on the first day of their arrival, and often even earlier. Instead of assimilation or, preferred in the European context, integration, the term incorporation is more suitable in this context.[83] This term is generally regarded as more "neutral," since it does not have a strong cultural connotation (Van Meeteren 2010: 11) and, while assimilation and integration imply becoming more like the national mainstream, incorporation leaves more room for studying "multilevel ties" (Glick Schiller et al. 2006: 614), including ties to the city of residence. The importance of Rotterdam as the context of the migrants' activities and identifications became clear throughout this book. More than seeing themselves as Dutch, many argue that they feel that they are citizens of Rotterdam, based on its diverse population composition to which they can relate emotionally and the fact that an important part of their daily activities take place there.

In the opening chapter, I argued that cities can be seen as strategic locations for studying transnational involvement, since in the city, various subpopulations – such as transnationally active migrants – have enough critical mass to form all kinds of institutions, which further strengthen their subculture (cf. Fischer 1975). This research shows that the presence of a large, heterogeneous population is indeed im-

[83] Rath (2009: 680) argues that the term assimilation has never become a "buzzword" in Europe, although nowadays those who advocate integration are actually "seeking 'assimilation', namely, the disappearance of ethnic differences." Vermeulen (2010: 1227) also uses assimilation and integration as synonyms.

portant for the two groups of migrants' practices and contacts. Many of them participate as a member, volunteer, and – in the case of the middle-class migrants – employee or entrepreneur in organizations that particularly focus on migrants. However, most of these organizations have a local scope: apart from the transnational corporations for which many knowledge workers work, few migrants participate in urban associations that have cross-border or border-transcending objectives. Activities that often have 'particularistic' or 'universalistic' transnational objectives, such as petitions, boycott actions, and donations to charitable organizations, are not particularly dependent on a local critical mass, but are more often organized through the internet. The super-diverse city thus does not so much seem to facilitate transnational involvement, but rather incorporation into local subcommunities of fellow migrants. Whether or not such an "ethnic infrastructure" makes these migrants "resistant to […] assimilatory trends" (Alba and Nee 2003: 100) is not central here. Rather, this research shows that the city is extremely important for different types of migrants' involvement: both for those who are often believed to be particularly attached to their country of origin and for those who are considered as footloose globetrotters.

Earlier in this section, I concluded that scholars of transnationalism should not only pay attention to horizontal transnational ties, but also include vertical transnational ties in their analyses more often, since these proved to be remarkably common among the migrants in this research. Here, I conclude that next to assimilation or integration in the country of settlement, local incorporation deserves a more central role in research on transnational involvement. Methodological nationalists – who believe that the nation-state naturally is the most important locus of action – still firmly dominate the debate (cf. Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; Glick Schiller et al. 2006). To counterbalance this dominant view, and to provide a better understanding of migrants' fragmented belonging, more (open-minded, rather than rigid and myopic) sub-nationalists and supra-nationalists are needed.

Implications for current academic and public debates

The findings of this research are not only interesting in the light of academic discussions about transnationalism, but have broader implications. In the empirical chapters, I already intervened in discussions related to academic disciplines other than

transnational migration studies, such as political science and urban studies, and in the public debate about migrants' assumed dual loyalties. Here, I will further discuss the potential contribution of my findings to current academic and public debates. First of all, I will argue that, whereas conceptual stretching is tempting for academics, this research shows the importance of conceptual precision. Second, I will claim that the ways in which migration and integration issues are addressed in current Dutch debates and policies are counterproductive.

Terminological camouflage versus conceptual precision

At the start of this book, I argued that since it is used indiscriminately for a wide range of phenomena, transnationalism has become a vague concept. It is an example of what Sartori (1970: 1052) calls "terminological camouflage," meaning that "things are declared alike by making them verbally identical." Instead of totally abandoning the concept, however, I followed Bauböck's (2010: 310-1) strategy "to enrich its meanings through analyzing the different contexts in which it applies and to introduce new terms only as needed for further specifications." Based on the comparison between two different types of migrants, I showed that it is important to make a distinction between transnationalism in a horizontal or bi-national sense and a vertical (e.g., pan-ethnic, pan-religious, and universalistic) sense; that transnationalism differs in appearance and significance with regard to the economic, political, and sociocultural spheres; and that transnational activities and identifications do not always go hand in hand. General statements such as 'transnationalism decreases with generation' should thus always be further specified: what interpretation is given to the prefix 'trans', what social spheres are taken into consideration, and what types of involvement?

The fact that most social scientists – quite rightly – not only want their findings to be precise, but also transferable to other cases and relevant for a larger public, has the side-effect that range of explanation often prevails over accuracy of description (cf. Sartori 1970: 1044). Although researchers will always have to deal with partly contradictory aims, it is still worthwhile to strive for a certain balance (cf. Goudsblom 1977). As Sartori (1970: 1052) argues, "the need for highly abstract, all-embracing categories does not require us to inflate, indeed to evaporate, the observational, empirically-linkable, categories that we do have." Highly abstract and more

concrete concepts should thus be seen as complements rather than as substitutes. This relates to Bauböck's claim that the term transnationalism can be useful, as long as it is further specified and contextualized. I do not totally agree with Bauböck (2010: 310), however, when he argues that terminological battles "tend to be tedious and unproductive," and therefore a waste of energy. Transnationalism is a relatively new concept that is used for phenomena that are often argued to be anything but new. The fact that it is a commonly used term does not mean it has to be treated as sacred. Stating that migrants' ties with their country of origin could be better referred to as 'homeland' ties than as 'transnational' ties, for instance, might not be that unreasonable.

The wish not only to make accurate descriptions, but also to compare these with other situations, preferably in other countries, and simultaneously to make a contribution to public debate, can lead to hasty conclusions. Examples of this phenomenon are not only found in the literature on transnationalism, but also in the more general field of migration studies. Kasinitz et al., for instance, provide a nuanced view of the position of second-generation immigrants in the city of New York. They conclude that although the young adults they studied are on the whole more socioeconomically successful than their parents, they do not form a homogeneous category and cannot be seen as representative for second-generation immigrants in other parts of the US. However, when putting their findings in an international perspective, the authors are less nuanced. They argue that the socioeconomic success of children of immigrants in New York is "particularly striking when compared with their counterparts in Western Europe," who, judging from the 2005 riots in the *banlieues* of Paris, are "symbols of the possible second generation decline throughout Western Europe" (Kasinitz et al. 2008: 344), suggesting that Western European children of immigrants do form a homogeneous population. Based on my findings, no general statements can be made about the position of second-generation migrants in Rotterdam (let alone the Netherlands or Western Europe as a whole), since I selected only those who can be counted as middle class. However, my findings do show that it is important to clarify what specific type of integration or incorporation is meant. For instance, while the second-generation migrants in this research often do not primarily identify themselves as Dutch, in a socioeconomic sense, they can be considered successfully integrated (cf. Crul and Heering 2008). Moreover, although second-generation migrants in the Netherlands might feel less Dutch than their coun-

terparts in the US feel American, this does not say much about their attachments to their city of residence or their neighborhood. When comparing migrants' degree of integration or incorporation, it should always be specified whether one is referring to structural (e.g., education, labor market position, and housing conditions) or socio-cultural integration (e.g., friendships and feelings of belonging), and what geographical levels are taken into consideration.

The side effects of debates about failed integration

The idea that Western European countries are characterized by 'failed' immigrant integration not only exists in academic literature. Political parties whose primary reason for existence is exactly this point of view have gained popularity in countries such as Belgium, Austria, France, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. Whereas Kasinitz et al. (2008: 344) point to structural factors that make European countries less receptive to newcomers than the city of New York, according to the right-wing populist parties in Europe, migrants themselves are largely to blame for their backward position, for instance because they did not – and also, due to too soft integration policies, were not forced to – make an effort to learn the dominant language. Parties like these usually call for an 'immigration stop', combined with strict assimilation policies regarding already settled migrant groups, threatening to send those who are considered to be unwilling to assimilate 'back home'. Although such measures are not implemented in their most extreme form, immigrants do feel the consequences of the right-wing wind that is blowing over Europe.

As I discussed earlier in this book, the integration paradox has it that particularly so-called well-integrated migrants suffer from the tone of this debate, since they are more confronted with it in newspapers and on television (cf. Gijsberts and Vervoort 2009). Being called an 'allochtone' – a term that is used by Dutch political parties from the left to the right but also in academic writing – for many migrants is in itself offensive, since the term suggests that they still do not belong in the Netherlands. As the successful actor Nasrdin Dchar, born in the Netherlands and of Moroccan origin, said in an interview: "If I am an 'allochtone' here, where am I an 'autochtone' then?"[84] Particularly second-generation migrants – but the same is true for

[84] In 2011, Dchar won a *Gouden Kalf*, a prestigious Dutch film award, for his appearance in the Dutch movie *Rabat*. In his speech, he made a statement against the "fear politics" of Geert Wilders

many 1.5- and first-generation migrants, who have often lived in the Netherlands for more than thirty years – do not have a 'home' to go 'back' to. This research has shown that the political climate is one of the reasons why middle-class migrants think about leaving the Netherlands to build a life elsewhere. Instead of encouraging established migrants to further strengthen their ties with the Netherlands, debates about failed integration and Islam as the source of all problems make people who are in various ways rooted in Dutch society long for their (parents') country of origin. Although some politicians might celebrate every single case in which a migrant decides to leave the country, alienating a socioeconomically successful category of migrants from the only home they know seems highly counterproductive for the goal of integration. To put it in Fenster's (2005) terms, it is important for people to not only *officially* belong to a certain place, for instance evidenced by their passport, or to *practically* belong based on everyday activities, such as work or leisure, but also to get the opportunity to *symbolically* belong there.

In discussions about restricting immigration and making assimilation more obligatory, one type of migrant is hardly ever mentioned: highly skilled temporary migrants. Unlike most other migrants, knowledge workers are seen as an added value to the Dutch society (Lucassen and Lucassen 2011: 40). The distinction between 'desired' and 'undesired' migrants becomes clearly visible in the selective migration policy that the Dutch government has developed in recent years. In 2010, the 'Law on modern migration policy' was passed, the implementation of which is supposed to make coming to the Netherlands more attractive for migrants who are, in the words of the government, "much needed to strengthen the economy, culture and science," while it is restrictive for those who are not (Government of the Netherlands 2010).[85] The 'Knowledge migrant procedure', implemented in 2004, already made it easier for highly skilled migrants to work in the Netherlands.

It will be interesting to see how this dual migration policy evolves in the near future. The fact that there is an economic need for certain types of migrants does not always mean that they are received with open arms. For instance, if the idea takes root that large numbers of knowledge workers from abroad cause substitution on higher levels of the Dutch labor market, the 'red carpet welcome' for these migrants

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and his followers, saying "I am a Dutchman. I am very proud of my Moroccan blood. I am a Muslim. And I have a fucking Gouden Kalf in my hands." He made the remark about the term 'allochtone' in the talkshow *24 uur met…* broadcasted on 9 January 2012 by VPRO.

[85] 'Culture' probably refers here to the cultural sector.

might crumble as well (cf. Burgers and Touburg, forthcoming). Moreover, even though politicians might see knowledge workers as 'good' migrants, this is not to say that they always feel very welcome in their neighborhoods, at work, in shops, or even when dealing with governmental authorities. As the intermezzo about the American trailing spouse Elle showed, no matter what their national or socioeconomic background is, newcomers are often looked at with suspicion. It would be interesting to further investigate the experiences of knowledge workers who are physically more easily distinguishable from the native Dutch with regard to prejudice and discrimination. This research showed that Surinamese migrants, who are less subject to public debate than their Moroccan or Turkish counterparts, often do encounter anti-immigrant sentiments. Even more so than in the case of knowledge workers from Western countries, like the American trailing spouse Elle, such sentiments might be experienced by knowledge workers from non-Western countries, for instance India or China.

Apart from the fact that knowledge workers' everyday experiences do not always correspond with the warm welcome that the government has in mind, there is another reason why a dual immigration strategy does not necessarily lead to a more attractive living environment for highly skilled migrants. I found that many knowledge workers, in accordance with Florida's (2002) theory about the creative class, prefer to live in an environment that is characterized by diversity and tolerance for differences. Not only because they themselves wish to be tolerated, but also because they find it interesting to spend their time in places that have a 'multicultural' or 'cosmopolitan' character. When the image of the Netherlands as a relatively tolerant country further develops in the direction of a country that keeps out diversity as much as possible, this could be a reason for knowledge workers to go somewhere else, or, if they have no choice but coming here, to leave as soon as they can.

Recommendations for further research

Earlier in this chapter, I have pointed to issues that deserve special attention in future research, such as the link between 'truly' transnational identifications and experienced stigmatization in the country of settlement, the relationship between 'cosmopolitan consumption' and class, the everyday experiences of non-Western knowledge workers, and, more generally, the importance of sub- and supra-national

levels for migrants' activities and identifications. Here, I will further suggest some directions for future research with regard to the subjects of study, the research locations, and the focal points within the distinguished social spheres.

First of all, it would be interesting to conduct a longitudinal study among socioeconomically successful migrant groups, such as the middle-class migrants and knowledge workers studied here. In this research, next to their past migration patterns, I discussed the migrants' future migration plans. However, since such plans often change over time, it would be interesting to interview these migrants again after a period of, say, five years. Have the knowledge workers who said that they planned to leave soon really left? And do the middle-class migrants who fantasized about returning to their country of origin still cherish that dream or have they even realized it? It also would be relevant to follow the migrants' (upward or downward) social mobility, as developments in their labor market position can affect their migration plans in important ways. The middle-class migrants often work in the public sector, such as in social work. Due to public expenditure cuts related to the current economic crisis, some of them might lose their jobs. Middle-aged middle-class migrants who become unemployed might decide to return to their country of origin earlier than planned. The knowledge workers often work for economic sectors that are even more vulnerable to economic trends, such as architecture. Knowledge workers who came to Rotterdam to build a career in an internationally famous architecture firm might not be able to stay and will have to look for opportunities elsewhere.

It would also be interesting to compare the local and transnational involvement of different types of migrants who share a lower instead of a higher socioeconomic position. For instance, a comparison could be made between recently arrived seasonal workers and more established lowly-skilled migrants. Another interesting approach is to compare different types of migrants within a certain national or ethnic group. Colic-Peisker (2006), for instance, compared two cohorts of Croatian immigrants in Australia, of which the first consisted of 'classic' migrants and the second of highly skilled migrants. A similar comparison could be made between, for instance, Chinese migrants who came to the Netherlands (or another destination country, for that matter) some decades ago and those who arrived recently as knowledge workers. Rather than comparing different ethnic groups, which is often done, by 'controlling' for ethnic background, such a research design can provide further in-

sight into the role of class and length of stay in migrants' local, (bi-)national, and 'truly' transnational involvement.

With regard to the subjects of study, I finally suggest inclusion of members of the majority population more often. Although I did not say much about them in this concluding chapter, it was rather interesting to see that members of the native Dutch middle class also develop all kinds of cross-border and border-transcending activities and identifications. For instance, through studying abroad and having relatives in other countries, these 'non-migrants' often have certain bi-national ties. Like the migrant groups, they often also participate in petitions or consumer boycotts that have 'universalistic' purposes. Although related to their migration background and minority position (for instance, being 'black' or Muslim), migrants are more likely to have horizontal and vertical transnational ties, members of the majority population should not be excluded from transnational migration studies beforehand. Attention to natives could nuance the assumption that is implicitly made by migration scholars – and more explicitly by certain politicians – that "simultaneous embeddedness in more than one society" (cf. Levitt and Jaworsky 2007: 131) or dual loyalty is the sole preserve of migrants.

Next to choosing different main characters, it would also be interesting to change the research setting. I presented Rotterdam as an extreme rather than a typical case, since its population is exceptionally diverse, and important political developments, such as the rise of Pim Fortuyn, started there. Does Rotterdam, because of these characteristics, encourage different types of involvement than other Dutch cities? Do smaller cities, such as Delft, also have sufficient critical mass for all sorts of immigrant or expatriate associations, or are migrants there more incorporated into mainstream organizations (cf. Alba and Nee 2003: 100)? The knowledge workers and middle-class migrants in this research often referred to Amsterdam as a city that is more cosmopolitan than Rotterdam, which, according to them, is expressed by the city's openness to different cultures. However, in his study of "Eurostars" – that is, highly skilled Western European workers who moved to another EU country – Favell (2008: 196) found that foreign European citizens in Amsterdam often complain about the difficulties of integrating there, since local communities are rather closed. If such characterizations are used even for the Netherlands' most 'cosmopolitan' city, does that mean that the Dutch society or culture in general makes it difficult for migrants to have the feeling that they belong there?

Although it would also be interesting to investigate the experiences of knowledge workers in different countries, international comparisons are often tricky. When knowledge workers in New York, for instance, feel more at home than those in Amsterdam, it is difficult to determine whether this should be attributed to differences between these migrants (e.g., the sector in which they work, their country of origin, age, and length of stay), to specifics of the city in which they live (e.g., the population composition and organizational infrastructure), or to national differences (e.g., the majority language, migration history, and policies). Nowadays, it seems almost impossible to get funding for research that does not include an international comparison, particularly in the field of migration studies. However, although such comparisons are interesting exactly because of their large scope, comparisons between different groups in one location can provide a more in-depth understanding of issues such as local incorporation and transnational involvement.

Regarding the exact activities and identifications that are taken into account, it would be interesting to look further at the importance of the neighborhood level for socio-cultural involvement and the office level for economic involvement. In the *Transnationalism and Urban Citizenship Survey* that was used in this research, not much attention was paid to the contacts that people have in their neighborhood, while this might be of special importance for their socio-cultural feelings of belonging, particularly in the case of trailing spouses that are stay-at-home moms. Moreover, in my chapter on the economic sphere, I focused mainly on the sectors in which the migrants are employed and how this influences their spatial mobility. Since the survey was initially designed as an instrument to learn more about the migrants' citizenship (so, political incorporation instead of incorporation in general), not much was asked about the specific nature of their work and business contacts. To determine whether the knowledge workers' jobs are really as 'transnational' and the middle-class migrants' jobs as 'local' as I suggested, it would be necessary to further look at their exact practices. Are the knowledge workers' skills indeed easily transferable to other contexts, or do they, during their stay abroad, mainly develop skills that are highly localized? And do the middle-class migrants, perhaps, have more international business contacts than could be expected based on the sectors in which they work?

Depending on the exact questions one wishes to answer, a suitable research method should be chosen. In this research, I was not only interested in the two

groups of migrants' general patterns of involvement on different spatial levels, but also in the stories behind them, which made me choose a mixed-methods approach. The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods made it possible to gain in-depth knowledge about the migrants' incorporation, without losing sight of the bigger picture. I not only used different methods, but also combined different strands of literature. I linked literature about expatriates to that on 'classic' migrant groups, research on transnational political involvement to that on 'unconventional' politics, and I combined insights from urban sociology with those from studies of socio-cultural transnationalism. Such a multidisciplinary design has proven to be very fruitful and therefore deserves to be encouraged. In studying transnational migration, scholars should not only transcend the borders of the nation-state more often, but also those between different methods and disciplines.

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Appendix: Overview of Respondent Characteristics

Table A1: Characteristics of the 225 middle-class migrants

#	National background	Gender	Age	Generation
1	Surinamese	Male	39	1.5
2	Surinamese	Male	48	First
3	Surinamese	Male	47	First
4	Surinamese	Male	26	Second
5	Surinamese	Male	34	1.5
6	Surinamese	Male	33	1.5
7	Surinamese	Male	55	First
8	Surinamese	Male	49	1.5
9	Surinamese	Male	33	1.5
10	Surinamese-Dutch	Male	25	Second
11	Surinamese	Male	20	Second
12	Surinamese	Male	32	1.5
13	Surinamese	Male	30	1.5
14	Surinamese	Male	21	1.5
15	Surinamese	Male	27	1.5
16	Surinamese	Male	45	First
17	Surinamese	Male	30	Second
18	Surinamese	Male	33	1.5
19	Surinamese	Male	41	1.5
20	Surinamese	Male	32	Second
21	Surinamese	Male	29	Second
22	Surinamese	Male	31	Second
23	Surinamese	Male	30	Second
24	Surinamese	Male	36	1.5
25	Surinamese	Male	33	Second
26	Surinamese	Male	27	Second
27	Surinamese	Male	28	Second
28	Surinamese	Male	55	First
29	Surinamese	Male	33	First
30	Surinamese	Male	53	First
31	Surinamese	Male	44	First
32	Surinamese	Male	45	First

33	Surinamese	Male	57	First
34	Surinamese	Male	50	First
35	Surinamese	Male	52	First
36	Surinamese-Dutch	Male	22	Second
37	Surinamese	Male	35	Second
38	Surinamese	Male	35	Second
39	Surinamese	Female	28	1.5
40	Surinamese-Dutch	Female	49	Second
41	Surinamese	Female	50	First
42	Surinamese-British Guyanese	Female	50	1.5
43	Surinamese	Female	35	1.5
44	Surinamese-Dutch	Female	36	Second
45	Surinamese	Female	24	Second
46	Surinamese	Female	25	1.5
47	Surinamese	Female	29	1.5
48	Surinamese	Female	51	1.5
49	Surinamese	Female	50	First
50	Surinamese	Female	53	First
51	Surinamese	Female	34	1.5
52	Surinamese	Female	38	1.5
53	Surinamese-Indonesian	Female	44	Second
54	Surinamese	Female	35	Second
55	Surinamese	Female	39	1.5
56	Surinamese	Female	37	1.5
57	Surinamese	Female	26	Second
58	Surinamese	Female	37	1.5
59	Surinamese	Female	27	Second
60	Surinamese	Female	25	Second
61	Surinamese	Female	56	First
62	Surinamese	Female	35	1.5
63	Surinamese	Female	26	Second
64	Surinamese	Female	62	First
65	Surinamese	Female	57	First
66	Surinamese	Female	31	Second
67	Surinamese	Female	63	First
68	Surinamese	Female	32	First

69	Surinamese	Female	40	First
70	Surinamese	Female	59	First
71	Surinamese-Venezuelan	Female	52	First
72	Surinamese	Female	33	1.5
73	Surinamese	Female	52	First
74	Surinamese	Female	29	1.5
75	Surinamese	Female	36	1.5
76	Turkish-Dutch	Male	28	Second
77	Turkish	Male	45	First
78	Turkish	Male	23	Second
79	Turkish	Male	25	Second
80	Turkish	Male	23	1.5
81	Turkish	Male	29	Second
82	Turkish	Male	47	First
83	Turkish	Male	42	First
84	Turkish	Male	42	First
85	Turkish	Male	25	1.5
86	Turkish	Male	49	First
87	Turkish	Male	29	Second
88	Turkish	Male	42	1.5
89	Turkish	Male	31	1.5
90	Turkish	Male	23	1.5
91	Turkish	Male	29	Second
92	Turkish	Male	43	First
93	Turkish	Male	26	Second
94	Turkish	Male	31	1.5
95	Turkish	Male	35	First
96	Turkish	Male	28	Second
97	Turkish	Male	28	Second
98	Turkish	Male	37	1.5
99	Turkish	Male	29	1.5
100	Turkish	Male	29	Second
101	Turkish	Male	27	Second
102	Turkish	Male	36	1.5
103	Turkish	Male	28	Second
104	Turkish	Male	27	Second
105	Turkish	Male	48	First

106	Turkish	Male	26	Second
107	Turkish	Male	39	1.5
108	Turkish	Male	39	First
109	Turkish	Male	31	Second
110	Turkish	Male	31	Second
111	Turkish	Male	33	First
112	Turkish	Male	30	Second
113	Turkish	Male	36	1.5
114	Turkish	Male	28	1.5
115	Turkish	Male	34	1.5
116	Turkish	Female	25	Second
117	Turkish	Female	27	1.5
118	Turkish	Female	29	Second
119	Turkish	Female	24	Second
120	Turkish	Female	28	Second
121	Turkish	Female	28	Second
122	Turkish	Female	24	Second
123	Turkish	Female	25	Second
124	Turkish	Female	26	Second
125	Turkish	Female	30	1.5
126	Turkish	Female	28	Second
127	Turkish	Female	27	Second
128	Turkish	Female	24	Second
129	Turkish	Female	44	1.5
130	Turkish	Female	39	Second
131	Turkish	Female	28	Second
132	Turkish	Female	42	First
133	Turkish	Female	25	Second
134	Turkish	Female	30	Second
135	Turkish	Female	47	First
136	Turkish	Female	36	1.5
137	Turkish	Female	47	1.5
138	Turkish	Female	41	First
139	Turkish	Female	43	First
140	Turkish	Female	42	First
141	Turkish	Female	45	First
142	Turkish	Female	35	First

143	Turkish	Female	45	First
144	Turkish	Female	38	1.5
145	Turkish	Female	24	Second
146	Turkish	Female	53	First
147	Turkish	Female	30	1.5
148	Turkish	Female	41	First
149	Turkish	Female	24	1.5
150	Turkish	Female	24	Second
151	Moroccan	Male	25	Second
152	Moroccan	Male	48	First
153	Moroccan	Male	29	Second
154	Moroccan	Male	24	Second
155	Moroccan-Algerian	Male	28	Second
156	Moroccan	Male	33	First
157	Moroccan	Male	29	Second
158	Moroccan	Male	25	1.5
159	Moroccan	Male	34	First
160	Moroccan	Male	32	First
161	Moroccan	Male	34	First
162	Moroccan	Male	43	First
163	Moroccan	Male	38	1.5
164	Moroccan	Male	51	First
165	Moroccan	Male	41	First
166	Moroccan	Male	56	First
167	Moroccan	Male	39	First
168	Moroccan	Male	45	First
169	Moroccan	Male	44	First
170	Moroccan	Male	27	1.5
171	Moroccan	Male	28	1.5
172	Moroccan	Male	35	1.5
173	Moroccan	Male	35	1.5
174	Moroccan	Male	37	First
175	Moroccan	Male	40	First
176	Moroccan	Male	25	First
177	Moroccan	Male	35	First
178	Moroccan	Male	32	Second
179	Moroccan	Male	40	First

180	Moroccan	Male	34	Second
181	Moroccan	Male	44	First
182	Moroccan	Male	39	First
183	Moroccan	Male	47	First
184	Moroccan	Male	41	First
185	Moroccan	Male	31	1.5
186	Moroccan	Male	31	Second
187	Moroccan	Male	26	Second
188	Moroccan	Male	29	Second
189	Moroccan	Male	29	Second
190	Moroccan	Female	31	1.5
191	Moroccan	Female	27	Second
192	Moroccan	Female	27	Second
193	Moroccan	Female	27	1.5
194	Moroccan	Female	27	Second
195	Moroccan	Female	25	Second
196	Moroccan-Algerian	Female	43	First
197	Moroccan	Female	49	First
198	Moroccan	Female	46	First
199	Moroccan	Female	43	First
200	Moroccan	Female	32	Second
201	Moroccan	Female	36	1.5
202	Moroccan	Female	28	Second
203	Moroccan	Female	36	1.5
204	Moroccan	Female	28	First
205	Moroccan	Female	36	1.5
206	Moroccan	Female	36	1.5
207	Moroccan	Female	20	Second
208	Moroccan	Female	36	1.5
209	Moroccan	Female	21	Second
210	Moroccan	Female	41	First
211	Moroccan	Female	29	1.5
212	Moroccan	Female	27	Second
213	Moroccan	Female	26	Second
214	Moroccan	Female	28	Second
215	Moroccan	Female	35	1.5
216	Moroccan	Female	41	First

217	Moroccan	Female	32	1.5
218	Moroccan	Female	26	1.5
219	Moroccan	Female	31	Second
220	Moroccan	Female	37	1.5
221	Moroccan	Female	32	1.5
222	Moroccan	Female	30	First
223	Moroccan	Female	25	Second
224	Moroccan	Female	25	Second
225	Moroccan	Female	24	Second

Table A2: Characteristics of the 15 female middle-class migrants interviewed about 'role models'

#	**National background**	**Gender**	**Age**	**Generation**
1	Surinamese	Female	49	First
2	Surinamese	Female	36	1.5
3	Surinamese-Dutch	Female	32	Second
4	Surinamese-Dutch	Female	35	Second
5	Surinamese-Venezuelan	Female	53	First
6	Surinamese	Female	35	1.5
7	Turkish	Female	35	1.5
8	Turkish	Female	43	First
9	Turkish	Female	31	1.5
10	Turkish	Female	37	1.5
11	Moroccan	Female	38	1.5
12	Moroccan	Female	30	1.5
13	Moroccan	Female	42	First
14	Cape Verdean	Female	32	Second
15	Cape Verdean	Female	37	1.5

Table A3: Characteristics of the 75 knowledge workers

#	National background	Gender	Type of respondent	Age	Length of stay in NL
1	American	Male	Knowledge worker	54	1-2 years
2	American	Male	Knowledge worker	42	1-2 years
3	American	Male	Trailing spouse	46	1-2 years
4	American	Female	Knowledge worker	36	2-3 years
5	American	Female	Knowledge worker	27	1-2 years
6	American	Female	Trailing spouse	34	1-2 years
7	American	Female	Trailing spouse	51	2-3 years
8	American	Female	Trailing spouse	44	1-2 years
9	American	Female	Trailing spouse	38	1-2 years
10	American	Female	Trailing spouse	41	1-2 years
11	American-French	Female	Trailing spouse	39	1-2 years
12	English	Male	Knowledge worker	38	1-2 years
13	English-Scottish	Male	Knowledge worker	46	2-3 years
14	English	Female	Trailing spouse	45	3-4 years
15	English	Female	Trailing spouse	44	6-7 years
16	English	Female	Trailing spouse	40	<1 year
17	German	Male	Knowledge worker	32	4-5 years
18	German-Dutch	Male	Knowledge worker	24	<1 year
19	German-Peruvian	Male	Knowledge worker	35	2-3 years
20	German	Female	Knowledge worker	47	1-2 years
21	German	Female	Knowledge worker	28	1-2 years
22	German	Female	Trailing spouse	28	1-2 years
23	German-American	Female	Trailing spouse	39	3-4 years
24	Japanese	Male	Knowledge worker	34	1-2 years
25	Japanese	Male	Knowledge worker	42	1-2 years
26	Japanese	Female	Knowledge worker	32	1-2 years
27	Japanese	Female	Trailing spouse	40	4-5 years
28	Japanese	Female	Trailing spouse	40	1-2 years
29	Portuguese	Female	Knowledge worker	26	2-3 years
30	Portuguese	Female	Knowledge worker	26	2-3 years
31	Portuguese	Female	Knowledge worker	27	4-5 years
32	Portuguese	Female	Knowledge worker	27	4-5 years
33	Indian	Male	Knowledge worker	50	5-6 years

34	Indian	Male	Knowledge worker	26	<1 year
35	Indian	Male	Knowledge worker	36	1-2 years
36	Indian	Female	Trailing spouse	43	2-3 years
37	Polish	Male	Knowledge worker	26	3-4 years
38	Polish	Male	Knowledge worker	29	4-5 years
39	Polish	Female	Knowledge worker	26	1-2 years
40	Polish	Female	Knowledge worker	35	3-4 years
41	Chinese	Male	Knowledge worker	35	6-7 years
42	Chinese	Female	Knowledge worker	30	3-4 years
43	Chinese	Female	Knowledge worker	30	3-4 years
44	South African	Male	Knowledge worker	38	1-2 years
45	South African	Male	Knowledge worker	28	5-6 years
46	South African	Female	Knowledge worker	28	1-2 years
47	South African-English	Female	Trailing spouse	28	1-2 years
48	Italian	Male	Knowledge worker	38	1-2 years
49	Italian-Peruvian	Male	Knowledge worker	31	4-5 years
50	Italian-Tunisian	Female	Knowledge worker	24	2-3 years
51	Spanish	Male	Knowledge worker	31	2-3 years
52	Spanish	Female	Knowledge worker	31	1-2 years
53	Turkish	Male	Knowledge worker	30	4-5 years
54	Turkish	Female	Knowledge worker	26	<1 year
55	French	Female	Knowledge worker	27	1-2 years
56	French	Female	Trailing spouse	41	5-6 years
57	South Korean	Male	Knowledge worker	32	1-2 years
58	South Korean	Male	Knowledge worker	32	1-2 years
59	Greek	Male	Knowledge worker	28	1-2 years
60	Greek	Female	Trailing spouse	45	1-2 years
61	Brazilian	Female	Knowledge worker	29	4-5 years
62	Brazilian	Female	Knowledge worker	29	1-2 years
63	Welsh	Female	Trailing spouse	55	6-7 years
64	Welsh-Irish	Female	Trailing spouse	26	<1 year
65	Scottish	Female	Trailing spouse	46	1-2 years
66	Taiwanese-Dutch	Female	Knowledge worker	20	<1 year
67	Taiwanese-Chinese	Female	Trailing spouse	42	4-5 years
68	Dutch	Male	Knowledge worker	44	1-2 years
69	Belgian	Female	Trailing spouse	35	1-2 years
70	Pakistani	Male	Knowledge worker	34	6-7 years

71	Finnish	Female	Knowledge worker	25	2-3 years
72	Romanian	Female	Knowledge worker	28	1-2 years
73	Albanian	Male	Knowledge worker	32	1-2 years
74	Australian	Female	Knowledge worker	31	1-2 years
75	Czech-Lebanese	Male	Knowledge worker	26	<1 year

Table A4: Characteristics of the 100 middle-class native Dutch

#	**National background**	**Gender**	**Age**
1	Dutch	Male	26
2	Dutch	Male	26
3	Dutch	Male	25
4	Dutch	Male	24
5	Dutch	Male	47
6	Dutch	Male	27
7	Dutch	Male	25
8	Dutch	Male	26
9	Dutch	Male	33
10	Dutch	Male	34
11	Dutch	Male	43
12	Dutch	Male	29
13	Dutch	Male	41
14	Dutch	Male	26
15	Dutch	Male	32
16	Dutch	Male	28
17	Dutch	Male	28
18	Dutch	Male	55
19	Dutch	Male	54
20	Dutch	Male	29
21	Dutch	Male	35
22	Dutch	Male	38
23	Dutch	Male	32
24	Dutch	Male	33
25	Dutch	Male	54
26	Dutch	Male	28
27	Dutch	Male	30

28	Dutch	Male	33
29	Dutch	Male	27
30	Dutch	Male	32
31	Dutch	Male	25
32	Dutch	Male	25
33	Dutch	Male	27
34	Dutch	Male	23
35	Dutch	Male	26
36	Dutch	Male	34
37	Dutch	Male	46
38	Dutch	Male	24
39	Dutch	Male	53
40	Dutch	Male	53
41	Dutch	Male	25
42	Dutch	Male	25
43	Dutch	Male	29
44	Dutch	Male	31
45	Dutch	Male	30
46	Dutch	Male	40
47	Dutch	Male	30
48	Dutch	Male	51
49	Dutch	Male	47
50	Dutch	Male	37
51	Dutch	Male	30
52	Dutch	Female	32
53	Dutch	Female	34
54	Dutch	Female	38
55	Dutch	Female	27
56	Dutch	Female	40
57	Dutch	Female	44
58	Dutch	Female	59
59	Dutch	Female	51
60	Dutch	Female	33
61	Dutch	Female	28
62	Dutch	Female	35
63	Dutch	Female	25
64	Dutch	Female	29

65	Dutch	Female	36
66	Dutch	Female	35
67	Dutch	Female	29
68	Dutch	Female	52
69	Dutch	Female	25
70	Dutch	Female	48
71	Dutch	Female	37
72	Dutch	Female	23
73	Dutch	Female	29
74	Dutch	Female	27
75	Dutch	Female	43
76	Dutch	Female	50
77	Dutch	Female	29
78	Dutch	Female	30
79	Dutch	Female	37
80	Dutch	Female	27
81	Dutch	Female	23
82	Dutch	Female	24
83	Dutch	Female	24
84	Dutch	Female	24
85	Dutch	Female	25
86	Dutch	Female	26
87	Dutch	Female	27
88	Dutch	Female	24
89	Dutch	Female	26
90	Dutch	Female	47
91	Dutch	Female	55
92	Dutch	Female	32
93	Dutch	Female	23
94	Dutch	Female	26
95	Dutch	Female	46
96	Dutch	Female	42
97	Dutch	Female	54
98	Dutch	Female	39
99	Dutch	Female	29
100	Dutch	Female	55

Dutch Summary

Meervoudig thuis: de transnationale en lokale betrokkenheid van economisch succesvolle migranten

Inleiding

Dit proefschrift gaat over de ruimtelijke schaal van de activiteiten en identificaties van twee succesvolle migrantengroepen: leden van 'klassieke' migrantengroeperingen in Nederland (Surinamers, Turken en Marokkanen) die een middenklassenstatus hebben bereikt en kennismigranten uit westerse en niet-westerse landen die voor hun werk veelal tijdelijk naar Nederland zijn gekomen. Het bestuderen van de lokale, nationale en grensoverschrijdende bindingen van deze groepen is van belang in het licht van recente discussies over *transnationalisme*, meestal opgevat als de banden die migranten onderhouden met hun herkomstland. Er wordt vaak beweerd dat dergelijke banden door ontwikkelingen op het gebied van mobiliteit (zoals frequentere en goedkopere vluchten) en communicatie (in het bijzonder betere en goedkopere telefoon- en internetverbindingen) de afgelopen decennia steeds meer voorkomen en intenser zijn geworden. Transnationalisme wordt door critici wel een *'catch-all term'* genoemd: het concept is in de loop der tijd voor zulke verschillende verschijnselen gebruikt, dat de betekenis ervan steeds vager is geworden. In dit onderzoek is het begrip transnationalisme daarom nader gespecificeerd en gecontextualiseerd. Omdat het '-isme' in transnationalisme volgens sommigen wijst op een ideologie, richt ik me op het empirisch vaststellen van *transnationale betrokkenheid*, opgevat als transnationale activiteiten en identificaties.

Theoretische achtergrond en onderzoeksvragen

De term transnationale betrokkenheid werk ik in *Hoofdstuk 1* uit op basis van wat er in de bestaande literatuur bekend is over de *substantie* (wat is het?), de *subjecten* (wie geven het gestalte?) en de *sferen* (waar vindt het plaats?) van transnationalisme.

Er zijn twee belangrijke lijnen van kritiek op wat transnationalisme is. Ten eerste menen veel auteurs dat er geen noodzaak bestond om een nieuw concept te introduceren voor bindingen die migranten na hun vertrek hebben met het her-

komstland, aangezien dit verschijnsel zich altijd al heeft voorgedaan. Na verloop van tijd worden deze bindingen zwakker: migranten richten zich steeds meer op het vestigingsland en steeds minder op het herkomstland. Ondanks het feit dat landsgrensoverschrijdende contacten door allerlei technologieën vergemakkelijkt zijn, blijft assimilatie of integratie volgens deze critici ook voor hedendaagse migranten de norm. Een tweede kritiekpunt betreft het voorvoegsel 'trans'. Dit heeft de betekenis van 'overstijgen', wat volgens sommigen impliceert dat onderzoek naar transnationalisme zich zou moeten richten op relaties die de grenzen van de natiestaat te boven gaan of 'transcenderen'. In transnationale migratiestudies wordt meestal gekeken naar 'bi-nationale' in plaats van naar dergelijke 'echt' transnationale bindingen. Met andere woorden: *horizontale* bindingen met twee natiestaten staan centraal, in plaats van bindingen die de natiestaat daadwerkelijk *verticaal* overstijgen. Vooral dit laatste kritiekpunt is van belang voor deze studie. Ik kijk niet alleen naar 'bi-nationale' of 'horizontaal transnationale' activiteiten en identificaties, maar ook naar 'echt' transnationale of 'verticaal transnationale' vormen van betrokkenheid. Daarnaast besteed ik, net als degenen die beweren dat transnationalisme slechts een tijdelijk verschijnsel is, aandacht aan de verhouding tussen transnationale betrokkenheid en incorporatie of inbedding in het land van vestiging.

De subjecten van deze studie zijn twee soorten sociaaleconomisch succesvolle migranten in Nederland. Waar veel studies over transnationalisme zich richten op één of meer verschillende *etnische* groepen, kijk ik naar twee migrantengroepen die op basis van het *type migratiestroom* waarvan zij deel uitmaken als zeer verschillend worden beschouwd. De middenklassenmigranten hebben een Surinaamse, Turkse of Marokkaanse achtergrond (d.w.z. ze zijn zelf in dat land geboren of ten minste een van hun ouders is daar geboren) en zijn meestal kinderen van voormalige koloniale migranten en gastarbeiders. Deze groepen worden in de bestaande literatuur vaak tot de 'klassieke' migranten gerekend. De kennismigranten, ook wel expats genoemd, zijn relatief kortgeleden vanwege hun werk (of dat van hun partner) naar Nederland gekomen en komen uit landen als de Verenigde Staten, het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Duitsland, Polen, Japan, China en India. Dergelijke migranten worden als voorbeeld gezien van een 'nieuw' migratiepatroon; van hen wordt verondersteld dat zij zich slechts tijdelijk vestigen en daarom geografisch meer mobiel zijn dan 'klassieke' migranten. In totaal zijn er 225 middenklassenmigranten geïnterviewd en 75 kennismigranten. (Daarnaast zijn er ter vergelijking nog 100 autochtone middenklas-

sers in Rotterdam geïnterviewd. In deze samenvatting zal ik echter niet nader ingaan op de bevindingen ten aanzien van deze groep.)

Het vergelijken van de transnationale betrokkenheid van middenklassenmigranten en kennismigranten is om meerdere redenen interessant. Allereerst bestaan er tegengestelde verwachtingen over de *aard* van hun betrokkenheid: van 'klassieke' migranten wordt verwacht dat zij vooral bi-nationale (of horizontaal transnationale) bindingen hebben, terwijl 'nieuwe' migranten zich niet met specifieke plekken verbonden zouden voelen, maar meer met de wereld als geheel (verticaal transnationale bindingen). Dergelijke verschillen worden echter vooral verondersteld in plaats van daadwerkelijk onderzocht; onderzoek waarin beide groepen vergeleken worden is zeldzaam.

Op basis van literatuur over transnationalisme kunnen ook verwachtingen worden geformuleerd over de *intensiteit* van de transnationale betrokkenheid van beide typen migranten. Zo wordt vaak gesteld dat verblijfsduur een rol speelt: hoe langer de verhuizing geleden is, des te zwakker de bindingen met het herkomstland zouden zijn. De kennismigranten zouden dan meer transnationaal betrokken zijn dan de middenklassenmigranten. Daarnaast is ook de economische positie van migranten van belang: op basis van hun baan – de meeste middenklassenmigranten werken op hbo-niveau, de meeste kennismigranten op universitair niveau – kan verwacht worden dat beide groepen voldoende economisch en cultureel kapitaal hebben om transnationale activiteiten te ondernemen. Ten slotte wordt verwacht dat juridische status een rol speelt bij de mate van transnationale betrokkenheid. Migranten die alleen de nationaliteit van het herkomstland hebben (zoals de meeste kennismigranten), worden verwacht vooral in dat land politiek actief te zijn, terwijl migranten die de nationaliteit van het land van vestiging hebben (zoals de meeste middenklassenmigranten) vooral in het gastland actief zouden zijn.

Of, en zo ja hoe, de ruimtelijke schaal van de betrokkenheid van middenklassenmigranten en kennismigranten daadwerkelijk verschilt onderzoek ik wat betreft drie sociale domeinen of sferen: de economische, politieke en sociaal-culturele sfeer. Een dergelijk onderscheid is gebruikelijk in de literatuur over transnationalisme. Zo is aangetoond dat de politieke betrokkenheid van migranten bij hun herkomstland meestal gering is, terwijl geld sturen naar familieleden vaak voorkomt. De sociaal-culturele sfeer wordt meestal als een restcategorie gebruikt. Allerlei soorten activiteiten, maar vooral ook gevoelsmatige bindingen gericht op het herkomstland worden

onder deze noemer geschaard. Mijn benadering wijkt op twee manieren af van die van het gebruikelijke onderzoek. Ten eerste kijk ik voor elk van de drie genoemde sferen naar zowel activiteiten als identiteiten. Identificaties zijn immers niet per definitie van sociaal-culturele aard. Ten tweede besteed ik speciale aandacht aan de relatie tussen de drie sferen, bijvoorbeeld aan de vraag of de economische positie van kennismigranten en middenklassenmigranten invloed heeft op hun lokale en transnationale sociaal-culturele betrokkenheid.

Op basis van mijn benadering van de substantie, subjecten en sferen van transnationale betrokkenheid, formuleer ik de volgende onderzoeksvragen:

1. Wat is de ruimtelijke schaal van de activiteiten en identificaties van middenklassenmigranten en kennismigranten in de economische, politieke en sociaal-culturele sfeer?

2. Welke verschillen en overeenkomsten bestaan er tussen de activiteiten en identificaties van de twee groepen migranten en hoe kunnen deze worden verklaard?

3. Wat is de relatie tussen de activiteiten en identificaties van de twee groepen migranten in de economische, politieke en sociaal-culturele sfeer?

Als onderzoekslocatie is gekozen voor de stad Rotterdam. Hoewel de gelijktijdige inbedding van migranten in de landen van herkomst en vestiging vaak op nationaal niveau wordt bestudeerd, zijn steden strategische plekken om transnationale betrokkenheid te onderzoeken. In steden leven allerlei groepen mensen met uiteenlopende achtergronden bij elkaar, waardoor er draagvlak is voor verschillende soorten organisaties die transnationale activiteiten kunnen ondersteunen en versterken. Daarnaast is het feit dat stedelingen voortdurend worden geconfronteerd met stadsgenoten met een andere afkomst een interessant gegeven voor het bestuderen van identificaties: met wie voelen ze zich verbonden en met wie niet?

Onderzoeksmethode

In *Hoofdstuk 2* licht ik de specifieke kenmerken van de stad Rotterdam als onderzoekslocatie verder toe, zoals het feit dat Rotterdam wat betreft bevolkingssamenstelling een van de meest diverse steden van Nederland is en dat de politieke ontwikkelingen in de stad – met name ten aanzien van het debat rond immigratie en integratie – trendzettend zijn gebleken voor de rest van het land. Daarnaast ga ik in dit hoofdstuk nader in op de onderzoeksopzet. De onderzoeksvragen worden beantwoord op basis van een combinatie van kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve methoden. Er zijn in totaal 400 interviews afgenomen waarin vragen zijn gesteld over onder andere arbeid, sociale contacten, politieke activiteiten, vrijwilligerswerk en identificatie met verschillende groepen en plaatsen.

Omdat de respondenten aan verschillende eisen moesten voldoen, zoals een bepaald baanniveau en een bepaalde verblijfsduur, was het niet mogelijk een steekproef te trekken uit de totale populatie migranten in Rotterdam. Er is gebruik gemaakt van de sneeuwbalmethode: respondenten is gevraagd of ze nog andere mensen kennen die aan de selectiecriteria voldoen en aan het onderzoek zouden kunnen meewerken. Om niet te veel mensen te werven binnen hetzelfde netwerk, zijn via contacten bij bedrijven en andere organisaties steeds nieuwe 'sneeuwballen' aan het rollen gebracht.

Aangezien er geen sprake is van een aselecte steekproef, kunnen de resultaten van dit onderzoek niet gegeneraliseerd worden naar andere middenklassenmigranten en kennismigranten in Rotterdam. Het doel van dit onderzoek is echter niet het toetsen van hypothesen, maar het verkrijgen van inzicht in hoe de beide migrantengroepen betrokken zijn op de verschillende geografische niveaus en maatschappelijke sferen waarvan zij deel uitmaken. De data zijn verzameld en geanalyseerd om het algemene theoretische debat over transnationalisme verder te brengen, vooral door bestaande theorieën aan te scherpen.

Empirische bevindingen

In de drie empirische hoofdstukken bespreek ik de bevindingen met betrekking tot de economische, politieke en sociaal-culturele sfeer. Na ieder hoofdstuk volgt een

intermezzo waarin kort aandacht wordt besteed aan een specifiek thema dat gerelateerd is aan de bediscussieerde sfeer.

Langer blijven of op zoek naar meer?

Elk hoofdstuk begint met uiteenlopende verwachtingen over de transnationale betrokkenheid van migranten op grond van eerder onderzoek. In *Hoofdstuk 3*, over de economische sfeer, is dat de verwachting dat kennismigranten hypermobiele 'kosmopolieten' of 'carrièrejagers' zijn, terwijl middenklassenmigranten slechts eenmalig gemigreerd zijn en meer geworteld zijn in zowel het land van vestiging als herkomst. Deze verwachting wordt deels bevestigd door de resultaten van dit onderzoek. De kennismigranten zijn vooral werkzaam in internationaal georiënteerde sectoren, zoals de olie- en voedselindustrie, transport en architectuur, terwijl de middenklassenmigranten vooral werken in lokaal of nationaal georiënteerde sectoren, zoals welzijnswerk, basis- en voortgezet onderwijs en politie en justitie. Kennismigranten zien hierdoor vaak meer carrièremogelijkheden in het buitenland dan middenklassenmigranten. Als middenklassenmigranten aan een terugkeer naar het herkomstland denken, is dat meestal een plan dat ze pas na hun pensionering willen uitvoeren.

In andere opzichten lijken de kennismigranten echter veel meer op 'klassieke' migranten dan vaak wordt gesuggereerd. Voor velen van hen is het verblijf in Nederland pas hun eerste ervaring in het buitenland. Bovendien verdwijnt de gedachte om te vertrekken bij veel kennismigranten naar de achtergrond, omdat ze net als de middenklassenmigranten op allerlei manieren verbonden zijn geraakt met de stad en het land waarin ze leven. Ze hebben bijvoorbeeld een Nederlandse partner ontmoet, hebben kinderen die hier naar school gaan of hebben moeite gedaan om de Nederlandse taal te leren. Het heeft energie gekost om te 'integreren' en velen willen dat proces op korte termijn niet nog een keer doormaken. Ondanks het feit dat ze wat hun werk betreft dus minder geografisch gebonden zijn dan de middenklassenmigranten, spelen ook bij de kennismigranten allerlei sociaal-culturele factoren een doorslaggevende rol bij hun migratieplannen.

In het eerste intermezzo staat de weg naar economisch succes centraal die vijftien vrouwelijke middenklassenmigranten hebben afgelegd en wordt de vraag gesteld of zij zichzelf zien als rolmodel voor andere vrouwen met een niet-

Nederlandse achtergrond. Het blijkt dat de vrouwen, ondanks het feit dat ze trots zijn op hun afkomst, niet gezien willen worden als een 'allochtoon rolmodel'. Ze willen wat hun werk betreft alleen afgerekend worden op hun prestaties, niet op toegeschreven kenmerken zoals geslacht, huidskleur of herkomstland. Dit is opvallend, aangezien identificaties op basis van etnische en religieuze achtergrond in andere sferen een belangrijke rol blijken te spelen.

Verschillende vormen van burgerschap

In *Hoofdstuk 4* onderzoek ik de positie van beide migrantengroepen in de politieke sfeer. Door sommige politici wordt wel beweerd dat een dubbele nationaliteit een dubbele loyaliteit inhoudt. Alleen migranten die enkel de Nederlandse nationaliteit hebben zouden zich als volwaardig burger met hun land van vestiging identificeren. Volgens deze redenering zijn verschillende aspecten van burgerschap inherent met elkaar verbonden. Dit blijkt niet te kloppen wanneer onder de beide migrantengroepen gekeken wordt naar de samenhang tussen burgerschap als formele status, als activiteit en als identiteit. De middenklassenmigranten en kennismigranten hechten over het algemeen weinig emotionele waarde aan hun nationaliteit(en); vele zien dit slechts als een praktische kwestie. Turkse en Marokkaanse middenklassenmigranten, die bijna allemaal een dubbele nationaliteit hebben, zijn nauwelijks actief in de politiek van hun herkomstland. Het feit dat de middenklassenmigranten bijna allemaal stemmen bij de Nederlandse lokale en/of nationale verkiezingen betekent niet per definitie dat zij zich ook Nederlander voelen. Zowel de middenklassenmigranten als de kennismigranten identificeren zich vaak sterker met hun eigen etnische groep dan met Nederlanders, vooral op basis van factoren als familiebanden en cultuur.

Een andere opvatting van zowel politici als academici is dat de politieke betrokkenheid van migranten verbonden is aan de natiestaat: ze zijn actief in en identificeren zich met het land van vestiging en/of het land van herkomst. In dit onderzoek heb ik echter ook gekeken naar vormen van betrokkenheid die nationale grenzen overstijgen. Deze blijken in de politieke sfeer zeer belangrijk te zijn. Terwijl zogenaamd 'conventionele' politieke activiteiten (zoals deelnemen aan verkiezingen) in hoge mate aan de natiestaat verbonden zijn, zijn meer 'onconventionele' activiteiten (zoals het deelnemen aan demonstraties, petities en boycotacties) vaak gericht op

landsgrensoverstijgende kwesties, zoals kinderarbeid, de ongelijkheid tussen blank en zwart en conflicten in het Midden-Oosten.

In het tweede intermezzo besteed ik specifiek aandacht aan boycotacties, die bijna altijd gebaseerd zijn op 'echt' transnationale politieke betrokkenheid. Er blijkt een verschil te bestaan tussen de doelen van de acties van middenklassenmigranten en kennismigranten. Terwijl de kennismigranten zich vooral richten op 'universalistische' kwesties, zoals universele mensenrechten, dierenwelzijn en milieuproblematiek, zijn er onder de middenklasse ook veel migranten die zich bezighouden met meer 'particularistische' kwesties, gerelateerd aan hun religie, etnische herkomst of migratieachtergrond. Zo boycotten veel respondenten die moslim zijn Amerikaanse producten vanwege de oorlog in Irak en Israëlische producten vanwege de Palestijnse kwestie; Surinaamse migranten van Creoolse herkomst boycotten Zuid-Afrikaanse producten vanwege de onderdrukking van de zwarte bevolking in dat land; en migranten van verschillende komaf boycotten de kleding van Tommy Hilfiger, omdat deze gezegd zou hebben dat zijn kleding niet voor etnische minderheden bedoeld is. Het zou interessant zijn nader te onderzoeken of er een verband is tussen dergelijke vormen van 'pan-religieuze' en 'pan-etnische' solidariteit en ervaren stigmatisering in het land van vestiging.

Gemeenschapsbanden binnen en buiten de stad

Hoofdstuk 5 bespreekt de ruimtelijke schaal van de sociaal-culturele betrokkenheid van beide migrantengroepen. In de voorgaande hoofdstukken is al gebleken dat de sociale contacten en culturele banden die migranten hebben met bepaalde plekken en groepen mensen van belang zijn bij hun toekomstige migratieplannen, hun identificatie met het herkomstland en hun transnationale politieke solidariteit. Hier onderzoek ik in hoeverre sociaal-culturele identificaties en activiteiten de grenzen van de natiestaat horizontaal passeren en verticaal overstijgen. Ik maak daarbij gebruik van inzichten uit transnationale migratiestudies en stadssociologische studies. Vanuit het perspectief van migratiestudies is transnationalisme in deze sfeer bij uitstek van belang, omdat migranten steeds eenvoudiger contacten kunnen onderhouden met familieleden en vrienden die op grote afstand wonen. Volgens inzichten uit de urbane sociologie zijn allerlei 'communale' banden inderdaad minder aan de directe

leefomgeving gebonden, maar gaat het meer om een verplaatsing van de stad naar het randstedelijk gebied dan om een verplaatsing naar het buitenland.

In het geval van gevoelens van verbondenheid met bepaalde plaatsen, ook wel *'place attachment'* genoemd, blijkt een transnationaal perspectief van belang. Migranten uit beide groepen voelen zich verbonden met allerlei verre oorden op basis van daadwerkelijke contacten (bijvoorbeeld met familieleden) of bijzondere ervaringen uit het verleden (bijvoorbeeld een studieperiode of vakantie), maar ook op basis van meer abstracte gevoelens van toebehoren. Pan-religieuze en pan-etnische identificaties blijken ook hier belangrijk. Migranten die moslim zijn voelen zich bijvoorbeeld verbonden met Mekka en Hindoestaans-Surinaamse migranten identificeren zich met India. Ook onder kennismigranten komen dergelijke abstracte identificaties veelvuldig voor. Zij voelen zich bijvoorbeeld verbonden met New York en Londen, vanwege het 'kosmopolitische' karakter van deze steden.

De sociaal-culturele activiteiten van beide migrantengroepen zijn echter veel minder landsgrensoverschrijdend. Communale banden – gedefinieerd als banden met familie en vrienden, banden op basis van participatie in het maatschappelijk middenveld (*'civil society'*) en banden op basis van recreatieve activiteiten – blijken in veel gevallen *lokale* banden te zijn. Wat betreft sociale netwerken is dit vooral bij middenklassenmigranten het geval: hun naaste familie en de meerderheid van hun vrienden wonen vaak in dezelfde stad als zij of elders in Nederland. De familie en vrienden van kennismigranten wonen vaker in het land van herkomst, maar het hebben van vrienden in de nabije omgeving wordt ook door deze migranten als erg belangrijk gezien. Activiteiten in de *civil society*, zoals vrijwilligerswerk voor migrantenorganisaties, scholen of sportverenigingen, vinden bij beide groepen vooral in de stad zelf plaats. De etnische en expat-organisaties waar velen zich voor inzetten zijn niet alleen gevestigd in Rotterdam, maar ook gericht op de lokale bevolking en niet – zoals in de literatuur over transnationalisme vaak wordt gesuggereerd – op de bevolking van het herkomstland of andere landen. Ook recreatieve activiteiten, zoals winkelen, uitgaan en het bezoeken van tentoonstellingen, spelen zich grotendeels in de woonplaats af. Hoewel veel migranten zich identificeren met steden als New York of Istanbul, gaan ze voor een wekelijks of maandelijks 'kosmopolitisch' uitje vaak hooguit naar Amsterdam.

In het derde en laatste intermezzo laat ik aan de hand van het verhaal van Elle, een Amerikaanse vrouw die vanwege het werk van haar man naar Nederland

is gekomen, zien hoe moeilijk 'integratie' kan zijn. Veel kennismigranten proberen meer te zijn dan een passant, bijvoorbeeld door de taal te leren en contact te leggen met de gevestigde bevolking, maar hebben het gevoel dat de ontvangende samenleving hen buitensluit. Hoewel hun dagelijks leven zich grotendeels hier afspeelt, blijft het voor veel kennismigranten moeilijk om Nederland echt als 'thuis' te zien.

Conclusies

Op basis van de empirische hoofdstukken en intermezzo's kunnen drie belangrijke conclusies worden getrokken als antwoord op de geformuleerde onderzoeksvragen:

1. *De betrokkenheid van migranten is sterk gefragmenteerd.* Er kunnen geen algemene uitspraken worden gedaan over het belang van transnationalisme, aangezien transnationale betrokkenheid in de ene sfeer niet per definitie samengaat met betrokkenheid in de andere sfeer. Zo zijn veel middenklassenmigranten wel in sociaal-culturele zin betrokken bij het herkomstland, maar niet in politieke zin. Voor de kennismigranten geldt hetzelfde, maar dan vooral ten aanzien van hun positie in Nederland. Daarnaast gaan transnationale identificaties niet altijd gepaard met transnationale activiteiten. Gevoelens van verbondenheid zijn vaak gebaseerd op abstracte ideeën over culturele of etnische verwantschap, in plaats van op concrete contacten of ervaringen. Er is sprake van gefragmenteerde betrokkenheid. In bestaande literatuur wordt wel een onderscheid gemaakt tussen verschillende betekenissen van het begrip 'thuis': ergens *thuis horen* (op basis van formele status), *thuis zijn* (op basis van dagelijkse activiteiten) en *thuis voelen* (gebaseerd op emotionele verbondenheid). Dit onderzoek toont aan dat deze verschillende vormen van 'thuis' tegelijkertijd voorkomen op verschillende ruimtelijke schaalniveaus. De middenklassenmigranten en kennismigranten zijn formeel lid van één of meerdere natiestaten. Hun dagelijkse bezigheden, zoals arbeid en recreatie, vinden vooral lokaal plaats, in de stad waar zij wonen. Hun emotionele bindingen hebben echter een veel grotere reikwijdte, waarbij nationale grenzen vaak geen rol spelen.

2. *De twee typen migranten lijken veel meer op elkaar dan wordt verondersteld.* In bestaande literatuur worden verschillen tussen migranten die behoren tot een zogenaamd 'klassiek' en 'nieuw' migratiepatroon vaak verondersteld, maar nauwelijks onder-

zocht. Dit onderzoek toont aan dat de overeenkomsten tussen beide typen migranten in veel opzichten groter zijn dan de verschillen. Anders dan wordt gedacht hebben kennismigranten net als 'klassieke' groepen vaak een sterke binding met het herkomstland en hebben middenklassenmigranten net als expats allerlei landsgrensoverstijgende bindingen. De variabelen sociaaleconomische status, verblijfsduur en juridische status blijken voor verschillende vormen van transnationale betrokkenheid een andere rol te spelen dan verwacht. Zo blijkt vooral het type sector en niet zozeer het inkomen of het opleidingsniveau van belang te zijn bij de verschillen in geografische mobiliteit tussen kennismigranten en middenklassenmigranten. Bovendien blijkt dat migranten die langer geleden gemigreerd zijn wel minder vaak activiteiten ondernemen die gericht zijn op het herkomstland dan migranten bij wie de migratie korter geleden is, maar dat transnationale gevoelens van verbondenheid – zowel in horizontale als verticale betekenis – minder samenhangen met verblijfsduur. Ten slotte zegt de burgerschapsstatus die migranten hebben weinig over hun activiteiten. Zo zijn middenklassenmigranten met een dubbele nationaliteit nauwelijks actief in de politiek van het herkomstland en worden er allerlei lokale en 'echt' transnationale politieke activiteiten ondernomen waarvoor formeel lidmaatschap geen vereiste is. Verrassend genoeg blijkt het aannemen van de Nederlandse nationaliteit de gerichtheid op Nederland soms eerder te verminderen dan te versterken. Veel middenklassenmigranten hebben de Nederlandse nationaliteit aangenomen om meer actief te kunnen zijn in het buitenland, vooral als toerist in Europa, maar soms ook op de huwelijksmarkt in het land van herkomst.

3. *Het lokale en 'echt' transnationale niveau zijn van groot belang.* Hoewel in veel onderzoek transnationalisme feitelijk vaak op bi-nationaal niveau wordt onderzocht – d.w.z. op het niveau van het land van vestiging en het land van herkomst – blijkt uit dit onderzoek dat schaalniveaus boven en onder de natiestaat zeer belangrijk zijn voor de activiteiten en identificaties van de twee migrantengroepen. Zowel politieke solidariteit als emotionele binding met bepaalde mensen of plaatsen is vaak gebaseerd op verticale in plaats van horizontale transnationale identificatie. Met andere woorden, niet op een gedeeld herkomstland, maar op een gedeelde religie, geschiedenis, minderheidspositie of het gevoel wereldburger te zijn. Deze landsgrensoverstijgende 'verbeelde gemeenschappen' verdienen meer aandacht in toekomstig onderzoek. Datzelfde geldt voor gemeenschappen op lokaal niveau. De middenklas-

senmigranten en kennismigranten blijken op allerlei manieren in de stad te zijn geïncorporeerd of ingebed. De migranten in dit onderzoek wonen niet alleen in Rotterdam, vele werken er ook, hebben er vrienden en brengen er hun vrije tijd door met activiteiten als winkelen en uitgaan, maar ook als vrijwilliger in lokaalgerichte etnische of expat-organisaties. Bovendien voelen velen zich ook emotioneel verbonden met de stad: 'Rotterdammer' zijn betekent voor velen deel uitmaken van een divers samengestelde bevolking, terwijl het 'Nederlander' zijn meer geassocieerd wordt met het hebben van een Nederlandse herkomst.

Discussie

Bovenstaande conclusies zijn niet alleen interessant in het licht van het wetenschappelijke debat over transnationalisme, maar ook voor meer algemene discussies over migratie en integratie. Door verschillende politieke partijen wordt migratie in toenemende mate gezien als een problematisch verschijnsel dat moet worden teruggedrongen. Het 'falen' van de integratie van al aanwezige groepen wordt als argument gebruikt om een verdere instroom te beperken. Hoewel in het wetenschappelijke debat een gedifferentieerder beeld wordt geschetst – bijvoorbeeld door onderscheid te maken tussen verschillende etnische groepen – is er ook in dit veld meer aandacht voor migranten die een 'probleem' vormen, bijvoorbeeld vanwege hun achterstand op het gebied van onderwijs en arbeidsmarkt of hun oververtegenwoordiging in criminaliteit, dan voor migranten met maatschappelijk succes.

Ook al gaan discussies over falende integratie niet in eerste instantie over hen, middenklassenmigranten voelen zich wel vaak aangesproken door de negatieve berichtgeving; vele hebben het gevoel dat ze altijd als een 'allochtoon' gezien zullen worden en voor sommige is dit zelfs een reden om te willen terugkeren naar hun geboorteland of, in het geval van de tweede generatie, het geboorteland van hun ouders. In termen van de eerder genoemde vormen van 'thuis': hoewel deze migranten formeel *thuishoren* in Nederland – de meeste hebben een Nederlands paspoort – en via wonen, werken en recreëren in praktische zin *thuis zijn* in Nederland, is het *thuisgevoel* bij vele de laatste jaren afgenomen. Dit is een belangrijke uitkomst voor politici en beleidsmakers, die de laatste jaren juist de nadruk hebben gelegd op 'de Nederlandse identiteit' als bindende factor. Als migranten alleen van Holland moe-

ten houden en deze liefde niet wederzijds is, zal een nadruk op identiteit en loyaliteit een averechts effect hebben.

Ook het selectieve migratiebeleid dat de Nederlandse overheid de laatste jaren heeft ontwikkeld kan contraproductieve gevolgen hebben. Doel van dit beleid is om 'talentvolle' migranten – zoals de kennismigranten uit dit onderzoek – aan te trekken en tegelijkertijd de komst van andere groepen zo veel mogelijk te beperken. Veel kennismigranten geven echter de voorkeur aan een diverse, open en tolerante leefomgeving. Hoewel de kennismigranten zich, anders dan de middenklassenmigranten, niet gestigmatiseerd voelen door anti-immigratiesentiment, zijn vele wel bezorgd over de populariteit van – in hun ogen – 'xenofobe' denkbeelden. Als het strikte migratie- en integratiebeleid het internationale imago van Nederland gaan overheersen, kan dat schadelijk zijn voor de aantrekkelijkheid van ons land als vestigingsplaats voor kennismigranten.

Curriculum Vitae

Marianne van Bochove (Rozenburg, 1983) obtained her Master's degree in Sociology (*cum laude*) at the Erasmus University Rotterdam in 2006. Based on her thesis about the normalization of Dutch Travelers in the city of Dordrecht she co-authored two articles with Jack Burgers, published in *Sociologie* and the *British Journal of Criminology*. In 2007, she started as a PhD student on the project Transnationalism and Urban Citizenship, also at the Erasmus University. In 2009, she obtained a two-year scholarship from the 'Settling Into Motion' program of the German *ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius*. She wrote several articles (some with Katja Rusinovic and Godfried Engbersen) about transnational political participation, published in *Beleid en Maatschappij*, *Global Networks*, and the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*.

Marianne has written several reports commissioned by or directed at local and national governments, as well as non-governmental organizations, about immigrant women as 'role models' (published by *Sociaal Platform Rotterdam*), the local citizenship of middle-class migrants in Rotterdam, and the position of knowledge workers in Rotterdam and The Hague (both together with Katja Rusinovic and Godfried Engbersen and published by *Nicis Institute*). Besides her PhD project, Marianne worked as a research assistant at the *Rotterdamse Raad voor Kunst and Cultuur* (RRKC), taking part in the organization of a series of debates on contemporary urban citizenship. For more and up-to-date information about Marianne's academic and professional activities, please see www.mariannevanbochove.nl.